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CVE-2026-105751

Docling: Arbitrary local file read via draw:image xlink:href in the OpenDocument backend

6.9 MediumFix available

Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.107.0 until 2.120.3, docling/backend/opendocument_backend.py uses the xlink:href attribute value of a draw:image element as a filesystem path when the referenced part is not found in the document archive. The _image_ref_from_odf_image function reads that attacker-controlled path without a scheme check, extraction-directory confinement, or the enable_local_fetch setting used by other backends. Readable files that Pillow can decode as images are embedded in converted output, and other existing paths can be distinguished through the attempted read. This issue is fixed in 2.120.3.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
Active

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.42%Up 0.1 points since Oct 6, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 6.9

Docling: Arbitrary local file read via draw:image xlink:href in the OpenDocument backend

Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.107.0 until 2.120.3, docling/backend/opendocument_backend.py uses the xlink:href attribute value of a draw:image element as a filesystem path when the referenced part is not found in the document archive. The _image_ref_from_odf_image function reads that attacker-controlled path without a scheme check, extraction-directory confinement, or the enable_local_fetch setting used by other backends. Readable files that Pillow can decode as images are embedded in converted output, and other existing paths can be distinguished through the attempted read. This issue is fixed in 2.120.3.

Record
CVE-2026-105751
CVSS 4.0
6.9 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-92815 6.9

Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.107.0 until 2.120.3, docling/backend/opendocument_backend.py uses the xlink:href attribute value of a draw:image element as a filesystem path when the referenced part is not found in the document archive. The _image_ref_from_odf_image function reads that attacker-controlled path without a scheme check, extraction-directory confinement, or the enable_local_fetch setting used by other backends. Readable files that Pillow can decode as images are embedded in converted output, and other existing paths can be distinguished through the attempted read. This issue is fixed in 2.120.3.

Record
EUVD-2026-92815
CVSS 4.0
6.9 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-4xhp-xg4w-8ppm 6.9

Docling: Arbitrary local file read via draw:image xlink:href in the OpenDocument backend

Summary

The ODF backend resolves the xlink:href of a draw:image element as a filesystem path whenever the referenced part is not found inside the document archive. The value comes straight from content.xml, so it is document content, and it is used with no scheme check, no confinement to the extraction directory, and without consulting the enable_local_fetch / enable_remote_fetch controls that the other backends use for exactly this decision.

Converting a crafted .odt therefore causes Docling to open an attacker-named absolute path on the converting host. Where the target decodes as an image, its complete contents are embedded in the resulting DoclingDocument and appear in the HTML, Markdown and JSON exports.

Both the read and the disclosure are confirmed by execution. The trigger is a 452-byte archive containing two entries.

Affected component

docling/backend/opendocument_backend.py, in _image_ref_from_odf_image:

image_url = _odf_image_href(image)
...
if image_data is None and odf_obj is not None and image_url:
    try:
        image_data = odf_obj.get_part(image_url)
    except Exception:
        image_data = None
 
if image_data is None and image_url:
    image_path = Path(image_url)
    if image_path.is_file():
        image_data = image_path.read_bytes()

_odf_image_href returns the xlink:href attribute. The in-archive lookup is attempted first; when it fails, the same string is handed to Path and read from disk.

The only filter on the way in is _odf_image_can_be_bitmap, which admits any path whose suffix is one of .bmp, .gif, .jpeg, .jpg, .png, .tif, .tiff, .webp, or empty. The empty-suffix case is what admits most paths of interest on a Unix host, /etc/passwd among them.

The backend does not use the project's own fetch controls

$ grep -n "enable_local_fetch\|enable_remote_fetch\|image_resource_loader" \
      docling/backend/opendocument_backend.py
$

Nothing. The HTML, Markdown, EPUB and XBRL backends all resolve image resources through docling/backend/utils/image_resource_loader.py, where enable_local_fetch and enable_remote_fetch both default to False. The ODF backend reimplements image loading and does not consult either, so the default of not fetching local resources is not applied on this path.

That is the substance of the report: the control exists, it is off by default, and this backend does not reach it.

Affected versions

Introduced by commit e2afe381, "feat: Add OpenDocument backend support and improve ODF image/table handling" (#3480), 2026-06-24. First released in v2.107.0.

Affected: docling >= 2.107.0, up to and including 2.117.0 and current main (52d8a6f24de7318a9ad4be2a7361ba93fc81a5c1).

Subsequent commits touching this file — 2c3e55b3 (skip a draw:object with a missing embedded part), b627ca91 (preserve content inside sections), 2ec33bc7 (guard backend imports) — address unrelated defects and leave the path resolution unchanged.

Reproduced on two independent machines:

| | | |---|---| | Python 3.12.3 | docling-slim 2.117.0, docling-core 2.88.0, odfdo 3.23.1 | | Python 3.14.4 | same releases, and again against main clones on sys.path |

Proof of concept

Trigger

An .odt needs only mimetype and content.xml. No manifest, no styles, no embedded image part.

import zipfile
 
CONTENT = (
    '<?xml version="1.0"?><office:document-content '
    'xmlns:office="urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:office:1.0" '
    'xmlns:text="urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:text:1.0" '
    'xmlns:draw="urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:drawing:1.0" '
    'xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" office:version="1.2">'
    '<office:body><office:text><text:p>'
    '<draw:frame><draw:image xlink:href="{href}"/></draw:frame>'
    '</text:p></office:text></office:body></office:document-content>'
)
 
def build(path, href):
    with…
Record
GHSA-4xhp-xg4w-8ppm
CVSS 4.0
6.9 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 6.9

Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.107.0 until 2.120.3, docling/backend/opendocument_backend.py uses the xlink:href attribute value of a draw:image element as a filesystem path when the referenced part is not found in the document archive. The _image_ref_from_odf_image function reads that attacker-controlled path without a scheme check, extraction-directory confinement, or the enable_local_fetch setting used by other backends. Readable files that Pillow can decode as images are embedded in converted output, and other existing paths can be distinguished through the attempted read. This issue is fixed in 2.120.3.

Record
CVE-2026-105751
CVSS 4.0
6.9 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 6.9

Docling: Arbitrary local file read via draw:image xlink:href in the OpenDocument backend

Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.107.0 until 2.120.3, docling/backend/opendocument_backend.py uses the xlink:href attribute value of a draw:image element as a filesystem path when the referenced part is not found in the document archive. The _image_ref_from_odf_image function reads that attacker-controlled path without a scheme check, extraction-directory confinement, or the enable_local_fetch setting used by other backends. Readable files that Pillow can decode as images are embedded in converted output, and other existing paths can be distinguished through the attempted read. This issue is fixed in 2.120.3.

Record
CVE-2026-105751
CVSS 4.0
6.9 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-4xhp-xg4w-8ppm 6.9

Docling: Arbitrary local file read via draw:image xlink:href in the OpenDocument backend

Summary

The ODF backend resolves the xlink:href of a draw:image element as a filesystem path whenever the referenced part is not found inside the document archive. The value comes straight from content.xml, so it is document content, and it is used with no scheme check, no confinement to the extraction directory, and without consulting the enable_local_fetch / enable_remote_fetch controls that the other backends use for exactly this decision.

Converting a crafted .odt therefore causes Docling to open an attacker-named absolute path on the converting host. Where the target decodes as an image, its complete contents are embedded in the resulting DoclingDocument and appear in the HTML, Markdown and JSON exports.

Both the read and the disclosure are confirmed by execution. The trigger is a 452-byte archive containing two entries.

Affected component

docling/backend/opendocument_backend.py, in _image_ref_from_odf_image:

image_url = _odf_image_href(image)
...
if image_data is None and odf_obj is not None and image_url:
    try:
        image_data = odf_obj.get_part(image_url)
    except Exception:
        image_data = None
 
if image_data is None and image_url:
    image_path = Path(image_url)
    if image_path.is_file():
        image_data = image_path.read_bytes()

_odf_image_href returns the xlink:href attribute. The in-archive lookup is attempted first; when it fails, the same string is handed to Path and read from disk.

The only filter on the way in is _odf_image_can_be_bitmap, which admits any path whose suffix is one of .bmp, .gif, .jpeg, .jpg, .png, .tif, .tiff, .webp, or empty. The empty-suffix case is what admits most paths of interest on a Unix host, /etc/passwd among them.

The backend does not use the project's own fetch controls

$ grep -n "enable_local_fetch\|enable_remote_fetch\|image_resource_loader" \
      docling/backend/opendocument_backend.py
$

Nothing. The HTML, Markdown, EPUB and XBRL backends all resolve image resources through docling/backend/utils/image_resource_loader.py, where enable_local_fetch and enable_remote_fetch both default to False. The ODF backend reimplements image loading and does not consult either, so the default of not fetching local resources is not applied on this path.

That is the substance of the report: the control exists, it is off by default, and this backend does not reach it.

Affected versions

Introduced by commit e2afe381, "feat: Add OpenDocument backend support and improve ODF image/table handling" (#3480), 2026-06-24. First released in v2.107.0.

Affected: docling >= 2.107.0, up to and including 2.117.0 and current main (52d8a6f24de7318a9ad4be2a7361ba93fc81a5c1).

Subsequent commits touching this file — 2c3e55b3 (skip a draw:object with a missing embedded part), b627ca91 (preserve content inside sections), 2ec33bc7 (guard backend imports) — address unrelated defects and leave the path resolution unchanged.

Reproduced on two independent machines:

| | | |---|---| | Python 3.12.3 | docling-slim 2.117.0, docling-core 2.88.0, odfdo 3.23.1 | | Python 3.14.4 | same releases, and again against main clones on sys.path |

Proof of concept

Trigger

An .odt needs only mimetype and content.xml. No manifest, no styles, no embedded image part.

import zipfile
 
CONTENT = (
    '<?xml version="1.0"?><office:document-content '
    'xmlns:office="urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:office:1.0" '
    'xmlns:text="urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:text:1.0" '
    'xmlns:draw="urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:drawing:1.0" '
    'xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" office:version="1.2">'
    '<office:body><office:text><text:p>'
    '<draw:frame><draw:image xlink:href="{href}"/></draw:frame>'
    '</text:p></office:text></office:body></office:document-content>'
)
 
def build(path, href):
    with…
Record
GHSA-4xhp-xg4w-8ppm
CVSS 4.0
6.9 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVPYSEC-2026-4207 6.9

Docling: Arbitrary local file read via draw:image xlink:href in the OpenDocument backend

Summary

The ODF backend resolves the xlink:href of a draw:image element as a filesystem path whenever the referenced part is not found inside the document archive. The value comes straight from content.xml, so it is document content, and it is used with no scheme check, no confinement to the extraction directory, and without consulting the enable_local_fetch / enable_remote_fetch controls that the other backends use for exactly this decision.

Converting a crafted .odt therefore causes Docling to open an attacker-named absolute path on the converting host. Where the target decodes as an image, its complete contents are embedded in the resulting DoclingDocument and appear in the HTML, Markdown and JSON exports.

Both the read and the disclosure are confirmed by execution. The trigger is a 452-byte archive containing two entries.

Affected component

docling/backend/opendocument_backend.py, in _image_ref_from_odf_image:

image_url = _odf_image_href(image)
...
if image_data is None and odf_obj is not None and image_url:
    try:
        image_data = odf_obj.get_part(image_url)
    except Exception:
        image_data = None
 
if image_data is None and image_url:
    image_path = Path(image_url)
    if image_path.is_file():
        image_data = image_path.read_bytes()

_odf_image_href returns the xlink:href attribute. The in-archive lookup is attempted first; when it fails, the same string is handed to Path and read from disk.

The only filter on the way in is _odf_image_can_be_bitmap, which admits any path whose suffix is one of .bmp, .gif, .jpeg, .jpg, .png, .tif, .tiff, .webp, or empty. The empty-suffix case is what admits most paths of interest on a Unix host, /etc/passwd among them.

The backend does not use the project's own fetch controls

$ grep -n "enable_local_fetch\|enable_remote_fetch\|image_resource_loader" \
      docling/backend/opendocument_backend.py
$

Nothing. The HTML, Markdown, EPUB and XBRL backends all resolve image resources through docling/backend/utils/image_resource_loader.py, where enable_local_fetch and enable_remote_fetch both default to False. The ODF backend reimplements image loading and does not consult either, so the default of not fetching local resources is not applied on this path.

That is the substance of the report: the control exists, it is off by default, and this backend does not reach it.

Affected versions

Introduced by commit e2afe381, "feat: Add OpenDocument backend support and improve ODF image/table handling" (#3480), 2026-06-24. First released in v2.107.0.

Affected: docling >= 2.107.0, up to and including 2.117.0 and current main (52d8a6f24de7318a9ad4be2a7361ba93fc81a5c1).

Subsequent commits touching this file — 2c3e55b3 (skip a draw:object with a missing embedded part), b627ca91 (preserve content inside sections), 2ec33bc7 (guard backend imports) — address unrelated defects and leave the path resolution unchanged.

Reproduced on two independent machines:

| | | |---|---| | Python 3.12.3 | docling-slim 2.117.0, docling-core 2.88.0, odfdo 3.23.1 | | Python 3.14.4 | same releases, and again against main clones on sys.path |

Proof of concept

Trigger

An .odt needs only mimetype and content.xml. No manifest, no styles, no embedded image part.

import zipfile
 
CONTENT = (
    '<?xml version="1.0"?><office:document-content '
    'xmlns:office="urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:office:1.0" '
    'xmlns:text="urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:text:1.0" '
    'xmlns:draw="urn:oasis:names:tc:opendocument:xmlns:drawing:1.0" '
    'xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" office:version="1.2">'
    '<office:body><office:text><text:p>'
    '<draw:frame><draw:image xlink:href="{href}"/></draw:frame>'
    '</text:p></office:text></office:body></office:document-content>'
)
 
def build(path, href):
    with…
Record
PYSEC-2026-4207
CVSS 4.0
6.9 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
docling
PyPI
2.107.0 up to 2.120.3
2.120.3
docling
PyPI
2.107.0 up to 2.120.3, plus listed versions
2.108.02.109.02.110.02.111.02.112.0
Show 10 moreShow less
2.113.02.114.02.115.02.116.02.117.02.118.02.118.12.119.02.120.12.120.2
2.120.3

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-105751 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.9) in Docling, published October 5, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.42%, the 36th percentile. Fixed in docling 2.120.3.

References

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Left out here: the rest of 3 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.

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