CVE-2025-53621

DSpace open source software is a repository application which provides durable access to digital resources. Two related XML External Entity (XXE) injection possibilities impact all versions of DSpace prior to 7.6.4, 8.2, and 9.1. External entities are not disabled when parsing XML files during import of an archive (in Simple Archive Format), either from command-line (./dspace import command) or from the "Batch Import (Zip)" user interface feature. External entities are also not explicitly disabled when parsing XML responses from some upstream services (ArXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, Creative Commons) used in import from external sources via the user interface or REST API. An XXE injection in these files may result in a connection being made to an attacker's site or a local path readable by the Tomcat user, with content potentially being injected into a metadata field. In the latter case, this may result in sensitive content disclosure, including retrieving arbitrary files or configurations from the server where DSpace is running. The Simple Archive Format (SAF) importer / Batch Import (Zip) is only usable by site administrators (from user interface / REST API) or system administrators (from command-line). Therefore, to exploit this vulnerability, the malicious payload would have to be provided by an attacker and trusted by an administrator, who would trigger the import. The fix is included in DSpace 7.6.4, 8.2, and 9.1. Please upgrade to one of these versions. For those who cannot upgrade immediately, it is possible to manually patch the DSpace backend. One may also apply some best practices, though the protection provided is not as complete as upgrading. Administrators must carefully inspect any SAF archives (they did not construct themselves) before importing. As necessary, affected external services can be disabled to mitigate the ability for payloads to be delivered via external service APIs.

DSpace open source software is a repository application which provides durable access to digital resources. Two related XML External Entity (XXE) injection possibilities impact all versions of DSpace prior to 7.6.4, 8.2, and 9.1. External entities are not disabled when parsing XML files during import of an archive (in Simple Archive Format), either from command-line (./dspace import command) or from the "Batch Import (Zip)" user interface feature. External entities are also not explicitly disabled when parsing XML responses from some upstream services (ArXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, Creative Commons) used in import from external sources via the user interface or REST API. An XXE injection in these files may result in a connection being made to an attacker's site or a local path readable by the Tomcat user, with content potentially being injected into a metadata field. In the latter case, this may result in sensitive content disclosure, including retrieving arbitrary files or configurations from the server where DSpace is running. The Simple Archive Format (SAF) importer / Batch Import (Zip) is only usable by site administrators (from user interface / REST API) or system administrators (from command-line). Therefore, to exploit this vulnerability, the malicious payload would have to be provided by an attacker and trusted by an administrator, who would trigger the import. The fix is included in DSpace 7.6.4, 8.2, and 9.1. Please upgrade to one of these versions. For those who cannot upgrade immediately, it is possible to manually patch the DSpace backend. One may also apply some best practices, though the protection provided is not as complete as upgrading. Administrators must carefully inspect any SAF archives (they did not construct themselves) before importing. As necessary, affected external services can be disabled to mitigate the ability for payloads to be delivered via external service APIs.

Impact

Two related XXE injection possibilities have been discovered, impacting all versions of DSpace prior to 7.6.4, 8.2 and 9.1.

1. External entities are not disabled when parsing XML files during import of an archive (in Simple Archive Format), either from command-line (./dspace import command) or from the "Batch Import (Zip)" user interface feature. (Likely impacts all versions of DSpace 1.x <= 7.6.3, 8.0 <= 8.1, and 9.0)
2. External entities are also not explicitly disabled when parsing XML responses from some upstream services (ArXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, Creative Commons) used in import from external sources via the user interface or REST API. (Impacts all versions of DSpace 7.0 <= 7.6.3, 8.0 <= 8.1 and 9.0)

An XXE injection in these files may result in a connection being made to an attacker's site or a local path readable by the Tomcat user, with content potentially being injected into a metadata field. In the latter case, this may result in sensitive content disclosure, including retrieving arbitrary files or configurations from the server where DSpace is running or content from remote URLs. The ability to include content from a remote URL could result in a request forgery attack, and disclosure of sensitive information in the response.

The Simple Archive Format (SAF) importer / Batch Import (Zip) is only usable by site administrators (from user interface / REST API) or system administrators (from command-line). Therefore, to exploit this vulnerability, the malicious payload would have to be provided by an attacker and trusted by an administrator (who would trigger the import).

• The most severe practical impact is a case where an attacker obtains DSpace administrator credentials and uses the Batch Import feature with a malicious SAF archive to expose sensitive local files readable by the Tomcat user, or secrets and access tokens from an authenticated service via request forgery.
• An attacker without administrative credentials might use some other tactic to convince an administrator to import a malicious SAF archive they have supplied.

The Import from External Sources feature has a narrower attack vector. While this feature is usable by any DSpace Submitter, the malicious payload must be provided by the external source (e.g. arXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, or Creative Commons). No known method exists for an attacker to inject XXE via content uploads. Instead, the service itself would need to be compromised in such a way that it would inject a malicious payload into its API response.

Patches

The fix is included in DSpace 7.6.4, 8.2 and 9.1. Please upgrade to one of these versions.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, it is possible to manually patch your DSpace backend. (No changes are necessary to the frontend.) A pull request exists which can be used to patch systems running DSpace 7.6.x, 8.x or 9.0. This pull request provides central methods to retrieve Java XML, SAX, JAXB XML document builders with safe default settings, including XXE protection.

• Pull request for 7.x: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/pull/11032 (Downloadable patch file)
• Pull request for 8.x: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/pull/11034 (Downloadable patch file)
• Pull request for 9.0: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/pull/11035 (Downloadable patch file)

Apply the patch to your DSpace

If at all possible, we recommend upgrading your DSpace site based on the upgrade instructions. However, if you are unable to do so, you can manually apply the above patches to your DSpace backend as follows:

1. Download the appropriate patch file to the machine where DSpace backend is running
2. From the [dspace-src] folder, apply…

DSpace open source software is a repository application which provides durable access to digital resources. Two related XML External Entity (XXE) injection possibilities impact all versions of DSpace prior to 7.6.4, 8.2, and 9.1. External entities are not disabled when parsing XML files during import of an archive (in Simple Archive Format), either from command-line (./dspace import command) or from the "Batch Import (Zip)" user interface feature. External entities are also not explicitly disabled when parsing XML responses from some upstream services (ArXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, Creative Commons) used in import from external sources via the user interface or REST API. An XXE injection in these files may result in a connection being made to an attacker's site or a local path readable by the Tomcat user, with content potentially being injected into a metadata field. In the latter case, this may result in sensitive content disclosure, including retrieving arbitrary files or configurations from the server where DSpace is running. The Simple Archive Format (SAF) importer / Batch Import (Zip) is only usable by site administrators (from user interface / REST API) or system administrators (from command-line). Therefore, to exploit this vulnerability, the malicious payload would have to be provided by an attacker and trusted by an administrator, who would trigger the import. The fix is included in DSpace 7.6.4, 8.2, and 9.1. Please upgrade to one of these versions. For those who cannot upgrade immediately, it is possible to manually patch the DSpace backend. One may also apply some best practices, though the protection provided is not as complete as upgrading. Administrators must carefully inspect any SAF archives (they did not construct themselves) before importing. As necessary, affected external services can be disabled to mitigate the ability for payloads to be delivered via external service APIs.

DSpace open source software is a repository application which provides durable access to digital resources. Two related XML External Entity (XXE) injection possibilities impact all versions of DSpace prior to 7.6.4, 8.2, and 9.1. External entities are not disabled when parsing XML files during import of an archive (in Simple Archive Format), either from command-line (./dspace import command) or from the "Batch Import (Zip)" user interface feature. External entities are also not explicitly disabled when parsing XML responses from some upstream services (ArXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, Creative Commons) used in import from external sources via the user interface or REST API. An XXE injection in these files may result in a connection being made to an attacker's site or a local path readable by the Tomcat user, with content potentially being injected into a metadata field. In the latter case, this may result in sensitive content disclosure, including retrieving arbitrary files or configurations from the server where DSpace is running. The Simple Archive Format (SAF) importer / Batch Import (Zip) is only usable by site administrators (from user interface / REST API) or system administrators (from command-line). Therefore, to exploit this vulnerability, the malicious payload would have to be provided by an attacker and trusted by an administrator, who would trigger the import. The fix is included in DSpace 7.6.4, 8.2, and 9.1. Please upgrade to one of these versions. For those who cannot upgrade immediately, it is possible to manually patch the DSpace backend. One may also apply some best practices, though the protection provided is not as complete as upgrading. Administrators must carefully inspect any SAF archives (they did not construct themselves) before importing. As necessary, affected external services can be disabled to mitigate the ability for payloads to be delivered via external service APIs.

Impact

Two related XXE injection possibilities have been discovered, impacting all versions of DSpace prior to 7.6.4, 8.2 and 9.1.

1. External entities are not disabled when parsing XML files during import of an archive (in Simple Archive Format), either from command-line (./dspace import command) or from the "Batch Import (Zip)" user interface feature. (Likely impacts all versions of DSpace 1.x <= 7.6.3, 8.0 <= 8.1, and 9.0)
2. External entities are also not explicitly disabled when parsing XML responses from some upstream services (ArXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, Creative Commons) used in import from external sources via the user interface or REST API. (Impacts all versions of DSpace 7.0 <= 7.6.3, 8.0 <= 8.1 and 9.0)

An XXE injection in these files may result in a connection being made to an attacker's site or a local path readable by the Tomcat user, with content potentially being injected into a metadata field. In the latter case, this may result in sensitive content disclosure, including retrieving arbitrary files or configurations from the server where DSpace is running or content from remote URLs. The ability to include content from a remote URL could result in a request forgery attack, and disclosure of sensitive information in the response.

The Simple Archive Format (SAF) importer / Batch Import (Zip) is only usable by site administrators (from user interface / REST API) or system administrators (from command-line). Therefore, to exploit this vulnerability, the malicious payload would have to be provided by an attacker and trusted by an administrator (who would trigger the import).

• The most severe practical impact is a case where an attacker obtains DSpace administrator credentials and uses the Batch Import feature with a malicious SAF archive to expose sensitive local files readable by the Tomcat user, or secrets and access tokens from an authenticated service via request forgery.
• An attacker without administrative credentials might use some other tactic to convince an administrator to import a malicious SAF archive they have supplied.

The Import from External Sources feature has a narrower attack vector. While this feature is usable by any DSpace Submitter, the malicious payload must be provided by the external source (e.g. arXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, or Creative Commons). No known method exists for an attacker to inject XXE via content uploads. Instead, the service itself would need to be compromised in such a way that it would inject a malicious payload into its API response.

Patches

The fix is included in DSpace 7.6.4, 8.2 and 9.1. Please upgrade to one of these versions.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, it is possible to manually patch your DSpace backend. (No changes are necessary to the frontend.) A pull request exists which can be used to patch systems running DSpace 7.6.x, 8.x or 9.0. This pull request provides central methods to retrieve Java XML, SAX, JAXB XML document builders with safe default settings, including XXE protection.

• Pull request for 7.x: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/pull/11032 (Downloadable patch file)
• Pull request for 8.x: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/pull/11034 (Downloadable patch file)
• Pull request for 9.0: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/pull/11035 (Downloadable patch file)

Apply the patch to your DSpace

If at all possible, we recommend upgrading your DSpace site based on the upgrade instructions. However, if you are unable to do so, you can manually apply the above patches to your DSpace backend as follows:

1. Download the appropriate patch file to the machine where DSpace backend is running
2. From the [dspace-src] folder, apply…