CVE-2026-104434

ZcashFoundation Zebra zebra-rpc before 8.0.0 and zebrad before 4.5.0 contain a reachable assertion in the z_listunifiedreceivers RPC handler, which calls expect() on Sapling receiver parsing that fails for Unified Addresses carrying invalid Jubjub points. Authenticated RPC clients can submit such an address to abort the zebrad process, repeatably keeping the node offline.

ZcashFoundation Zebra zebra-rpc before 8.0.0 and zebrad before 4.5.0 contain a reachable assertion in the z_listunifiedreceivers RPC handler, which calls expect() on Sapling receiver parsing that fails for Unified Addresses carrying invalid Jubjub points. Authenticated RPC clients can submit such an address to abort the zebrad process, repeatably keeping the node offline.

Am I affected

You are affected if:

1. You run zebrad up to and including v4.4.1.
2. Your zebrad.toml sets rpc.listen_addr to a TCP address (RPC server is enabled).
3. An attacker can authenticate to the RPC endpoint. With the default enable_cookie_auth = true, this requires the attacker to read the .cookie file (typically local access). With enable_cookie_auth = false, any network client reaching the RPC port can trigger it.

Summary

The z_listunifiedreceivers RPC handler panics when processing a structurally valid Unified Address whose Sapling receiver carries 43 bytes that fail cryptographic validation (sapling_crypto::PaymentAddress::from_bytes returns None for non-subgroup Jubjub points). The handler calls .expect("using data already decoded as valid") on the fallible result. Because Zebra's release profile sets panic = "abort", the panic terminates the entire node process, not just the RPC task.

Details

zcash_address::unified::Encoding::decode validates only the structural envelope of a Unified Address (F4Jumble, bech32m, typecode ordering, 43-byte length for Sapling). It does not validate that the embedded pk_d is a valid Jubjub subgroup point or that the diversifier produces a valid g_d preimage.

At zebra-rpc/src/methods.rs:2893, the handler calls Address::try_from_sapling(network, data), which delegates to sapling_crypto::PaymentAddress::from_bytes. When from_bytes returns None (most random 32-byte strings fail the subgroup check), the .expect() fires and the process aborts.

The same crate already handles this correctly in try_from_unified at zebra-chain/src/primitives/address.rs:99-110, which returns Err when from_bytes fails. The vulnerable code path bypasses this validated route.

Patches

zebra-rpc 8.0.0 and zebrad 4.5.0.

Replace .expect() with .map_err(|e| ErrorObject::owned(...)) for proper error propagation, or route through the existing try_from_unified path which already handles this case correctly.

Workarounds

• Disable the RPC server by removing rpc.listen_addr from zebrad.toml.
• Ensure enable_cookie_auth = true (the default) and restrict filesystem access to the .cookie file.
• Place a reverse proxy in front of the RPC port that rejects z_listunifiedreceivers calls with untrusted address parameters.

Impact

A single authenticated RPC request terminates the zebrad process. The attack is repeatable on restart (the same request triggers the same abort), allowing an attacker to keep the node down indefinitely until the request is filtered upstream. Operators using lightwalletd backends, Zaino indexers, or mining pool infrastructure that forward RPC calls to zebrad may be exposed if the forwarding path passes through z_listunifiedreceivers.

Credit

Reported by @robustfengbin via a private GitHub Security Advisory submission.

ZcashFoundation Zebra zebra-rpc before 8.0.0 and zebrad before 4.5.0 contain a reachable assertion in the z_listunifiedreceivers RPC handler, which calls expect() on Sapling receiver parsing that fails for Unified Addresses carrying invalid Jubjub points. Authenticated RPC clients can submit such an address to abort the zebrad process, repeatably keeping the node offline.

ZcashFoundation Zebra zebra-rpc before 8.0.0 and zebrad before 4.5.0 contain a reachable assertion in the z_listunifiedreceivers RPC handler, which calls expect() on Sapling receiver parsing that fails for Unified Addresses carrying invalid Jubjub points. Authenticated RPC clients can submit such an address to abort the zebrad process, repeatably keeping the node offline.

ZcashFoundation Zebra zebra-rpc before 8.0.0 and zebrad before 4.5.0 contain a reachable assertion in the z_listunifiedreceivers RPC handler, which calls expect() on Sapling receiver parsing that fails for Unified Addresses carrying invalid Jubjub points. Authenticated RPC clients can submit such an address to abort the zebrad process, repeatably keeping the node offline.

Am I affected

You are affected if:

1. You run zebrad up to and including v4.4.1.
2. Your zebrad.toml sets rpc.listen_addr to a TCP address (RPC server is enabled).
3. An attacker can authenticate to the RPC endpoint. With the default enable_cookie_auth = true, this requires the attacker to read the .cookie file (typically local access). With enable_cookie_auth = false, any network client reaching the RPC port can trigger it.

Summary

The z_listunifiedreceivers RPC handler panics when processing a structurally valid Unified Address whose Sapling receiver carries 43 bytes that fail cryptographic validation (sapling_crypto::PaymentAddress::from_bytes returns None for non-subgroup Jubjub points). The handler calls .expect("using data already decoded as valid") on the fallible result. Because Zebra's release profile sets panic = "abort", the panic terminates the entire node process, not just the RPC task.

Details

zcash_address::unified::Encoding::decode validates only the structural envelope of a Unified Address (F4Jumble, bech32m, typecode ordering, 43-byte length for Sapling). It does not validate that the embedded pk_d is a valid Jubjub subgroup point or that the diversifier produces a valid g_d preimage.

At zebra-rpc/src/methods.rs:2893, the handler calls Address::try_from_sapling(network, data), which delegates to sapling_crypto::PaymentAddress::from_bytes. When from_bytes returns None (most random 32-byte strings fail the subgroup check), the .expect() fires and the process aborts.

The same crate already handles this correctly in try_from_unified at zebra-chain/src/primitives/address.rs:99-110, which returns Err when from_bytes fails. The vulnerable code path bypasses this validated route.

Patches

zebra-rpc 8.0.0 and zebrad 4.5.0.

Replace .expect() with .map_err(|e| ErrorObject::owned(...)) for proper error propagation, or route through the existing try_from_unified path which already handles this case correctly.

Workarounds

• Disable the RPC server by removing rpc.listen_addr from zebrad.toml.
• Ensure enable_cookie_auth = true (the default) and restrict filesystem access to the .cookie file.
• Place a reverse proxy in front of the RPC port that rejects z_listunifiedreceivers calls with untrusted address parameters.

Impact

A single authenticated RPC request terminates the zebrad process. The attack is repeatable on restart (the same request triggers the same abort), allowing an attacker to keep the node down indefinitely until the request is filtered upstream. Operators using lightwalletd backends, Zaino indexers, or mining pool infrastructure that forward RPC calls to zebrad may be exposed if the forwarding path passes through z_listunifiedreceivers.

Credit

Reported by @robustfengbin via a private GitHub Security Advisory submission.