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CVE-2026-10683

DesignWare I2C target driver can be wedged into a permanent stuck state by an on-bus master (DoS)

2.4 Low

In the Synopsys DesignWare I2C driver (drivers/i2c/i2c_dw.c) operating in target/slave mode, the rx_full interrupt handler gates the write_requested() callback on dw->state != CMD_SEND, and dw->state is only reset to READY on a STOP interrupt. The START_DET interrupt, whose handler in i2c_dw_slave_read_clear_intr_bits() would reset the state on every (re)START, was never added to the enabled interrupt mask in i2c_dw_slave_register(), so that recovery path was dead code.

As a result, if the STOP interrupt is lost (bus glitch/reset, or a concurrent master driving STOP) or the bus master issues a legal WRITE-repeated-START-WRITE sequence with the same direction, the driver remains in CMD_SEND permanently and never invokes write_requested() again for the life of the target.

An I2C master on the same physical bus can deliberately trigger this, causing the I2C target function to malfunction for all subsequent write transactions and desynchronizing consumer framing state (e.g. MCTP-over-I2C), a recoverable-by-reset denial of service of the target peripheral.

The fix unmasks START_DET so the state is reset at every bus (re)START. Impact is availability-only over a local board-level bus; no memory corruption results in the in-tree consumer, whose per-byte buffer write is independently bounds-checked.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Physical
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

Exploit likelihood

0.24%Up 0.1 points since Jul 28, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 2.4

DesignWare I2C target driver can be wedged into a permanent stuck state by an on-bus master (DoS)

In the Synopsys DesignWare I2C driver (drivers/i2c/i2c_dw.c) operating in target/slave mode, the rx_full interrupt handler gates the write_requested() callback on dw->state != CMD_SEND, and dw->state is only reset to READY on a STOP interrupt. The START_DET interrupt, whose handler in i2c_dw_slave_read_clear_intr_bits() would reset the state on every (re)START, was never added to the enabled interrupt mask in i2c_dw_slave_register(), so that recovery path was dead code.

As a result, if the STOP interrupt is lost (bus glitch/reset, or a concurrent master driving STOP) or the bus master issues a legal WRITE-repeated-START-WRITE sequence with the same direction, the driver remains in CMD_SEND permanently and never invokes write_requested() again for the life of the target.

An I2C master on the same physical bus can deliberately trigger this, causing the I2C target function to malfunction for all subsequent write transactions and desynchronizing consumer framing state (e.g. MCTP-over-I2C), a recoverable-by-reset denial of service of the target peripheral.

The fix unmasks START_DET so the state is reset at every bus (re)START. Impact is availability-only over a local board-level bus; no memory corruption results in the in-tree consumer, whose per-byte buffer write is independently bounds-checked.

Record
CVE-2026-10683
CVSS 3.1
2.4 LowCVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weakness
CWE-835
Updated
2026-11-04
EUVDEUVD-2026-49399 2.4

In the Synopsys DesignWare I2C driver (drivers/i2c/i2c_dw.c) operating in target/slave mode, the rx_full interrupt handler gates the write_requested() callback on dw->state != CMD_SEND, and dw->state is only reset to READY on a STOP interrupt. The START_DET interrupt, whose handler in i2c_dw_slave_read_clear_intr_bits() would reset the state on every (re)START, was never added to the enabled interrupt mask in i2c_dw_slave_register(), so that recovery path was dead code.

As a result, if the STOP interrupt is lost (bus glitch/reset, or a concurrent master driving STOP) or the bus master issues a legal WRITE-repeated-START-WRITE sequence with the same direction, the driver remains in CMD_SEND permanently and never invokes write_requested() again for the life of the target.

An I2C master on the same physical bus can deliberately trigger this, causing the I2C target function to malfunction for all subsequent write transactions and desynchronizing consumer framing state (e.g. MCTP-over-I2C), a recoverable-by-reset denial of service of the target peripheral.

The fix unmasks START_DET so the state is reset at every bus (re)START. Impact is availability-only over a local board-level bus; no memory corruption results in the in-tree consumer, whose per-byte buffer write is independently bounds-checked.

Record
EUVD-2026-49399
CVSS 3.1
2.4 LowCVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Updated
2026-11-04
NVD 2.4

In the Synopsys DesignWare I2C driver (drivers/i2c/i2c_dw.c) operating in target/slave mode, the rx_full interrupt handler gates the write_requested() callback on dw->state != CMD_SEND, and dw->state is only reset to READY on a STOP interrupt. The START_DET interrupt, whose handler in i2c_dw_slave_read_clear_intr_bits() would reset the state on every (re)START, was never added to the enabled interrupt mask in i2c_dw_slave_register(), so that recovery path was dead code.

As a result, if the STOP interrupt is lost (bus glitch/reset, or a concurrent master driving STOP) or the bus master issues a legal WRITE-repeated-START-WRITE sequence with the same direction, the driver remains in CMD_SEND permanently and never invokes write_requested() again for the life of the target.

An I2C master on the same physical bus can deliberately trigger this, causing the I2C target function to malfunction for all subsequent write transactions and desynchronizing consumer framing state (e.g. MCTP-over-I2C), a recoverable-by-reset denial of service of the target peripheral.

The fix unmasks START_DET so the state is reset at every bus (re)START. Impact is availability-only over a local board-level bus; no memory corruption results in the in-tree consumer, whose per-byte buffer write is independently bounds-checked.

Record
CVE-2026-10683
CVSS 3.1
2.4 LowCVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
CVSS 3.1
4.6 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-835
Updated
2026-11-04
OSV 2.4

DesignWare I2C target driver can be wedged into a permanent stuck state by an on-bus master (DoS)

In the Synopsys DesignWare I2C driver (drivers/i2c/i2c_dw.c) operating in target/slave mode, the rx_full interrupt handler gates the write_requested() callback on dw->state != CMD_SEND, and dw->state is only reset to READY on a STOP interrupt. The START_DET interrupt, whose handler in i2c_dw_slave_read_clear_intr_bits() would reset the state on every (re)START, was never added to the enabled interrupt mask in i2c_dw_slave_register(), so that recovery path was dead code.

As a result, if the STOP interrupt is lost (bus glitch/reset, or a concurrent master driving STOP) or the bus master issues a legal WRITE-repeated-START-WRITE sequence with the same direction, the driver remains in CMD_SEND permanently and never invokes write_requested() again for the life of the target.

An I2C master on the same physical bus can deliberately trigger this, causing the I2C target function to malfunction for all subsequent write transactions and desynchronizing consumer framing state (e.g. MCTP-over-I2C), a recoverable-by-reset denial of service of the target peripheral.

The fix unmasks START_DET so the state is reset at every bus (re)START. Impact is availability-only over a local board-level bus; no memory corruption results in the in-tree consumer, whose per-byte buffer write is independently bounds-checked.

Record
CVE-2026-10683
CVSS 3.1
2.4 LowCVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weakness
CWE-835
Updated
2026-11-05

Affected products

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
factsCVE List
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-10683 is a low vulnerability (CVSS 2.4) in Zephyrproject Zephyr, published July 27, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.24%, the 15th percentile. No source names a fixed version.

References

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