CVE-2025-45582

GNU Tar provides the ability to create tar archives, as well as various other kinds of manipulation. For example, you can use Tar on previously created archives to extract files, to store additional files, or to update or list files which were already stored.

Security Fix(es):

GNU Tar through 1.35 allows file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives, with a certain two-step process. First, the victim must extract an archive that contains a ../ symlink to a critical directory. Second, the victim must extract an archive that contains a critical file, specified via a relative pathname that begins with the symlink name and ends with that critical file's name. Here, the extraction follows the symlink and overwrites the critical file. This bypasses the protection mechanism of "Member name contains '..'" that would occur for a single TAR archive that attempted to specify the critical file via a ../ approach. For example, the first archive can contain "x -> ../../../../../home/victim/.ssh" and the second archive can contain x/authorized_keys. This can affect server applications that automatically extract any number of user-supplied TAR archives, and were relying on the blocking of traversal. This can also affect software installation processes in which "tar xf" is run more than once (e.g., when installing a package can automatically install two dependencies that are set up as untrusted tarballs instead of official packages). NOTE: the official GNU Tar manual has an otherwise-empty directory for each "tar xf" in its Security Rules of Thumb; however, third-party advice leads users to run "tar xf" more than once into the same directory.(CVE-2025-45582)

GNU Tar provides the ability to create tar archives, as well as various other kinds of manipulation. For example, you can use Tar on previously created archives to extract files, to store additional files, or to update or list files which were already stored.

Security Fix(es):

GNU Tar through 1.35 allows file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives, with a certain two-step process. First, the victim must extract an archive that contains a ../ symlink to a critical directory. Second, the victim must extract an archive that contains a critical file, specified via a relative pathname that begins with the symlink name and ends with that critical file's name. Here, the extraction follows the symlink and overwrites the critical file. This bypasses the protection mechanism of "Member name contains '..'" that would occur for a single TAR archive that attempted to specify the critical file via a ../ approach. For example, the first archive can contain "x -> ../../../../../home/victim/.ssh" and the second archive can contain x/authorized_keys. This can affect server applications that automatically extract any number of user-supplied TAR archives, and were relying on the blocking of traversal. This can also affect software installation processes in which "tar xf" is run more than once (e.g., when installing a package can automatically install two dependencies that are set up as untrusted tarballs instead of official packages). NOTE: the official GNU Tar manual has an otherwise-empty directory for each "tar xf" in its Security Rules of Thumb; however, third-party advice leads users to run "tar xf" more than once into the same directory.(CVE-2025-45582)

GNU Tar provides the ability to create tar archives, as well as various other kinds of manipulation. For example, you can use Tar on previously created archives to extract files, to store additional files, or to update or list files which were already stored.

Security Fix(es):

GNU Tar through 1.35 allows file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives, with a certain two-step process. First, the victim must extract an archive that contains a ../ symlink to a critical directory. Second, the victim must extract an archive that contains a critical file, specified via a relative pathname that begins with the symlink name and ends with that critical file's name. Here, the extraction follows the symlink and overwrites the critical file. This bypasses the protection mechanism of "Member name contains '..'" that would occur for a single TAR archive that attempted to specify the critical file via a ../ approach. For example, the first archive can contain "x -> ../../../../../home/victim/.ssh" and the second archive can contain x/authorized_keys. This can affect server applications that automatically extract any number of user-supplied TAR archives, and were relying on the blocking of traversal. This can also affect software installation processes in which "tar xf" is run more than once (e.g., when installing a package can automatically install two dependencies that are set up as untrusted tarballs instead of official packages). NOTE: the official GNU Tar manual has an otherwise-empty directory for each "tar xf" in its Security Rules of Thumb; however, third-party advice leads users to run "tar xf" more than once into the same directory.(CVE-2025-45582)

GNU Tar provides the ability to create tar archives, as well as various other kinds of manipulation. For example, you can use Tar on previously created archives to extract files, to store additional files, or to update or list files which were already stored.

Security Fix(es):

GNU Tar through 1.35 allows file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives, with a certain two-step process. First, the victim must extract an archive that contains a ../ symlink to a critical directory. Second, the victim must extract an archive that contains a critical file, specified via a relative pathname that begins with the symlink name and ends with that critical file's name. Here, the extraction follows the symlink and overwrites the critical file. This bypasses the protection mechanism of "Member name contains '..'" that would occur for a single TAR archive that attempted to specify the critical file via a ../ approach. For example, the first archive can contain "x -> ../../../../../home/victim/.ssh" and the second archive can contain x/authorized_keys. This can affect server applications that automatically extract any number of user-supplied TAR archives, and were relying on the blocking of traversal. This can also affect software installation processes in which "tar xf" is run more than once (e.g., when installing a package can automatically install two dependencies that are set up as untrusted tarballs instead of official packages). NOTE: the official GNU Tar manual has an otherwise-empty directory for each "tar xf" in its Security Rules of Thumb; however, third-party advice leads users to run "tar xf" more than once into the same directory.(CVE-2025-45582)

GNU Tar provides the ability to create tar archives, as well as various other kinds of manipulation. For example, you can use Tar on previously created archives to extract files, to store additional files, or to update or list files which were already stored.

Security Fix(es):

GNU Tar through 1.35 allows file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives, with a certain two-step process. First, the victim must extract an archive that contains a ../ symlink to a critical directory. Second, the victim must extract an archive that contains a critical file, specified via a relative pathname that begins with the symlink name and ends with that critical file's name. Here, the extraction follows the symlink and overwrites the critical file. This bypasses the protection mechanism of "Member name contains '..'" that would occur for a single TAR archive that attempted to specify the critical file via a ../ approach. For example, the first archive can contain "x -> ../../../../../home/victim/.ssh" and the second archive can contain x/authorized_keys. This can affect server applications that automatically extract any number of user-supplied TAR archives, and were relying on the blocking of traversal. This can also affect software installation processes in which "tar xf" is run more than once (e.g., when installing a package can automatically install two dependencies that are set up as untrusted tarballs instead of official packages). NOTE: the official GNU Tar manual has an otherwise-empty directory for each "tar xf" in its Security Rules of Thumb; however, third-party advice leads users to run "tar xf" more than once into the same directory.(CVE-2025-45582)

GNU Tar provides the ability to create tar archives, as well as various other kinds of manipulation. For example, you can use Tar on previously created archives to extract files, to store additional files, or to update or list files which were already stored.

Security Fix(es):

GNU Tar through 1.35 allows file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives, with a certain two-step process. First, the victim must extract an archive that contains a ../ symlink to a critical directory. Second, the victim must extract an archive that contains a critical file, specified via a relative pathname that begins with the symlink name and ends with that critical file's name. Here, the extraction follows the symlink and overwrites the critical file. This bypasses the protection mechanism of "Member name contains '..'" that would occur for a single TAR archive that attempted to specify the critical file via a ../ approach. For example, the first archive can contain "x -> ../../../../../home/victim/.ssh" and the second archive can contain x/authorized_keys. This can affect server applications that automatically extract any number of user-supplied TAR archives, and were relying on the blocking of traversal. This can also affect software installation processes in which "tar xf" is run more than once (e.g., when installing a package can automatically install two dependencies that are set up as untrusted tarballs instead of official packages). NOTE: the official GNU Tar manual has an otherwise-empty directory for each "tar xf" in its Security Rules of Thumb; however, third-party advice leads users to run "tar xf" more than once into the same directory.(CVE-2025-45582)

The GNU tar program can save multiple files in an archive and restore files from an archive.

Security Fix(es):

• tar: Tar path traversal (CVE-2025-45582)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

The GNU tar program can save multiple files in an archive and restore files from an archive.

Security Fix(es):

• tar: Tar path traversal (CVE-2025-45582)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

The GNU tar program can save multiple files in an archive and restore files from an archive.

Security Fix(es):

• tar: Tar path traversal (CVE-2025-45582)

• tar: tar: Hidden file injection via crafted archives (CVE-2026-5704)

• tar: tar: TOCTOU in incremental dumpdir 'X' rename handling allows restore path escape (CVE-2026-18477)

• tar: tar: --one-top-level hardlink targets not confined to top-level directory enabling arbitrary file overwrite (CVE-2026-18508)

Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s):

• tar: --one-top-level with absolute path fails [rhel-8.10.z] (JIRA:Rocky Linux-144019)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

GNU Tar through 1.35 allows file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives, with a certain two-step process. First, the victim must extract an archive that contains a ../ symlink to a critical directory. Second, the victim must extract an archive that contains a critical file, specified via a relative pathname that begins with the symlink name and ends with that critical file's name. Here, the extraction follows the symlink and overwrites the critical file. This bypasses the protection mechanism of "Member name contains '..'" that would occur for a single TAR archive that attempted to specify the critical file via a ../ approach. For example, the first archive can contain "x -> ../../../../../home/victim/.ssh" and the second archive can contain x/authorized_keys. This can affect server applications that automatically extract any number of user-supplied TAR archives, and were relying on the blocking of traversal. This can also affect software installation processes in which "tar xf" is run more than once (e.g., when installing a package can automatically install two dependencies that are set up as untrusted tarballs instead of official packages). NOTE: the official GNU Tar manual has an otherwise-empty directory for each "tar xf" in its Security Rules of Thumb; however, third-party advice leads users to run "tar xf" more than once into the same directory.

The GNU tar program can save multiple files in an archive and restore files from an archive.

Security Fix(es):

• tar: Tar path traversal (CVE-2025-45582)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

The GNU tar program can save multiple files in an archive and restore files from an archive.

Security Fix(es):

• tar: Tar path traversal (CVE-2025-45582)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

The GNU tar program can save multiple files in an archive and restore files from an archive.

Security Fix(es):

• tar: Tar path traversal (CVE-2025-45582)
• tar: tar: Hidden file injection via crafted archives (CVE-2026-5704)
• tar: tar: TOCTOU in incremental dumpdir 'X' rename handling allows restore path escape (CVE-2026-18477)
• tar: tar: --one-top-level hardlink targets not confined to top-level directory enabling arbitrary file overwrite (CVE-2026-18508)

Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s):

• tar: --one-top-level with absolute path fails [almalinux-8.10.z] (JIRA:AlmaLinux-144019)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

GNU Tar through 1.35 allows file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives, with a certain two-step process. First, the victim must extract an archive that contains a ../ symlink to a critical directory. Second, the victim must extract an archive that contains a critical file, specified via a relative pathname that begins with the symlink name and ends with that critical file's name. Here, the extraction follows the symlink and overwrites the critical file. This bypasses the protection mechanism of "Member name contains '..'" that would occur for a single TAR archive that attempted to specify the critical file via a ../ approach. For example, the first archive can contain "x -> ../../../../../home/victim/.ssh" and the second archive can contain x/authorized_keys. This can affect server applications that automatically extract any number of user-supplied TAR archives, and were relying on the blocking of traversal. This can also affect software installation processes in which "tar xf" is run more than once (e.g., when installing a package can automatically install two dependencies that are set up as untrusted tarballs instead of official packages). NOTE: the official GNU Tar manual has an otherwise-empty directory for each "tar xf" in its Security Rules of Thumb; however, third-party advice leads users to run "tar xf" more than once into the same directory.

GNU Tar through 1.35 allows file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives, with a certain two-step process. First, the victim must extract an archive that contains a ../ symlink to a critical directory. Second, the victim must extract an archive that contains a critical file, specified via a relative pathname that begins with the symlink name and ends with that critical file's name. Here, the extraction follows the symlink and overwrites the critical file. This bypasses the protection mechanism of "Member name contains '..'" that would occur for a single TAR archive that attempted to specify the critical file via a ../ approach. For example, the first archive can contain "x -> ../../../../../home/victim/.ssh" and the second archive can contain x/authorized_keys. This can affect server applications that automatically extract any number of user-supplied TAR archives, and were relying on the blocking of traversal. This can also affect software installation processes in which "tar xf" is run more than once (e.g., when installing a package can automatically install two dependencies that are set up as untrusted tarballs instead of official packages). NOTE: the official GNU Tar manual has an otherwise-empty directory for each "tar xf" in its Security Rules of Thumb; however, third-party advice leads users to run "tar xf" more than once into the same directory.

• CVE-2025-45582: fixed path traversal vulnerability using malicious archive extraction

• CVE-2025-45582: fixed path traversal vulnerability using malicious archive extraction

GNU Tar through 1.35 allows file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives, with a certain two-step process. (CVE-2025-45582) Tar: toctou in incremental dumpdir 'x' rename handling allows restore path escape. (CVE-2026-18477) Tar: --one-top-level hardlink targets not confined to top-level directory enabling arbitrary file overwrite. (CVE-2026-18508)

These are all security issues fixed in the tar-1.35-7.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.

This update for tar fixes the following issue:

Security issue:

• CVE-2025-45582: file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives (bsc#1246399).

Non security issue:

• Fixes tar creating invalid tarballs when used with --delete (bsc#1246607)

This update for tar fixes the following issues

• CVE-2026-5704: crafted archives can be used to to hide file injection (bsc#1261900).
• Fix --dereference/-h not working properly after CVE-2025-45582 fix (bsc#1265450).

This update for tar fixes the following issue:

• CVE-2025-45582: file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives (bsc#1246399).

This update for tar fixes the following issue:

• CVE-2025-45582: file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives (bsc#1246399).

This update for tar fixes the following issue:

• CVE-2025-45582: file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives (bsc#1246399).

This update for tar fixes the following issue:

Security issue:

• CVE-2025-45582: file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives (bsc#1246399).

Non security issue:

• Fixes tar creating invalid tarballs when used with --delete (bsc#1246607)

This update for tar fixes the following issue:

Security issue:

• CVE-2025-45582: file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives (bsc#1246399).

Non security issue:

• Fixes tar creating invalid tarballs when used with --delete (bsc#1246607)

This update for tar fixes the following issues

• CVE-2026-5704: crafted archives can be used to to hide file injection (bsc#1261900).
• Fix --dereference/-h not working properly after CVE-2025-45582 fix (bsc#1265450).

This update for tar fixes the following issues

• CVE-2026-5704: crafted archives can be used to to hide file injection (bsc#1261900).
• Fix --dereference/-h not working properly after CVE-2025-45582 fix (bsc#1265450).

This update for tar fixes the following issues:

Upgrade tar to version 1.34 (jsc#PED-16073).

Security issues fixed:

• CVE-2025-45582: file overwrite via directory traversal in crafted TAR archives (bsc#1246399).

Other updates and bugfixes:

• Changes from 1.28:
  • New --one-top-level option: extract all files into a subdirectory named after the archive base name
  • New --sort option: sort directory entries by name or inode when creating archives
  • New exclusion options: --exclude-ignore, --exclude-ignore-recursive, and --exclude-vcs-ignores
  • New checkpoint action: totals; extended checkpoint format specifiers
  • Official tar(1) and rmt(8) manpages now provided upstream
  • Refuse to read from or write archives to a tty device
• Changes from 1.29:
  • New --verbatim-files-from option: treat each line in a file list as a literal file name regardless of leading dashes
• Changes from 1.30:
  • Member names containing '..' components are now skipped on extraction (security hardening)
  • Erroneous use of position-sensitive options is now reported
  • --numeric-owner now applies to private (pax) headers too
  • Fixed --delay-directory-restore in several edge cases
  • New --warnings=failed-read option to suppress unreadable-file warnings when combined with --ignore-failed-read
• Changes from 1.32:
  • POSIX extended format headers no longer include PID by default
  • Wildcards in --exclude-vcs-ignore mode no longer match slashes
  • Fixed --no-overwrite-dir option
  • Fixed handling of chained renames in incremental backups
  • Link counting works for file names supplied via -T
• Changes from 1.33:
  • Fix extraction over pipe
  • Fix memory leak in read_header
  • Fix extraction when . and .. are unreadable
  • Gracefully handle duplicate symlinks when extracting
  • Re-initialise supplementary groups when switching to user privileges

It was discovered that tar incorrectly handled symlinks when extracting archives. An attacker could possibly use this issue to overwrite arbitrary files.