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CVE-2025-59734

Heap-buffer-overflow write in FFmpeg SANM process_ftch

8.7 HighFix available

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.

When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. 

This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.

A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.

Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.

GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.

This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.

We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Adjacent network
Complexity
High
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
Passive

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.18%Up 0.2 points since Oct 6, 2025
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 8.7

Heap-buffer-overflow write in FFmpeg SANM process_ftch

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.

When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. 

This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.

A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.

Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.

GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.

This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.

We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Record
CVE-2025-59734
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-416
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2025-32184 8.7

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.

When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. 

This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.

A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.

Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.

GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.

This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.

We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Record
EUVD-2025-32184
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-g9mr-r3g9-6594 8.7

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted...

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.

When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. 

This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.

A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.

Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.

GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.

This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.

We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Record
GHSA-g9mr-r3g9-6594
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Weakness
CWE-416
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 8.7

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.

When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. 

This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.

A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.

Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.

GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.

This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.

We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Record
CVE-2025-59734
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Weakness
CWE-416
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVALPINE-CVE-2025-59734 8.7

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.

When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. 

This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.

A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.

Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.

GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.

This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.

We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Record
ALPINE-CVE-2025-59734
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Updated
2026-11-03
OSV 8.7

Heap-buffer-overflow write in FFmpeg SANM process_ftch

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.

When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. 

This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.

A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.

Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.

GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.

This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.

We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Record
CVE-2025-59734
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-416
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVDEBIAN-CVE-2025-59734 8.7

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2. When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.  This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false. A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer. Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb. GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata. This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Record
DEBIAN-CVE-2025-59734
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVJLSEC-2026-647 8.7

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation...

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2.

When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0.

This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false.

A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer.

Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb.

GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata.

This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format.

We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Record
JLSEC-2026-647
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2025-59734 8.7

It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2. When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false. A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer. Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb. GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata. This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2025-59734
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
ffmpeg
Alpine:v3.23
before 8.0-r0
8.0-r0
ffmpeg
Alpine:v3.24
before 8.0-r0
8.0-r0
FFMPEG_jll
Julia
6.1.1+0 up to 8.0.0+0
8.0.0+0
FFplay_jll
Julia
7.1.0+0 up to 8.1.2+0
8.1.2+0
libav
Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
6:0.8.7-1ubuntu26:9.10-1ubuntu16:9.10-1ubuntu26:9.10-1ubuntu56:9.10-1ubuntu6
Show 9 moreShow less
6:9.10-1ubuntu76:9.11-2ubuntu16:9.11-2ubuntu26:9.13-0ubuntu0.14.04.16:9.14-0ubuntu0.14.04.16:9.16-0ubuntu0.14.04.16:9.18-0ubuntu0.14.04.16:9.20-0ubuntu0.14.04.16:9.20-0ubuntu0.14.04.1+esm1
None known
ffmpeg
Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
7:2.7.2-1build17:2.8.1-1ubuntu17:2.8.2-1ubuntu17:2.8.3-17:2.8.4-1
Show 31 moreShow less
7:2.8.4-1ubuntu17:2.8.4-1ubuntu27:2.8.4-1ubuntu37:2.8.4-1ubuntu47:2.8.6-1ubuntu17:2.8.6-1ubuntu27:2.8.8-0ubuntu0.16.04.17:2.8.10-0ubuntu0.16.04.17:2.8.11-0ubuntu0.16.04.17:2.8.14-0ubuntu0.16.04.17:2.8.15-0ubuntu0.16.04.17:2.8.15-0ubuntu0.16.04.1+esm17:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.17:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm17:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm27:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm37:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm47:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm57:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm67:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm77:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm87:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm97:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm107:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm117:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm127:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm137:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm147:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm157:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm167:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm177:2.8.17-0ubuntu0.1+esm18
None known
ffmpeg
Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
7:3.3.4-27:3.3.4-2build37:3.4-2ubuntu27:3.4-47:3.4-4build1
Show 25 moreShow less
7:3.4.1-17:3.4.1-1build17:3.4.2-17:3.4.2-1build17:3.4.2-27:3.4.4-0ubuntu0.18.04.17:3.4.6-0ubuntu0.18.04.17:3.4.8-0ubuntu0.27:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.17:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm17:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm27:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm37:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm47:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm57:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm67:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm77:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm87:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm97:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm107:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm117:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm127:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm137:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm147:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm157:3.4.11-0ubuntu0.1+esm16
None known
ffmpeg
Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
7:4.1.4-1build27:4.2.1-27:4.2.1-2ubuntu17:4.2.2-1build17:4.2.2-1ubuntu1
Show 21 moreShow less
7:4.2.4-1ubuntu0.17:4.2.4-1ubuntu0.1+esm17:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.17:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm17:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm27:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm37:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm47:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm57:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm67:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm77:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm87:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm97:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm107:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm117:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm127:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm137:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm147:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm157:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm167:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm177:4.2.7-0ubuntu0.1+esm18
None known
ffmpeg
Ubuntu:22.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
7:4.4-6ubuntu57:4.4.1-2ubuntu17:4.4.1-3ubuntu17:4.4.1-3ubuntu27:4.4.1-3ubuntu37:4.4.1-3ubuntu57:4.4.2-0ubuntu0.22.04.1
None known
ffmpeg
Ubuntu:24.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
7:6.0-6ubuntu17:6.0-9ubuntu17:6.1-2ubuntu17:6.1-3ubuntu17:6.1-4ubuntu1
Show 4 moreShow less
7:6.1-5ubuntu17:6.1.1-1ubuntu17:6.1.1-3ubuntu17:6.1.1-3ubuntu5
None known
ffmpeg
Ubuntu:25.10
All versions, plus listed versions
7:7.1.1-1ubuntu17:7.1.1-1ubuntu27:7.1.1-1ubuntu37:7.1.1-1ubuntu47:7.1.1-1ubuntu4.17:7.1.1-1ubuntu4.2
None known

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, aliases, referencesOSV
affected
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2025-59734 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.7) in Ffmpeg, published October 6, 2025. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.18%, the 7th percentile. Fixed in ffmpeg 8.0-r0.

References

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