CVE-2025-71372

Picklescan before 0.0.33 fails to detect the numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef gadget in pickle reduce methods, allowing arbitrary code execution. Attackers can craft malicious pickle files that execute arbitrary Python code when loaded, bypassing Picklescan's safety checks and enabling supply-chain poisoning of shared model files.

Picklescan before 0.0.33 fails to detect the numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef gadget in pickle reduce methods, allowing arbitrary code execution. Attackers can craft malicious pickle files that execute arbitrary Python code when loaded, bypassing Picklescan's safety checks and enabling supply-chain poisoning of shared model files.

Picklescan before 0.0.33 fails to detect the numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef gadget in pickle reduce methods, allowing arbitrary code execution. Attackers can craft malicious pickle files that execute arbitrary Python code when loaded, bypassing Picklescan's safety checks and enabling supply-chain poisoning of shared model files.

Summary

Picklescan uses the numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef function (a NumPy F2PY helper) to execute arbitrary Python code during unpickling.

Details

Picklescan fails to detect a malicious pickle that uses the gadget numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef in __reduce__, allowing arbitrary command execution when the pickle is loaded. A crafted object returns this function plus attacker‑controlled arguments; the scan reports the file as safe, but pickle.load() triggers execution.

PoC

class PoC:
    def __reduce__(self):
        from numpy.f2py.crackfortran import getlincoef
        return getlincoef, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')", None)

Impact

• Arbitrary code execution on the victim machine once they load the “scanned as safe” pickle / model file.
• Affects any workflow relying on Picklescan to vet untrusted pickle / PyTorch artifacts.
• Enables supply‑chain poisoning of shared model files.

Credits

• ac0d3r
• Tong Liu, Institute of information engineering, CAS

Picklescan before 0.0.33 fails to detect the numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef gadget in pickle reduce methods, allowing arbitrary code execution. Attackers can craft malicious pickle files that execute arbitrary Python code when loaded, bypassing Picklescan's safety checks and enabling supply-chain poisoning of shared model files.

Picklescan before 0.0.33 fails to detect the numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef gadget in pickle reduce methods, allowing arbitrary code execution. Attackers can craft malicious pickle files that execute arbitrary Python code when loaded, bypassing Picklescan's safety checks and enabling supply-chain poisoning of shared model files.

Summary

Picklescan uses the numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef function (a NumPy F2PY helper) to execute arbitrary Python code during unpickling.

Details

Picklescan fails to detect a malicious pickle that uses the gadget numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef in __reduce__, allowing arbitrary command execution when the pickle is loaded. A crafted object returns this function plus attacker‑controlled arguments; the scan reports the file as safe, but pickle.load() triggers execution.

PoC

class PoC:
    def __reduce__(self):
        from numpy.f2py.crackfortran import getlincoef
        return getlincoef, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')", None)

Impact

• Arbitrary code execution on the victim machine once they load the “scanned as safe” pickle / model file.
• Affects any workflow relying on Picklescan to vet untrusted pickle / PyTorch artifacts.
• Enables supply‑chain poisoning of shared model files.

Credits

• ac0d3r
• Tong Liu, Institute of information engineering, CAS