CVE-2026-0857

Use of a Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in Mesalvo MEONA (MEONA Server and MEONA Client) for user accounts whose password was last set under a version before MEONA 2024.10. MEONA versions before 2024.10 protected stored passwords with SHA-1 (versions from October 2015) or stored them without protection (earlier versions). Since MEONA 2024.10 (June 2024) Argon2 is the default method and every password that is set or changed is stored with Argon2; passwords last set under an earlier version keep the earlier method until they are changed. An administrator could in addition select the storage method per account. A MEONA super administrator can read the stored value of such accounts in the user administration of the MEONA Client or export it through administrative database functions. Only accounts managed locally in MEONA are affected; accounts authenticated through the operating hospital's directory service (Active Directory / Entra ID) have no password stored in MEONA. In typical installations end users authenticate through the directory service and local accounts are limited to emergency and technical accounts. Exploitation requires super administrator permissions in MEONA (or direct access to the MEONA database) from within the operating hospital's network; MEONA is operated exclusively within closed hospital networks without exposure to the public Internet, and where a hospital permits remote access to that network at all, it is only through the hospital's own remote-access infrastructure (e.g. VPN) under the hospital's control. Installations in which every password has been set or changed under MEONA 2024.10 or later are not affected. Mesalvo is not aware of any exploitation outside the reported security test. This issue affects MEONA Server and MEONA Client in versions 2024.10, 2025.04 and 2026.03 (for accounts with passwords last set under earlier versions). MEONA 2025.04.24 and 2026.03.02 (planned Q4 2026) remove the legacy storage methods, require every affected account to set a new Argon2-protected password at next logon, and no longer display stored credential values in the user administration. See Mesalvo Security Advisory MSA-2026-002.

Use of a Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in Mesalvo MEONA (MEONA Server and MEONA Client) for user accounts whose password was last set under a version before MEONA 2024.10. MEONA versions before 2024.10 protected stored passwords with SHA-1 (versions from October 2015) or stored them without protection (earlier versions). Since MEONA 2024.10 (June 2024) Argon2 is the default method and every password that is set or changed is stored with Argon2; passwords last set under an earlier version keep the earlier method until they are changed. An administrator could in addition select the storage method per account. A MEONA super administrator can read the stored value of such accounts in the user administration of the MEONA Client or export it through administrative database functions. Only accounts managed locally in MEONA are affected; accounts authenticated through the operating hospital's directory service (Active Directory / Entra ID) have no password stored in MEONA. In typical installations end users authenticate through the directory service and local accounts are limited to emergency and technical accounts. Exploitation requires super administrator permissions in MEONA (or direct access to the MEONA database) from within the operating hospital's network; MEONA is operated exclusively within closed hospital networks without exposure to the public Internet, and where a hospital permits remote access to that network at all, it is only through the hospital's own remote-access infrastructure (e.g. VPN) under the hospital's control. Installations in which every password has been set or changed under MEONA 2024.10 or later are not affected. Mesalvo is not aware of any exploitation outside the reported security test. This issue affects MEONA Server and MEONA Client in versions 2024.10, 2025.04 and 2026.03 (for accounts with passwords last set under earlier versions). MEONA 2025.04.24 and 2026.03.02 (planned Q4 2026) remove the legacy storage methods, require every affected account to set a new Argon2-protected password at next logon, and no longer display stored credential values in the user administration. See Mesalvo Security Advisory MSA-2026-002.

Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Memory vulnerability in Mesalvo Meona Client Launcher Component, Mesalvo Meona Server Component.

This issue affects Meona Client Launcher Component: through 19.06.2020 15:11:49; Meona Server Component: through 2025.04 5+323020.

Use of a Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in Mesalvo MEONA (MEONA Server and MEONA Client) for user accounts whose password was last set under a version before MEONA 2024.10. MEONA versions before 2024.10 protected stored passwords with SHA-1 (versions from October 2015) or stored them without protection (earlier versions). Since MEONA 2024.10 (June 2024) Argon2 is the default method and every password that is set or changed is stored with Argon2; passwords last set under an earlier version keep the earlier method until they are changed. An administrator could in addition select the storage method per account. A MEONA super administrator can read the stored value of such accounts in the user administration of the MEONA Client or export it through administrative database functions. Only accounts managed locally in MEONA are affected; accounts authenticated through the operating hospital's directory service (Active Directory / Entra ID) have no password stored in MEONA. In typical installations end users authenticate through the directory service and local accounts are limited to emergency and technical accounts. Exploitation requires super administrator permissions in MEONA (or direct access to the MEONA database) from within the operating hospital's network; MEONA is operated exclusively within closed hospital networks without exposure to the public Internet, and where a hospital permits remote access to that network at all, it is only through the hospital's own remote-access infrastructure (e.g. VPN) under the hospital's control. Installations in which every password has been set or changed under MEONA 2024.10 or later are not affected. Mesalvo is not aware of any exploitation outside the reported security test. This issue affects MEONA Server and MEONA Client in versions 2024.10, 2025.04 and 2026.03 (for accounts with passwords last set under earlier versions). MEONA 2025.04.24 and 2026.03.02 (planned Q4 2026) remove the legacy storage methods, require every affected account to set a new Argon2-protected password at next logon, and no longer display stored credential values in the user administration. See Mesalvo Security Advisory MSA-2026-002.