CVE-2026-104797

The Advanced Form Integration — Connect Forms to 300+ Apps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Unverified Password Change in all versions up to, and including, 2.9.0 The adfoin_ultimatememberac_send_data function, which powers the Ultimate Member "Update Profile Field" action, resolves the target WordPress user from an attacker-supplied email address and passes an attacker-controlled field key and value directly to UM()->user()->update_profile() in the account context — which explicitly bypasses Ultimate Member's banned-key validation — without performing any submitter identity verification, ownership check, capability check, current-password reauthentication, or restriction on sensitive keys such as user_pass. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any WordPress user account, including Administrator accounts, by submitting a public Contact Form 7 form with a target email and user_pass as the field key, enabling full site takeover. Exploitation requires an administrator to have pre-configured a Contact Form 7 integration that maps the target email, field key, and value from public form inputs to the Ultimate Member Update Profile Field action — the exact workflow the plugin's own UI advertises for this action type.

The Advanced Form Integration — Connect Forms to 300+ Apps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Unverified Password Change in all versions up to, and including, 2.9.0 The adfoin_ultimatememberac_send_data function, which powers the Ultimate Member "Update Profile Field" action, resolves the target WordPress user from an attacker-supplied email address and passes an attacker-controlled field key and value directly to UM()->user()->update_profile() in the account context — which explicitly bypasses Ultimate Member's banned-key validation — without performing any submitter identity verification, ownership check, capability check, current-password reauthentication, or restriction on sensitive keys such as user_pass. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any WordPress user account, including Administrator accounts, by submitting a public Contact Form 7 form with a target email and user_pass as the field key, enabling full site takeover. Exploitation requires an administrator to have pre-configured a Contact Form 7 integration that maps the target email, field key, and value from public form inputs to the Ultimate Member Update Profile Field action — the exact workflow the plugin's own UI advertises for this action type.

The Advanced Form Integration — Connect Forms to 300+ Apps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Unverified Password Change in all versions up to, and including, 2.9.0 The adfoin_ultimatememberac_send_data function, which powers the Ultimate Member "Update Profile Field" action, resolves the target WordPress user from an attacker-supplied email address and passes an attacker-controlled field key and value directly to UM()->user()->update_profile() in the account context — which explicitly bypasses Ultimate Member's banned-key validation — without performing any submitter identity verification, ownership check, capability check, current-password reauthentication, or restriction on sensitive keys such as user_pass. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any WordPress user account, including Administrator accounts, by submitting a public Contact Form 7 form with a target email and user_pass as the field key, enabling full site takeover. Exploitation requires an administrator to have pre-configured a Contact Form 7 integration that maps the target email, field key, and value from public form inputs to the Ultimate Member Update Profile Field action — the exact workflow the plugin's own UI advertises for this action type.

The Advanced Form Integration — Connect Forms to 300+ Apps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Unverified Password Change in all versions up to, and including, 2.9.0 The adfoin_ultimatememberac_send_data function, which powers the Ultimate Member "Update Profile Field" action, resolves the target WordPress user from an attacker-supplied email address and passes an attacker-controlled field key and value directly to UM()->user()->update_profile() in the account context — which explicitly bypasses Ultimate Member's banned-key validation — without performing any submitter identity verification, ownership check, capability check, current-password reauthentication, or restriction on sensitive keys such as user_pass. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any WordPress user account, including Administrator accounts, by submitting a public Contact Form 7 form with a target email and user_pass as the field key, enabling full site takeover. Exploitation requires an administrator to have pre-configured a Contact Form 7 integration that maps the target email, field key, and value from public form inputs to the Ultimate Member Update Profile Field action — the exact workflow the plugin's own UI advertises for this action type.