CVE-2026-102829

simple-git, an interface for running git commands in any node.js application, enables applications to execute Git operations from JavaScript. Prior to 2.0.1 of the argv-parser package, parseEnv omits VISUAL from GitEnvKeys, so prepareEnv drops the value before vulnerabilityCheck can classify it as allowUnsafeEditor. A consuming application that forwards attacker-influenced environment values can therefore allow Git to invoke an attacker-selected editor during operations such as commit amendment or interactive rebase when no higher-priority editor setting overrides VISUAL and Git's terminal prerequisites are met. The executable runs with the privileges of the Node.js process. This issue is fixed in argv-parser 2.0.1.

simple-git, an interface for running git commands in any node.js application, enables applications to execute Git operations from JavaScript. Prior to 2.0.1 of the argv-parser package, parseEnv omits VISUAL from GitEnvKeys, so prepareEnv drops the value before vulnerabilityCheck can classify it as allowUnsafeEditor. A consuming application that forwards attacker-influenced environment values can therefore allow Git to invoke an attacker-selected editor during operations such as commit amendment or interactive rebase when no higher-priority editor setting overrides VISUAL and Git's terminal prerequisites are met. The executable runs with the privileges of the Node.js process. This issue is fixed in argv-parser 2.0.1.

Security control bypass in @simple-git/argv-parser: Git's VISUAL editor fallback is not classified as allowUnsafeEditor

Report metadata

| Field | Value | | --- | --- | | Package | @simple-git/argv-parser (npm, pkg:npm/%40simple-git/argv-parser) | | Repository | https://github.com/steveukx/git-js | | Component | parseEnv (packages/argv-parser/src/env/parse-env.ts), reached via vulnerabilityCheck(tokens, env) | | Vulnerability class | Security-control bypass — incomplete denylist in unsafe-editor detection | | Verified against | c427fbad33f1f2b11341f1cf852eedecbb106400 (@simple-git/argv-parser 1.1.1), plus the published npm artifact 1.1.1; main at 98864c6 observed still unpatched | | API surface | Public documented API (parseEnv(raw) / vulnerabilityCheck(tokens, env)) | | Affected in default configuration | Yes — reproduced with blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin under default options, with no unsafe allowances enabled |

Summary

GitEnvKeys in packages/argv-parser/src/env/parse-env.ts maps only editor, git_editor and git_sequence_editor to the allowUnsafeEditor category. prepareEnv keeps an environment entry only when its lowercased name is a known GitEnvKey or starts with git, so VISUAL is discarded before collectConfigVulnerabilities ever inspects it. Git, however, falls back to VISUAL when resolving an editor, so parseEnv({ VISUAL: '/tmp/evileditor' }) reports no vulnerability while an interactive Git operation will execute that binary.

In a consuming application the shape is: environment values derived from a request or job are forwarded into the child Git environment and classified by this parser before spawn. The parser exists to classify exactly such values, and the equivalent EDITOR or GIT_EDITOR value is rejected — so the attacker gains an editor substitution that the guard is specifically designed to block.

• EDITOR -> classified allowUnsafeEditor (GitEnvKeys, lines 5-27)
• GIT_EDITOR -> classified allowUnsafeEditor (GitEnvKeys, lines 5-27)
• GIT_SEQUENCE_EDITOR -> classified allowUnsafeEditor (GitEnvKeys, lines 5-27)
• VISUAL -> absent from GitEnvKeys; dropped by prepareEnv, lines 60-68 — no vulnerability emitted

Impact

A consuming application that allows attacker-influenced environment values can have an attacker-selected executable launched by Git during operations such as git commit --amend, bypassing the parser's default unsafe-editor protection. Execution happens as the host user running the Git child process, with the attacker's binary invoked against the repository's editor file (for example .git/COMMIT_EDITMSG, or .git/rebase-merge/git-rebase-todo for git rebase -i).

The new capability is the bypass itself: without this gap, the same attacker-supplied value under EDITOR, GIT_EDITOR or GIT_SEQUENCE_EDITOR is refused unless the consumer explicitly opts in to allowUnsafeEditor. With VISUAL, the equivalent code execution proceeds with no opt-in and no reported vulnerability. VISUAL also takes precedence over EDITOR, the variable the parser does flag.

Scoring note: no CVSS vector or score is available for this finding, and one is not asserted here. Exploitability depends on the consuming application's data flow — specifically whether attacker-influenced environment entries reach the Git child environment. Consumers that never forward untrusted environment values into Git, or that always set a higher-priority GIT_EDITOR or core.editor, are not affected.

Preconditions

1. The consumer forwards attacker-influenced environment entries into the environment passed to child Git (for example via simple-git's .env()), and classifies them with this parser before spawn.
2. The Git command opens an editor — for example commit without -m, commit --amend, or rebase -i.
3. No higher-priority editor setting overrides VISUAL: GIT_EDITOR, core.editor and EDITOR are absent…

simple-git, an interface for running git commands in any node.js application, enables applications to execute Git operations from JavaScript. Prior to 2.0.1 of the argv-parser package, parseEnv omits VISUAL from GitEnvKeys, so prepareEnv drops the value before vulnerabilityCheck can classify it as allowUnsafeEditor. A consuming application that forwards attacker-influenced environment values can therefore allow Git to invoke an attacker-selected editor during operations such as commit amendment or interactive rebase when no higher-priority editor setting overrides VISUAL and Git's terminal prerequisites are met. The executable runs with the privileges of the Node.js process. This issue is fixed in argv-parser 2.0.1.

simple-git, an interface for running git commands in any node.js application, enables applications to execute Git operations from JavaScript. Prior to 2.0.1 of the argv-parser package, parseEnv omits VISUAL from GitEnvKeys, so prepareEnv drops the value before vulnerabilityCheck can classify it as allowUnsafeEditor. A consuming application that forwards attacker-influenced environment values can therefore allow Git to invoke an attacker-selected editor during operations such as commit amendment or interactive rebase when no higher-priority editor setting overrides VISUAL and Git's terminal prerequisites are met. The executable runs with the privileges of the Node.js process. This issue is fixed in argv-parser 2.0.1.

Security control bypass in @simple-git/argv-parser: Git's VISUAL editor fallback is not classified as allowUnsafeEditor

Report metadata

| Field | Value | | --- | --- | | Package | @simple-git/argv-parser (npm, pkg:npm/%40simple-git/argv-parser) | | Repository | https://github.com/steveukx/git-js | | Component | parseEnv (packages/argv-parser/src/env/parse-env.ts), reached via vulnerabilityCheck(tokens, env) | | Vulnerability class | Security-control bypass — incomplete denylist in unsafe-editor detection | | Verified against | c427fbad33f1f2b11341f1cf852eedecbb106400 (@simple-git/argv-parser 1.1.1), plus the published npm artifact 1.1.1; main at 98864c6 observed still unpatched | | API surface | Public documented API (parseEnv(raw) / vulnerabilityCheck(tokens, env)) | | Affected in default configuration | Yes — reproduced with blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin under default options, with no unsafe allowances enabled |

Summary

GitEnvKeys in packages/argv-parser/src/env/parse-env.ts maps only editor, git_editor and git_sequence_editor to the allowUnsafeEditor category. prepareEnv keeps an environment entry only when its lowercased name is a known GitEnvKey or starts with git, so VISUAL is discarded before collectConfigVulnerabilities ever inspects it. Git, however, falls back to VISUAL when resolving an editor, so parseEnv({ VISUAL: '/tmp/evileditor' }) reports no vulnerability while an interactive Git operation will execute that binary.

In a consuming application the shape is: environment values derived from a request or job are forwarded into the child Git environment and classified by this parser before spawn. The parser exists to classify exactly such values, and the equivalent EDITOR or GIT_EDITOR value is rejected — so the attacker gains an editor substitution that the guard is specifically designed to block.

• EDITOR -> classified allowUnsafeEditor (GitEnvKeys, lines 5-27)
• GIT_EDITOR -> classified allowUnsafeEditor (GitEnvKeys, lines 5-27)
• GIT_SEQUENCE_EDITOR -> classified allowUnsafeEditor (GitEnvKeys, lines 5-27)
• VISUAL -> absent from GitEnvKeys; dropped by prepareEnv, lines 60-68 — no vulnerability emitted

Impact

A consuming application that allows attacker-influenced environment values can have an attacker-selected executable launched by Git during operations such as git commit --amend, bypassing the parser's default unsafe-editor protection. Execution happens as the host user running the Git child process, with the attacker's binary invoked against the repository's editor file (for example .git/COMMIT_EDITMSG, or .git/rebase-merge/git-rebase-todo for git rebase -i).

The new capability is the bypass itself: without this gap, the same attacker-supplied value under EDITOR, GIT_EDITOR or GIT_SEQUENCE_EDITOR is refused unless the consumer explicitly opts in to allowUnsafeEditor. With VISUAL, the equivalent code execution proceeds with no opt-in and no reported vulnerability. VISUAL also takes precedence over EDITOR, the variable the parser does flag.

Scoring note: no CVSS vector or score is available for this finding, and one is not asserted here. Exploitability depends on the consuming application's data flow — specifically whether attacker-influenced environment entries reach the Git child environment. Consumers that never forward untrusted environment values into Git, or that always set a higher-priority GIT_EDITOR or core.editor, are not affected.

Preconditions

1. The consumer forwards attacker-influenced environment entries into the environment passed to child Git (for example via simple-git's .env()), and classifies them with this parser before spawn.
2. The Git command opens an editor — for example commit without -m, commit --amend, or rebase -i.
3. No higher-priority editor setting overrides VISUAL: GIT_EDITOR, core.editor and EDITOR are absent…

TuxCare rebuilt @simple-git/argv-parser to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 1.1.1-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt @simple-git/argv-parser to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 1.1.1-tuxcare.2.

Root has patched CVE-2026-102829 in the @simple-git/argv-parser package for Root:npm. Multiple fixed versions available.