CVE-2025-59734
Heap-buffer-overflow write in FFmpeg SANM process_ftch
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.
When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.
This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.
A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.
Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.
GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.
This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Adjacent network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- Passive
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
8.7
Heap-buffer-overflow write in FFmpeg SANM process_ftch
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.
When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.
This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.
A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.
Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.
GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.
This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
- Record
CVE-2025-59734- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-416
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2025-32184
8.7
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.
When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.
This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.
A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.
Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.
GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.
This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
- Record
EUVD-2025-32184- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-g9mr-r3g9-6594
8.7
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted...
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.
When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.
This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.
A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.
Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.
GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.
This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
- Record
GHSA-g9mr-r3g9-6594- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - Weakness
- CWE-416
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
8.7
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.
When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.
This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.
A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.
Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.
GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.
This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
- Record
CVE-2025-59734- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - Weakness
- CWE-416
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVALPINE-CVE-2025-59734
8.7
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.
When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.
This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.
A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.
Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.
GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.
This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
- Record
ALPINE-CVE-2025-59734- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - Updated
- 2026-11-03
OSV
8.7
Heap-buffer-overflow write in FFmpeg SANM process_ftch
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.
When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.
This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.
A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.
Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.
GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.
This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
- Record
CVE-2025-59734- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-416
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVDEBIAN-CVE-2025-59734
8.7
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2. When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false. A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer. Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb. GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata. This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
- Record
DEBIAN-CVE-2025-59734- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVJLSEC-2026-647
8.7
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation...
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.
When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.
This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.
A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again.
Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.
Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.
GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.
This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
- Record
JLSEC-2026-647- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2025-59734
8.7
It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2. When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false. A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer. Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb. GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata. This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
- Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2025-59734- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
ffmpegAlpine:v3.23 |
before 8.0-r0 | 8.0-r0 |
ffmpegAlpine:v3.24 |
before 8.0-r0 | 8.0-r0 |
FFMPEG_jllJulia |
6.1.1+0 up to 8.0.0+0 | 8.0.0+0 |
FFplay_jllJulia |
7.1.0+0 up to 8.1.2+0 | 8.1.2+0 |
libavUbuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 6:0.8.7-1ubuntu26:9.10-1ubuntu16:9.10-1ubuntu26:9.10-1ubuntu56:9.10-1ubuntu6 Show 9 moreShow less6:9.10-1ubuntu76:9.11-2ubuntu16:9.11-2ubuntu26:9.13-0ubuntu0.14.04.16:9.14-0ubuntu0.14.04.16:9.16-0ubuntu0.14.04.16:9.18-0ubuntu0.14.04.16:9.20-0ubuntu0.14.04.16:9.20-0ubuntu0.14.04.1+esm1 |
None known |
ffmpegUbuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 7:2.7.2-1build17:2.8.1-1ubuntu17:2.8.2-1ubuntu17:2.8.3-17:2.8.4-1 Show 31 moreShow less7:2.8.4-1ubuntu17:2.8.4-1ubuntu27:2.8.4-1ubuntu37:2.8.4-1ubuntu47:2.8.6-1ubuntu17:2.8.6-1ubuntu27:2.8.8-0ubuntu0.16.04.17:2.8.10-0ubuntu0.16.04.17:2.8.11-0ubuntu0.16.04.17:2.8.14-0ubuntu0.16.04.17:2.8.15-0ubuntu0.16.04.17:2.8.15-0ubuntu0.16.04.1+esm17:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.17:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm17:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm27:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm37:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm47:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm57:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm67:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm77:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm87:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm97:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm107:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm117:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm127:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm137:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm147:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm157:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm167:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm177:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm18 |
None known |
ffmpegUbuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 7:3.3.4-27:3.3.4-2build37:3.4-2ubuntu27:3.4-47:3.4-4build1 Show 25 moreShow less7:3.4.1-17:3.4.1-1build17:3.4.2-17:3.4.2-1build17:3.4.2-27:3.4.4-0ubuntu0.18.04.17:3.4.6-0ubuntu0.18.04.17:3.4.8-0ubuntu0.27:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.17:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm17:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm27:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm37:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm47:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm57:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm67:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm77:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm87:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm97:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm107:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm117:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm127:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm137:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm147:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm157:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm16 |
None known |
ffmpegUbuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 7:4.1.4-1build27:4.2.1-27:4.2.1-2ubuntu17:4.2.2-1build17:4.2.2-1ubuntu1 Show 21 moreShow less7:4.2.4-1ubuntu0.17:4.2.4-1ubuntu0.1+esm17:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.17:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm17:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm27:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm37:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm47:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm57:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm67:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm77:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm87:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm97:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm107:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm117:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm127:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm137:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm147:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm157:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm167:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm177:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm18 |
None known |
ffmpegUbuntu:22.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 7:4.4-6ubuntu57:4.4.1-2ubuntu17:4.4.1-3ubuntu17:4.4.1-3ubuntu27:4.4.1-3ubuntu37:4.4.1-3ubuntu57:4.4.2-0ubuntu0.22.04.1 |
None known |
ffmpegUbuntu:24.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 7:6.0-6ubuntu17:6.0-9ubuntu17:6.1-2ubuntu17:6.1-3ubuntu17:6.1-4ubuntu1 Show 4 moreShow less7:6.1-5ubuntu17:6.1.1-1ubuntu17:6.1.1-3ubuntu17:6.1.1-3ubuntu5 |
None known |
ffmpegUbuntu:25.10 |
All versions, plus listed versions 7:7.1.1-1ubuntu17:7.1.1-1ubuntu27:7.1.1-1ubuntu37:7.1.1-1ubuntu47:7.1.1-1ubuntu4.17:7.1.1-1ubuntu4.2 |
None known |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| affected, aliases, references | OSV | |
| affected | ||
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2025-59734 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.7) in Ffmpeg, published October 6, 2025. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.18%, the 7th percentile. Fixed in ffmpeg 8.0-r0.