CVE-2025-68477

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.0, Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127[.]0[.]0[.]1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169[.]254[.]169[.]254), and it returns the response body as the result. Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks. Version 1.7.0 contains a patch for this issue.

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.0, Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127[.]0[.]0[.]1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169[.]254[.]169[.]254), and it returns the response body as the result. Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks. Version 1.7.0 contains a patch for this issue.

Vulnerability Overview

Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and it returns the response body as the result.

Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks.

Vulnerable Code

1. When a flow runs, the API Request URL is set via user input or tweaks, or it falls back to the value stored in the node UI.

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L349-L359

   @router.post("/run/{flow_id_or_name}", response_model=None, response_model_exclude_none=True)
   async def simplified_run_flow(
       *,
       background_tasks: BackgroundTasks,
       flow: Annotated[FlowRead | None, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],
       input_request: SimplifiedAPIRequest | None = None,
       stream: bool = False,
       api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],
       context: dict | None = None,
       http_request: Request,
   ):
   

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L573-L588

   @router.post(
       "/run/advanced/{flow_id_or_name}",
       response_model=RunResponse,
       response_model_exclude_none=True,
   )
   async def experimental_run_flow(
       *,
       session: DbSession,
       flow: Annotated[Flow, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],
       inputs: list[InputValueRequest] | None = None,
       outputs: list[str] | None = None,
       tweaks: Annotated[Tweaks | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,
       stream: Annotated[bool, Body(embed=True)] = False,
       session_id: Annotated[None | str, Body(embed=True)] = None,
       api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],
   ) -> RunResponse:
   

2. Normalization/validation stage: It only checks that the URL is non-empty and well-formed. No blocking of private networks, localhost, or IMDS.

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L280-L289

       def _normalize_url(self, url: str) -> str:
           """Normalize URL by adding https:// if no protocol is specified."""
           if not url or not isinstance(url, str):
               msg = "URL cannot be empty"
               raise ValueError(msg)
   
           url = url.strip()
           if url.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
               return url
           return f"https://{url}"
   

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L433-L438

           url = self._normalize_url(url)
   
           # Validate URL
           if not validators.url(url):
               msg = f"Invalid URL provided: {url}"
               raise ValueError(msg)
   

3. On the server side, it sends a request to an arbitrary URL using httpx.AsyncClient and exposes the response body as metadata["result"].

   …

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.0, Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127[.]0[.]0[.]1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169[.]254[.]169[.]254), and it returns the response body as the result. Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks. Version 1.7.0 contains a patch for this issue.

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.0, Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127[.]0[.]0[.]1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169[.]254[.]169[.]254), and it returns the response body as the result. Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks. Version 1.7.0 contains a patch for this issue.

Vulnerability Overview

Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and it returns the response body as the result.

Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks.

Vulnerable Code

1. When a flow runs, the API Request URL is set via user input or tweaks, or it falls back to the value stored in the node UI.

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L349-L359

   @router.post("/run/{flow_id_or_name}", response_model=None, response_model_exclude_none=True)
   async def simplified_run_flow(
       *,
       background_tasks: BackgroundTasks,
       flow: Annotated[FlowRead | None, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],
       input_request: SimplifiedAPIRequest | None = None,
       stream: bool = False,
       api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],
       context: dict | None = None,
       http_request: Request,
   ):
   

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L573-L588

   @router.post(
       "/run/advanced/{flow_id_or_name}",
       response_model=RunResponse,
       response_model_exclude_none=True,
   )
   async def experimental_run_flow(
       *,
       session: DbSession,
       flow: Annotated[Flow, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],
       inputs: list[InputValueRequest] | None = None,
       outputs: list[str] | None = None,
       tweaks: Annotated[Tweaks | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,
       stream: Annotated[bool, Body(embed=True)] = False,
       session_id: Annotated[None | str, Body(embed=True)] = None,
       api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],
   ) -> RunResponse:
   

2. Normalization/validation stage: It only checks that the URL is non-empty and well-formed. No blocking of private networks, localhost, or IMDS.

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L280-L289

       def _normalize_url(self, url: str) -> str:
           """Normalize URL by adding https:// if no protocol is specified."""
           if not url or not isinstance(url, str):
               msg = "URL cannot be empty"
               raise ValueError(msg)
   
           url = url.strip()
           if url.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
               return url
           return f"https://{url}"
   

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L433-L438

           url = self._normalize_url(url)
   
           # Validate URL
           if not validators.url(url):
               msg = f"Invalid URL provided: {url}"
               raise ValueError(msg)
   

3. On the server side, it sends a request to an arbitrary URL using httpx.AsyncClient and exposes the response body as metadata["result"].

   …

Vulnerability Overview

Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and it returns the response body as the result.

Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks.

Vulnerable Code

1. When a flow runs, the API Request URL is set via user input or tweaks, or it falls back to the value stored in the node UI.

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L349-L359

   @router.post("/run/{flow_id_or_name}", response_model=None, response_model_exclude_none=True)
   async def simplified_run_flow(
       *,
       background_tasks: BackgroundTasks,
       flow: Annotated[FlowRead | None, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],
       input_request: SimplifiedAPIRequest | None = None,
       stream: bool = False,
       api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],
       context: dict | None = None,
       http_request: Request,
   ):
   

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L573-L588

   @router.post(
       "/run/advanced/{flow_id_or_name}",
       response_model=RunResponse,
       response_model_exclude_none=True,
   )
   async def experimental_run_flow(
       *,
       session: DbSession,
       flow: Annotated[Flow, Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)],
       inputs: list[InputValueRequest] | None = None,
       outputs: list[str] | None = None,
       tweaks: Annotated[Tweaks | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,
       stream: Annotated[bool, Body(embed=True)] = False,
       session_id: Annotated[None | str, Body(embed=True)] = None,
       api_key_user: Annotated[UserRead, Depends(api_key_security)],
   ) -> RunResponse:
   

2. Normalization/validation stage: It only checks that the URL is non-empty and well-formed. No blocking of private networks, localhost, or IMDS.

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L280-L289

       def _normalize_url(self, url: str) -> str:
           """Normalize URL by adding https:// if no protocol is specified."""
           if not url or not isinstance(url, str):
               msg = "URL cannot be empty"
               raise ValueError(msg)
   
           url = url.strip()
           if url.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
               return url
           return f"https://{url}"
   

   https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L433-L438

           url = self._normalize_url(url)
   
           # Validate URL
           if not validators.url(url):
               msg = f"Invalid URL provided: {url}"
               raise ValueError(msg)
   

3. On the server side, it sends a request to an arbitrary URL using httpx.AsyncClient and exposes the response body as metadata["result"].

   …