CVE-2026-105744
Docling: Arbitrary file read/write (and command execution when shell-escape is enabled) when rendering untrusted TikZ with the opt-in Tectonic engine
Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.94.0 until 2.132.0, callers that opt into LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic") invoke docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py to compile an untrusted TikZ body and document preamble without restricting TeX file primitives including \openin and \openout. Crafted input can read files available to the converter and create or overwrite writable files, and enabling the tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape option additionally permits shell commands through TeX. The default configuration, which does not enable Tectonic rendering, is not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.132.0.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- Required
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
7.5
Docling: Arbitrary file read/write (and command execution when shell-escape is enabled) when rendering untrusted TikZ with the opt-in Tectonic engine
Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.94.0 until 2.132.0, callers that opt into LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic") invoke docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py to compile an untrusted TikZ body and document preamble without restricting TeX file primitives including \openin and \openout. Crafted input can read files available to the converter and create or overwrite writable files, and enabling the tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape option additionally permits shell commands through TeX. The default configuration, which does not enable Tectonic rendering, is not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.132.0.
- Record
CVE-2026-105744- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-22, CWE-73, CWE-1188
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-92804
7.5
Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.94.0 until 2.132.0, callers that opt into LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic") invoke docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py to compile an untrusted TikZ body and document preamble without restricting TeX file primitives including \openin and \openout. Crafted input can read files available to the converter and create or overwrite writable files, and enabling the tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape option additionally permits shell commands through TeX. The default configuration, which does not enable Tectonic rendering, is not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.132.0.
- Record
EUVD-2026-92804- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-x3q2-h9hx-4r4j
7.5
Docling has arbitrary file read/write (and command execution when shell-escape is enabled) when rendering untrusted TikZ with the opt-in Tectonic engine
Summary
When the LaTeX backend is configured to render TikZ pictures with the Tectonic engine (LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic")), the TikZ body and the document preamble from the input file are compiled by Tectonic without any restriction on TeX's file primitives. A crafted .tex file can read files the process can read and write files at paths the process can write. If the caller also sets tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=True, the document can run shell commands through \write18.
Details
docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py writes the picture source into a temporary document and runs the tectonic binary on it. _resolve_local_dependency only decides which files are staged into the temporary directory. It does not limit what TeX opens at compile time, so:
\input{/abs/path},\verbatiminput{...}and\openinread arbitrary files, and their content can be typeset into the rendered picture that ends up in the conversion output. For an in-memoryDocumentStream, staging is skipped entirely.\immediate\openout/\writecreate or overwrite files outside the temporary directory. Neither needs shell escape. Tectonic's--untrustedflag does not block them either.
Separately, the TectonicEngine constructor defaults to allow_shell_escape=True. The LaTeX backend always passes tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape explicitly (default False), so this default only affects code that instantiates TectonicEngine directly.
Affected configurations
- Affected: callers that set
tikz_engine="tectonic", have atectonicbinary available (onPATHor in the docling cache), and convert untrusted LaTeX. - Not affected: the default configuration (
tikz_engine=None). docling does not installtectonicautomatically, and the CLI exposes no option to enable it.
Impact
Disclosure of local files readable by the process, and creation or overwrite of files writable by the process. Writing to startup or configuration files can lead to code execution. With shell escape enabled, commands run directly.
Proof of concept
\documentclass{article}
\usepackage{tikz}
\begin{document}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\immediate\openout15=/tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt
\immediate\write15{written by the input document}
\immediate\closeout15
\node {x};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{document}
Converting this file with LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic") creates /tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt.
Patches
Mitigated in docling 2.132.0 by #4419:
TectonicEnginenow defaults toallow_shell_escape=False, and without shell escape Tectonic runs with--untrustedand--only-cached.- Before compiling, docling checks the generated document and every staged file. It skips rendering, and keeps the diagram as TikZ code, when the source uses the
\openin,\openout,\XeTeXpicfileor\XeTeXpdffileprimitives, or names an absolute, home, drive-letter or parent-directory path in\input,\include,\includegraphics,\InputIfFileExistsor\graphicspath.
This check is best-effort. It reads the source text, and TeX can open files in ways a text check cannot see, for example through package commands or names built by macros. As documented in the pipeline options reference, untrusted LaTeX rendered with tikz_engine="tectonic" should still be processed in an isolated environment.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 2.132.0. For older versions:
- Do not enable
tikz_engine="tectonic"for untrusted input, or run the conversion in an OS-level sandbox (container, no host mounts, read-only filesystem, no network). - Never set
tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=Truefor untrusted input.
- Record
GHSA-x3q2-h9hx-4r4j- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-22, CWE-73, CWE-1188
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
7.5
Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.94.0 until 2.132.0, callers that opt into LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic") invoke docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py to compile an untrusted TikZ body and document preamble without restricting TeX file primitives including \openin and \openout. Crafted input can read files available to the converter and create or overwrite writable files, and enabling the tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape option additionally permits shell commands through TeX. The default configuration, which does not enable Tectonic rendering, is not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.132.0.
- Record
CVE-2026-105744- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-22, CWE-73, CWE-1188
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
7.5
Docling: Arbitrary file read/write (and command execution when shell-escape is enabled) when rendering untrusted TikZ with the opt-in Tectonic engine
Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.94.0 until 2.132.0, callers that opt into LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic") invoke docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py to compile an untrusted TikZ body and document preamble without restricting TeX file primitives including \openin and \openout. Crafted input can read files available to the converter and create or overwrite writable files, and enabling the tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape option additionally permits shell commands through TeX. The default configuration, which does not enable Tectonic rendering, is not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.132.0.
- Record
CVE-2026-105744- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-1188, CWE-22, CWE-73
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-x3q2-h9hx-4r4j
7.5
Docling has arbitrary file read/write (and command execution when shell-escape is enabled) when rendering untrusted TikZ with the opt-in Tectonic engine
Summary
When the LaTeX backend is configured to render TikZ pictures with the Tectonic engine (LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic")), the TikZ body and the document preamble from the input file are compiled by Tectonic without any restriction on TeX's file primitives. A crafted .tex file can read files the process can read and write files at paths the process can write. If the caller also sets tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=True, the document can run shell commands through \write18.
Details
docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py writes the picture source into a temporary document and runs the tectonic binary on it. _resolve_local_dependency only decides which files are staged into the temporary directory. It does not limit what TeX opens at compile time, so:
\input{/abs/path},\verbatiminput{...}and\openinread arbitrary files, and their content can be typeset into the rendered picture that ends up in the conversion output. For an in-memoryDocumentStream, staging is skipped entirely.\immediate\openout/\writecreate or overwrite files outside the temporary directory. Neither needs shell escape. Tectonic's--untrustedflag does not block them either.
Separately, the TectonicEngine constructor defaults to allow_shell_escape=True. The LaTeX backend always passes tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape explicitly (default False), so this default only affects code that instantiates TectonicEngine directly.
Affected configurations
- Affected: callers that set
tikz_engine="tectonic", have atectonicbinary available (onPATHor in the docling cache), and convert untrusted LaTeX. - Not affected: the default configuration (
tikz_engine=None). docling does not installtectonicautomatically, and the CLI exposes no option to enable it.
Impact
Disclosure of local files readable by the process, and creation or overwrite of files writable by the process. Writing to startup or configuration files can lead to code execution. With shell escape enabled, commands run directly.
Proof of concept
\documentclass{article}
\usepackage{tikz}
\begin{document}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\immediate\openout15=/tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt
\immediate\write15{written by the input document}
\immediate\closeout15
\node {x};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{document}
Converting this file with LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic") creates /tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt.
Patches
Mitigated in docling 2.132.0 by #4419:
TectonicEnginenow defaults toallow_shell_escape=False, and without shell escape Tectonic runs with--untrustedand--only-cached.- Before compiling, docling checks the generated document and every staged file. It skips rendering, and keeps the diagram as TikZ code, when the source uses the
\openin,\openout,\XeTeXpicfileor\XeTeXpdffileprimitives, or names an absolute, home, drive-letter or parent-directory path in\input,\include,\includegraphics,\InputIfFileExistsor\graphicspath.
This check is best-effort. It reads the source text, and TeX can open files in ways a text check cannot see, for example through package commands or names built by macros. As documented in the pipeline options reference, untrusted LaTeX rendered with tikz_engine="tectonic" should still be processed in an isolated environment.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 2.132.0. For older versions:
- Do not enable
tikz_engine="tectonic"for untrusted input, or run the conversion in an OS-level sandbox (container, no host mounts, read-only filesystem, no network). - Never set
tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=Truefor untrusted input.
- Record
GHSA-x3q2-h9hx-4r4j- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-1188, CWE-22, CWE-73
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVPYSEC-2026-4191
8.8
Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.94.0 until 2.132.0, callers that opt into LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic") invoke docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py to compile an untrusted TikZ body and document preamble without restricting TeX file primitives including \openin and \openout. Crafted input can read files available to the converter and create or overwrite writable files, and enabling the tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape option additionally permits shell commands through TeX. The default configuration, which does not enable Tectonic rendering, is not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.132.0.
- Record
PYSEC-2026-4191- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVPYSEC-2026-4216
7.5
Docling has arbitrary file read/write (and command execution when shell-escape is enabled) when rendering untrusted TikZ with the opt-in Tectonic engine
Summary
When the LaTeX backend is configured to render TikZ pictures with the Tectonic engine (LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic")), the TikZ body and the document preamble from the input file are compiled by Tectonic without any restriction on TeX's file primitives. A crafted .tex file can read files the process can read and write files at paths the process can write. If the caller also sets tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=True, the document can run shell commands through \write18.
Details
docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py writes the picture source into a temporary document and runs the tectonic binary on it. _resolve_local_dependency only decides which files are staged into the temporary directory. It does not limit what TeX opens at compile time, so:
\input{/abs/path},\verbatiminput{...}and\openinread arbitrary files, and their content can be typeset into the rendered picture that ends up in the conversion output. For an in-memoryDocumentStream, staging is skipped entirely.\immediate\openout/\writecreate or overwrite files outside the temporary directory. Neither needs shell escape. Tectonic's--untrustedflag does not block them either.
Separately, the TectonicEngine constructor defaults to allow_shell_escape=True. The LaTeX backend always passes tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape explicitly (default False), so this default only affects code that instantiates TectonicEngine directly.
Affected configurations
- Affected: callers that set
tikz_engine="tectonic", have atectonicbinary available (onPATHor in the docling cache), and convert untrusted LaTeX. - Not affected: the default configuration (
tikz_engine=None). docling does not installtectonicautomatically, and the CLI exposes no option to enable it.
Impact
Disclosure of local files readable by the process, and creation or overwrite of files writable by the process. Writing to startup or configuration files can lead to code execution. With shell escape enabled, commands run directly.
Proof of concept
\documentclass{article}
\usepackage{tikz}
\begin{document}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\immediate\openout15=/tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt
\immediate\write15{written by the input document}
\immediate\closeout15
\node {x};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{document}
Converting this file with LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic") creates /tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt.
Patches
Mitigated in docling 2.132.0 by #4419:
TectonicEnginenow defaults toallow_shell_escape=False, and without shell escape Tectonic runs with--untrustedand--only-cached.- Before compiling, docling checks the generated document and every staged file. It skips rendering, and keeps the diagram as TikZ code, when the source uses the
\openin,\openout,\XeTeXpicfileor\XeTeXpdffileprimitives, or names an absolute, home, drive-letter or parent-directory path in\input,\include,\includegraphics,\InputIfFileExistsor\graphicspath.
This check is best-effort. It reads the source text, and TeX can open files in ways a text check cannot see, for example through package commands or names built by macros. As documented in the pipeline options reference, untrusted LaTeX rendered with tikz_engine="tectonic" should still be processed in an isolated environment.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 2.132.0. For older versions:
- Do not enable
tikz_engine="tectonic"for untrusted input, or run the conversion in an OS-level sandbox (container, no host mounts, read-only filesystem, no network). - Never set
tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=Truefor untrusted input.
- Record
PYSEC-2026-4216- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
doclingPyPI |
2.94.0 up to 2.132.0 | 2.132.0 |
docling-slimPyPI |
2.94.0 up to 2.132.0 | 2.132.0 |
doclingPyPI |
2.94.0 up to 2.132.0, plus listed versions 2.100.02.101.02.102.02.102.12.102.2 Show 39 moreShow less2.103.02.104.02.105.02.106.02.107.02.108.02.109.02.110.02.111.02.112.02.113.02.114.02.115.02.116.02.117.02.118.02.118.12.119.02.120.12.120.22.120.32.121.02.122.02.123.02.123.12.124.02.125.02.126.02.127.02.128.02.129.02.130.02.131.02.95.02.96.02.96.12.97.02.98.02.99.0 |
2.132.0 |
docling-slimPyPI |
2.94.0 up to 2.132.0, plus listed versions 2.100.02.101.02.102.02.102.12.102.2 Show 39 moreShow less2.103.02.104.02.105.02.106.02.107.02.108.02.109.02.110.02.111.02.112.02.113.02.114.02.115.02.116.02.117.02.118.02.118.12.119.02.120.12.120.22.120.32.121.02.122.02.123.02.123.12.124.02.125.02.126.02.127.02.128.02.129.02.130.02.131.02.95.02.96.02.96.12.97.02.98.02.99.0 |
2.132.0 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-105744 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) in Docling, published October 5, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.37%, the 30th percentile. Fixed in docling 2.132.0.
References
github.com/docling-project/docling/security/advisories/GHSA-x3q2-h9hx-4r4j
github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/4419
github.com/docling-project/docling/commit/38b6fa0a465d46fdacbbec333f50fa19c4f6b342
github.com/docling-project/docling/releases/tag/v2.132.0
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105744
github.com/advisories/GHSA-x3q2-h9hx-4r4j
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/105xxx/CVE-2026-105744.json
github.com/docling-project/docling
pypi.org/project/docling-slim