CVE-2026-104845

Seroval facilitates JS value stringification, including complex structures beyond JSON.stringify capabilities. Prior to 1.6.3, deserializeTypedArray in fromJSON and fromCrossJSON trusts a deserialized source value as an ArrayBuffer and does not bound the serialized element count. An attacker can provide a small untrusted JSON object with a large length value, causing the array-like TypedArray constructor to synchronously allocate the selected number of elements and exhaust CPU or memory while starving the event loop. The offset check does not reject the crafted source because source.byteLength is undefined. DataView reaches a similar unchecked cast but throws rather than allocating, and the issue has no identified confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.3.

Seroval facilitates JS value stringification, including complex structures beyond JSON.stringify capabilities. Prior to 1.6.3, deserializeTypedArray in fromJSON and fromCrossJSON trusts a deserialized source value as an ArrayBuffer and does not bound the serialized element count. An attacker can provide a small untrusted JSON object with a large length value, causing the array-like TypedArray constructor to synchronously allocate the selected number of elements and exhaust CPU or memory while starving the event loop. The offset check does not reject the crafted source because source.byteLength is undefined. DataView reaches a similar unchecked cast but throws rather than allocating, and the issue has no identified confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.3.

Summary

deserializeTypedArray casts the source node to ArrayBuffer without checking it and never bounds the element count. Pass a plain object with a length property and it hits the array-like TypedArray constructor, allocating that many elements. The offset guard above it can't stop this: source.byteLength is undefined, so the comparison is always false.

The length is one integer in the JSON, so a tiny payload can name any allocation size, and it runs synchronously inside fromJSON, starving the event loop instead of just slowing one request. fromCrossJSON is the same.

Impact is unauthenticated CPU/memory exhaustion for any service deserializing untrusted Seroval JSON: same profile as the array-length and nested-depth DoS issues already fixed here. No confidentiality or integrity impact. DataView has the same unchecked cast but throws instead of allocating. A runtime instanceof ArrayBuffer check plus a size cap should fix it.

Seroval facilitates JS value stringification, including complex structures beyond JSON.stringify capabilities. Prior to 1.6.3, deserializeTypedArray in fromJSON and fromCrossJSON trusts a deserialized source value as an ArrayBuffer and does not bound the serialized element count. An attacker can provide a small untrusted JSON object with a large length value, causing the array-like TypedArray constructor to synchronously allocate the selected number of elements and exhaust CPU or memory while starving the event loop. The offset check does not reject the crafted source because source.byteLength is undefined. DataView reaches a similar unchecked cast but throws rather than allocating, and the issue has no identified confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.3.

Seroval facilitates JS value stringification, including complex structures beyond JSON.stringify capabilities. Prior to 1.6.3, deserializeTypedArray in fromJSON and fromCrossJSON trusts a deserialized source value as an ArrayBuffer and does not bound the serialized element count. An attacker can provide a small untrusted JSON object with a large length value, causing the array-like TypedArray constructor to synchronously allocate the selected number of elements and exhaust CPU or memory while starving the event loop. The offset check does not reject the crafted source because source.byteLength is undefined. DataView reaches a similar unchecked cast but throws rather than allocating, and the issue has no identified confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.3.

Summary

deserializeTypedArray casts the source node to ArrayBuffer without checking it and never bounds the element count. Pass a plain object with a length property and it hits the array-like TypedArray constructor, allocating that many elements. The offset guard above it can't stop this: source.byteLength is undefined, so the comparison is always false.

The length is one integer in the JSON, so a tiny payload can name any allocation size, and it runs synchronously inside fromJSON, starving the event loop instead of just slowing one request. fromCrossJSON is the same.

Impact is unauthenticated CPU/memory exhaustion for any service deserializing untrusted Seroval JSON: same profile as the array-length and nested-depth DoS issues already fixed here. No confidentiality or integrity impact. DataView has the same unchecked cast but throws instead of allocating. A runtime instanceof ArrayBuffer check plus a size cap should fix it.

TuxCare rebuilt seroval to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 1.5.6-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt seroval-plugins to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 1.5.6-tuxcare.1.