CVE-2025-22620

Summary

gix-worktree-state specifies 0777 permissions when checking out executable files, intending that the umask will restrict them appropriately. But one of the strategies it uses to set permissions is not subject to the umask. This causes files in a repository to be world-writable in some situations.

Details

Git repositories track executable bits for regular files. In tree objects and the index, regular file modes are stored as 0644 if not executable, or 0755 if executable. But this is independent of how the permissions are set in the filesystem (where supported).

gix_worktree_state::checkout has two strategies for checking out a file and marking it executable on a Unix-like operating system, one of which is vulnerable:

• If the file is created by assuming it does not already exist, correct permissions are applied, because permissions specified when opening a file are subject to the umask.
• If the file is considered possibly already to exist—even in a clean checkout if the application does not specify the option to treat the destination directory as empty—then permissions conferring unrestricted access to any user account on the system are wrongly applied, because permissions specified when calling chmod on an existing file are not subject to the umask. 

Specifically, checkout::entry::checkout chooses the strategy for each file. The same strategy is usually chosen for each executable file, if no process (i.e. long running) smudge filter is in use. The strategy depends on the checkout::Options::destination_is_initially_empty value, which is passed along to checkout::entry::open_file, whose return value includes a flag indicating whether permissions still need to be set:

• With destination_is_initially_empty: true, executable permissions are specified when opening the file, via OpenOptionsEx::mode, by its effect on the behavior of OpenOptions::open. A mode of 0777 is safe here, for the same reason the default mode of 0666 is safe. When creating a file, the applied mode is the specified mode with any bits unset from it that are set in the umask.

  https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/blob/8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918/gix-worktree-state/src/checkout/entry.rs#L265-L268

  The set_executable_after_creation flag in the open_file return value is then false.

• With destination_is_initially_empty: false, executable permissions are set in a separate step, via PermissionsExt::set_mode and set_permissions. A mode of 0777 is not safe here, because the umask is not applied. The vulnerable code appears in checkout::entry::finalize_entry, which receives the set_executable_after_creation flag originally from open_file:

…

Summary

gix-worktree-state specifies 0777 permissions when checking out executable files, intending that the umask will restrict them appropriately. But one of the strategies it uses to set permissions is not subject to the umask. This causes files in a repository to be world-writable in some situations.

Details

Git repositories track executable bits for regular files. In tree objects and the index, regular file modes are stored as 0644 if not executable, or 0755 if executable. But this is independent of how the permissions are set in the filesystem (where supported).

gix_worktree_state::checkout has two strategies for checking out a file and marking it executable on a Unix-like operating system, one of which is vulnerable:

• If the file is created by assuming it does not already exist, correct permissions are applied, because permissions specified when opening a file are subject to the umask.
• If the file is considered possibly already to exist—even in a clean checkout if the application does not specify the option to treat the destination directory as empty—then permissions conferring unrestricted access to any user account on the system are wrongly applied, because permissions specified when calling chmod on an existing file are not subject to the umask. 

Specifically, checkout::entry::checkout chooses the strategy for each file. The same strategy is usually chosen for each executable file, if no process (i.e. long running) smudge filter is in use. The strategy depends on the checkout::Options::destination_is_initially_empty value, which is passed along to checkout::entry::open_file, whose return value includes a flag indicating whether permissions still need to be set:

• With destination_is_initially_empty: true, executable permissions are specified when opening the file, via OpenOptionsEx::mode, by its effect on the behavior of OpenOptions::open. A mode of 0777 is safe here, for the same reason the default mode of 0666 is safe. When creating a file, the applied mode is the specified mode with any bits unset from it that are set in the umask.

  https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/blob/8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918/gix-worktree-state/src/checkout/entry.rs#L265-L268

  The set_executable_after_creation flag in the open_file return value is then false.

• With destination_is_initially_empty: false, executable permissions are set in a separate step, via PermissionsExt::set_mode and set_permissions. A mode of 0777 is not safe here, because the umask is not applied. The vulnerable code appears in checkout::entry::finalize_entry, which receives the set_executable_after_creation flag originally from open_file:

…

gitoxide is an implementation of git written in Rust. Prior to 0.17.0, gix-worktree-state specifies 0777 permissions when checking out executable files, intending that the umask will restrict them appropriately. But one of the strategies it uses to set permissions is not subject to the umask. This causes files in a repository to be world-writable in some situations. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.17.0.

These are all security issues fixed in the gitoxide-0.42.0-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.

This update for gitoxide fixes the following issues:

Changes in gitoxide:

• Update to 0.56.0:

  • Fixes CVE-2026-40034 (boo#1266434): the CommandForbiddenInModules trust check could be bypassed in gix_submodule::File::update(), which allowed arbitrary command execution from a crafted .gitmodules file
  • Fixes a submodule name validation bypass that allowed traversal out of .git/modules and disclosure of credentials
  • Fixes symlinked .gitmodules files being followed and parsed from outside the repository
  • Fixes several denial-of-service vectors in gix-pack: unchecked indexing panics and uncapped allocations from crafted pack data
  • Fixes HTTP credentials being leaked to the redirected host by the curl transport backend
  • Add the gix config show, gix config list, gix config fmt, gix free remote refs, gix free trust, gix dirwalk and gix tix subcommands
  • Add a gix status --untracked flag and gix merge tree --message for creating commits
  • gix exclude query is now index-aware and no longer reports ignore matches for tracked files, matching git check-ignore
  • Preserve all configured remote URLs rather than only the last one
  • Fix fetching and cloning with tag refspecs in shallow clones, relative worktree linking files and loose ref path-prefix collisions
  • Update the crates to the Rust 2024 edition

• Refresh the vendored dependencies. Recording the state of the remaining open CVE bugs against this version, none of which it is affected by:

  • CVE-2026-25541 (boo#1274525): the vendored bytes is now 1.12.1, above the 1.11.1 fix
  • CVE-2025-22620 (boo#1236139): gix-worktree-state is 0.33.0, far above the 0.17.0 that fixed the world-writable checkout of executable files

• update to 0.50.0: see https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/compare/v0.42.0...v0.50.0

• update to 0.42.0:

  • add first 'debug' version of gix diff file
  • use revspecs for revision and path
  • CVE-2025-31130: use collision-detecting SHA-1 hash boo#1240872

• Update to version 0.41.0:

  • add gix blame -L start,end
  • add gix env to print paths relevant to the Git installation.
  • Document the remaining subcommands
  • Add support for statistics and additional performance information.
  • add gix blame to the CLI. That way it's possible to see the blame result of any file in the repository.

• Updates from version 0.40.0:

  • add first 'debug' version of gix log. It's primarily meant to better understand gix blame.
  • add --tree-favor to gix merge tree|commit. With it one can decide which side to favor in case of irreconcilable tree-conflicts.
  • CVE-2025-22620: gix-worktree-state specifies 0777 permissions when checking out executable files (boo#1236139)

• Update to version 0.39.0: New Features

  • add gix merge commit --debug
  • add gix merge commits
  • add gix merge tree to merge trees similarly to git merge-tree.

• Update to version 0.38.0: New Features

  • support for listing worktrees with gix worktree list
  • add first 'debug' version of gix diff tree.
  • add new gix cat command.
  • add gix merge-file with similar features as git merge-file
  • gix merge-base for the CLI Bug Fixes
  • Adjust gix clean warning and help for worktree fix
  • Clarify -r/--repositories and --skip-hidden-repositories Other
  • switch from time to jiff
  • Unify style in config support info