Every CVE Search/ Get API key

CVE-2026-104795

Insights-runtime-extractor: insights-runtime-extractor: container escape via privileged binary execution

8.8 High

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (hostPID: true) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator:

  1. fork()s a child process
  2. setns() into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
  3. fchdir() back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where /crio.sock is hostPath-mounted)
  4. Calls only seteuid(target_uid) — changing the effective UID but leaving the real UID and saved-set-UID at 0 and retaining the permitted capability set
  5. The check_no_privileged_perms() guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0
  6. The VersionExecutable fingerprint invokes fpr_kind_executable with process.command_line[0] — the target's argv[0], read from /proc/<pid>/cmdline and fully controlled by the workload
  7. fpr_kind_executable calls exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() — executing the workload's own binary inside the workload's mount namespace while ruid=0 in the host user namespace

The executed process can call setuid(0) to restore full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.

Affected Code

1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

File: extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs

// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
        .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);
// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
    debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}

2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)

File: fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go

// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]
func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {
    out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
    if err != nil {
        return "", err
    }
    return string(out), nil
}

3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)

File: version_executable.rs

// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint
return Some(vec![
    fpr_kind_executable,
    out_dir.to_string(),
    String::from(&process.command_line[0]),
    String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),
]);

Attack Pattern

Attacker: Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) Victim: The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet Trigger: Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node

Attack sequence:

  1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (node, python, python3, MainThread, or contains java)
  2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls setuid(0) to restore root
  3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0
  4. The attacker's code regains full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the host user namespace
  5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.18%Unchanged since Oct 15, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 8.8

Insights-runtime-extractor: insights-runtime-extractor: container escape via privileged binary execution

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (hostPID: true) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator:

  1. fork()s a child process
  2. setns() into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
  3. fchdir() back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where /crio.sock is hostPath-mounted)
  4. Calls only seteuid(target_uid) — changing the effective UID but leaving the real UID and saved-set-UID at 0 and retaining the permitted capability set
  5. The check_no_privileged_perms() guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0
  6. The VersionExecutable fingerprint invokes fpr_kind_executable with process.command_line[0] — the target's argv[0], read from /proc/<pid>/cmdline and fully controlled by the workload
  7. fpr_kind_executable calls exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() — executing the workload's own binary inside the workload's mount namespace while ruid=0 in the host user namespace

The executed process can call setuid(0) to restore full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.

Affected Code

1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

File: extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs

// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
        .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);
// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
    debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}

2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)

File: fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go

// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]
func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {
    out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
    if err != nil {
        return "", err
    }
    return string(out), nil
}

3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)

File: version_executable.rs

// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint
return Some(vec![
    fpr_kind_executable,
    out_dir.to_string(),
    String::from(&process.command_line[0]),
    String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),
]);

Attack Pattern

Attacker: Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) Victim: The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet Trigger: Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node

Attack sequence:

  1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (node, python, python3, MainThread, or contains java)
  2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls setuid(0) to restore root
  3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0
  4. The attacker's code regains full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the host user namespace
  5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise
Record
CVE-2026-104795
CVSS 3.1
8.8 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-250
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-100981 8.8

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (hostPID: true) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator:

  1. fork()s a child process
  2. setns() into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
  3. fchdir() back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where /crio.sock is hostPath-mounted)
  4. Calls only seteuid(target_uid) — changing the effective UID but leaving the real UID and saved-set-UID at 0 and retaining the permitted capability set
  5. The check_no_privileged_perms() guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0
  6. The VersionExecutable fingerprint invokes fpr_kind_executable with process.command_line[0] — the target's argv[0], read from /proc/<pid>/cmdline and fully controlled by the workload
  7. fpr_kind_executable calls exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() — executing the workload's own binary inside the workload's mount namespace while ruid=0 in the host user namespace

The executed process can call setuid(0) to restore full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.

Affected Code

1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

File: extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs

// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
        .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);
// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
    debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}

2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)

File: fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go

// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]
func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {
    out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
    if err != nil {
        return "", err
    }
    return string(out), nil
}

3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)

File: version_executable.rs

// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint
return Some(vec![
    fpr_kind_executable,
    out_dir.to_string(),
    String::from(&process.command_line[0]),
    String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),
]);

Attack Pattern

Attacker: Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) Victim: The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet Trigger: Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node

Attack sequence:

  1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (node, python, python3, MainThread, or contains java)
  2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls setuid(0) to restore root
  3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0
  4. The attacker's code regains full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the host user namespace
  5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise
Record
EUVD-2026-100981
CVSS 3.1
8.8 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-98f3-7g2j-289q 8.8

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans...

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (hostPID: true) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator:

  1. fork()s a child process
  2. setns() into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
  3. fchdir() back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where /crio.sock is hostPath-mounted)
  4. Calls only seteuid(target_uid) — changing the effective UID but leaving the real UID and saved-set-UID at 0 and retaining the permitted capability set
  5. The check_no_privileged_perms() guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0
  6. The VersionExecutable fingerprint invokes fpr_kind_executable with process.command_line[0] — the target's argv[0], read from /proc/<pid>/cmdline and fully controlled by the workload
  7. fpr_kind_executable calls exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() — executing the workload's own binary inside the workload's mount namespace while ruid=0 in the host user namespace

The executed process can call setuid(0) to restore full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.

Affected Code

1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

File: extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs

// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
        .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);
// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
    debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}

2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)

File: fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go

// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]
func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {
    out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
    if err != nil {
        return "", err
    }
    return string(out), nil
}

3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)

File: version_executable.rs

// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint
return Some(vec![
    fpr_kind_executable,
    out_dir.to_string(),
    String::from(&process.command_line[0]),
    String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),
]);

Attack Pattern

Attacker: Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) Victim: The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet Trigger: Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node

Attack sequence:

  1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (node, python, python3, MainThread, or contains java)
  2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls setuid(0) to restore root
  3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0
  4. The attacker's code regains full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the host user namespace
  5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise
Record
GHSA-98f3-7g2j-289q
CVSS 3.1
8.8 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-250
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 8.8

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (hostPID: true) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator:

  1. fork()s a child process
  2. setns() into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
  3. fchdir() back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where /crio.sock is hostPath-mounted)
  4. Calls only seteuid(target_uid) — changing the effective UID but leaving the real UID and saved-set-UID at 0 and retaining the permitted capability set
  5. The check_no_privileged_perms() guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0
  6. The VersionExecutable fingerprint invokes fpr_kind_executable with process.command_line[0] — the target's argv[0], read from /proc/<pid>/cmdline and fully controlled by the workload
  7. fpr_kind_executable calls exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() — executing the workload's own binary inside the workload's mount namespace while ruid=0 in the host user namespace

The executed process can call setuid(0) to restore full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.

Affected Code

1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

File: extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs

// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
        .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);
// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
    debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}

2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)

File: fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go

// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]
func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {
    out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
    if err != nil {
        return "", err
    }
    return string(out), nil
}

3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)

File: version_executable.rs

// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint
return Some(vec![
    fpr_kind_executable,
    out_dir.to_string(),
    String::from(&process.command_line[0]),
    String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),
]);

Attack Pattern

Attacker: Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) Victim: The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet Trigger: Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node

Attack sequence:

  1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (node, python, python3, MainThread, or contains java)
  2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls setuid(0) to restore root
  3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0
  4. The attacker's code regains full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the host user namespace
  5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise
Record
CVE-2026-104795
CVSS 3.1
8.8 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-250
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-104795 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.8) in Red Hat Openshift Container Platform 4.19, published October 14, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.18%, the 7th percentile. No source names a fixed version.

References

MoveEnter Open