CVE-2025-71392

SurrealDB before 2.0.5, 2.1.x before 2.1.5, and 2.2.x before 2.2.2 fails to properly escape table and field names in the command-line export command. An authenticated System User with OWNER or EDITOR roles can create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL. When a higher-privileged user subsequently imports the exported backup, the injected SurrealQL executes, enabling privilege escalation and root-level takeover of the SurrealDB instance. Applications that let users define custom tables or fields are also exposed to a universal second-order SurrealQL injection even when query parameters are sanitized.

SurrealDB before 2.0.5, 2.1.x before 2.1.5, and 2.2.x before 2.2.2 fails to properly escape table and field names in the command-line export command. An authenticated System User with OWNER or EDITOR roles can create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL. When a higher-privileged user subsequently imports the exported backup, the injected SurrealQL executes, enabling privilege escalation and root-level takeover of the SurrealDB instance. Applications that let users define custom tables or fields are also exposed to a universal second-order SurrealQL injection even when query parameters are sanitized.

The SurrealDB command-line tool allows exporting databases through the export command. It was discovered that table or field names are not properly sanitized in exports, leading to a SurrealQL injection when the backup is reimported.

For the injection to occur, an authenticated System User with OWNER or EDITOR roles needs to create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL, subsequently exported using the export operation

The attacker could achieve a privilege escalation and root level access to the SurrealDB instance if a higher privileged user subsequently performs the import operation.

Furthermore, applications using SurrealDB that allow its users to define custom fields or tables are at risk of a universal second order SurrealQL injection, even if query parameters are properly sanitized.

This issue was discovered and patched during an code audit and penetration test of SurrealDB by cure53, the severity defined within cure53's preliminary finding is Critical, matched by our CVSS v4 assessment.

Impact

This attack can be used to perform privilege escalation and complete takeover (root access) of the SurrealDB instance, as well as being able to perform SurrealQL injection attacks against co-tenanted applications where SurrealDB is used as a shared backend for multiple applications.

Patches

A patch has been created that addresses the issue by fixing the bugs in the exporter which failed to escape some characters properly.

• Versions 2.0.5, 2.1.5, 2.2.2 and later are not affected by this issue.

Workarounds

For SurrealDB users that are unable to upgrade, users that are looking to perform import operations must manually inspect the exported data for injected statements, prior to importing.

Resources

SurrealDB Documentation - Export SurrealDB Documentation - Import SurrealDB Documentation - Authentication

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-ccj3-5p93-8p42. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

SurrealDB before 2.0.5, 2.1.x before 2.1.5, and 2.2.x before 2.2.2 fails to properly escape table and field names in the command-line export command. An authenticated System User with OWNER or EDITOR roles can create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL. When a higher-privileged user subsequently imports the exported backup, the injected SurrealQL executes, enabling privilege escalation and root-level takeover of the SurrealDB instance. Applications that let users define custom tables or fields are also exposed to a universal second-order SurrealQL injection even when query parameters are sanitized.

SurrealDB before 2.0.5, 2.1.x before 2.1.5, and 2.2.x before 2.2.2 fails to properly escape table and field names in the command-line export command. An authenticated System User with OWNER or EDITOR roles can create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL. When a higher-privileged user subsequently imports the exported backup, the injected SurrealQL executes, enabling privilege escalation and root-level takeover of the SurrealDB instance. Applications that let users define custom tables or fields are also exposed to a universal second-order SurrealQL injection even when query parameters are sanitized.

SurrealDB before 2.0.5, 2.1.x before 2.1.5, and 2.2.x before 2.2.2 fails to properly escape table and field names in the command-line export command. An authenticated System User with OWNER or EDITOR roles can create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL. When a higher-privileged user subsequently imports the exported backup, the injected SurrealQL executes, enabling privilege escalation and root-level takeover of the SurrealDB instance. Applications that let users define custom tables or fields are also exposed to a universal second-order SurrealQL injection even when query parameters are sanitized.

The SurrealDB command-line tool allows exporting databases through the export command. It was discovered that table or field names are not properly sanitized in exports, leading to a SurrealQL injection when the backup is reimported.

For the injection to occur, an authenticated System User with OWNER or EDITOR roles needs to create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL, subsequently exported using the export operation

The attacker could achieve a privilege escalation and root level access to the SurrealDB instance if a higher privileged user subsequently performs the import operation.

Furthermore, applications using SurrealDB that allow its users to define custom fields or tables are at risk of a universal second order SurrealQL injection, even if query parameters are properly sanitized.

This issue was discovered and patched during an code audit and penetration test of SurrealDB by cure53, the severity defined within cure53's preliminary finding is Critical, matched by our CVSS v4 assessment.

Impact

This attack can be used to perform privilege escalation and complete takeover (root access) of the SurrealDB instance, as well as being able to perform SurrealQL injection attacks against co-tenanted applications where SurrealDB is used as a shared backend for multiple applications.

Patches

A patch has been created that addresses the issue by fixing the bugs in the exporter which failed to escape some characters properly.

• Versions 2.0.5, 2.1.5, 2.2.2 and later are not affected by this issue.

Workarounds

For SurrealDB users that are unable to upgrade, users that are looking to perform import operations must manually inspect the exported data for injected statements, prior to importing.

Resources

SurrealDB Documentation - Export SurrealDB Documentation - Import SurrealDB Documentation - Authentication

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-ccj3-5p93-8p42. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

SurrealDB before 2.0.5, 2.1.x before 2.1.5, and 2.2.x before 2.2.2 fails to properly escape table and field names in the command-line export command. An authenticated System User with OWNER or EDITOR roles can create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL. When a higher-privileged user subsequently imports the exported backup, the injected SurrealQL executes, enabling privilege escalation and root-level takeover of the SurrealDB instance. Applications that let users define custom tables or fields are also exposed to a universal second-order SurrealQL injection even when query parameters are sanitized.