CVE-2025-39941

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

zram: fix slot write race condition

Parallel concurrent writes to the same zram index result in leaked zsmalloc handles. Schematically we can have something like this:

CPU0 CPU1 zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock()

compress compress handle = zs_malloc() handle = zs_malloc() zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock

Either CPU0 or CPU1 zsmalloc handle will leak because zs_free() is done too early. In fact, we need to reset zram entry right before we set its new handle, all under the same slot lock scope.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

zram: fix slot write race condition

Parallel concurrent writes to the same zram index result in leaked zsmalloc handles. Schematically we can have something like this:

CPU0 CPU1 zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock()

compress compress handle = zs_malloc() handle = zs_malloc() zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock

Either CPU0 or CPU1 zsmalloc handle will leak because zs_free() is done too early. In fact, we need to reset zram entry right before we set its new handle, all under the same slot lock scope.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

zram: fix slot write race condition

Parallel concurrent writes to the same zram index result in leaked zsmalloc handles. Schematically we can have something like this:

CPU0 CPU1 zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock()

compress compress handle = zs_malloc() handle = zs_malloc() zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock

Either CPU0 or CPU1 zsmalloc handle will leak because zs_free() is done too early. In fact, we need to reset zram entry right before we set its new handle, all under the same slot lock scope.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

zram: fix slot write race condition

Parallel concurrent writes to the same zram index result in leaked zsmalloc handles. Schematically we can have something like this:

CPU0 CPU1 zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock()

compress compress handle = zs_malloc() handle = zs_malloc() zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock

Either CPU0 or CPU1 zsmalloc handle will leak because zs_free() is done too early. In fact, we need to reset zram entry right before we set its new handle, all under the same slot lock scope.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

zram: fix slot write race condition

Parallel concurrent writes to the same zram index result in leaked zsmalloc handles. Schematically we can have something like this:

CPU0 CPU1 zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock()

compress compress handle = zs_malloc() handle = zs_malloc() zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock

Either CPU0 or CPU1 zsmalloc handle will leak because zs_free() is done too early. In fact, we need to reset zram entry right before we set its new handle, all under the same slot lock scope.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zram: fix slot write race condition Parallel concurrent writes to the same zram index result in leaked zsmalloc handles. Schematically we can have something like this: CPU0 CPU1 zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() compress compress handle = zs_malloc() handle = zs_malloc() zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock Either CPU0 or CPU1 zsmalloc handle will leak because zs_free() is done too early. In fact, we need to reset zram entry right before we set its new handle, all under the same slot lock scope.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zram: fix slot write race condition Parallel concurrent writes to the same zram index result in leaked zsmalloc handles. Schematically we can have something like this: CPU0 CPU1 zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() compress compress handle = zs_malloc() handle = zs_malloc() zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock Either CPU0 or CPU1 zsmalloc handle will leak because zs_free() is done too early. In fact, we need to reset zram entry right before we set its new handle, all under the same slot lock scope.