CVE-2026-107213
Excelize: Nil-pointer dereference in GetSlicers when a worksheet has extLst present but no drawing element
Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. From 2.9.0 to 2.11.0, GetSlicers checks for ExtLst but dereferences ws.Drawing without checking whether the independently optional drawing element exists. File.GetSlicers reads ws.Drawing.RID after seeing a worksheet extLst element even when the independently optional worksheet drawing element is absent. When a crafted worksheet contains an extLst element without a drawing element and the application calls GetSlicers, the nil ws.Drawing pointer is dereferenced while resolving the drawing relationship, allowing an attacker to panic and terminate an unprotected process. No fixed version is available as of this review.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
8.7
Excelize: Nil-pointer dereference in GetSlicers when a worksheet has extLst present but no drawing element
Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. From 2.9.0 to 2.11.0, GetSlicers checks for ExtLst but dereferences ws.Drawing without checking whether the independently optional drawing element exists. File.GetSlicers reads ws.Drawing.RID after seeing a worksheet extLst element even when the independently optional worksheet drawing element is absent. When a crafted worksheet contains an extLst element without a drawing element and the application calls GetSlicers, the nil ws.Drawing pointer is dereferenced while resolving the drawing relationship, allowing an attacker to panic and terminate an unprotected process. No fixed version is available as of this review.
- Record
CVE-2026-107213- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-476
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-94530
8.7
Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. From 2.9.0 to 2.11.0, GetSlicers checks for ExtLst but dereferences ws.Drawing without checking whether the independently optional drawing element exists. File.GetSlicers reads ws.Drawing.RID after seeing a worksheet extLst element even when the independently optional worksheet drawing element is absent. When a crafted worksheet contains an extLst element without a drawing element and the application calls GetSlicers, the nil ws.Drawing pointer is dereferenced while resolving the drawing relationship, allowing an attacker to panic and terminate an unprotected process. No fixed version is available as of this review.
- Record
EUVD-2026-94530- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-r7x5-4969-99p7
8.7
Excelize: Nil-pointer dereference in GetSlicers when a worksheet has extLst present but no drawing element
Summary
GetSlicers guards only if ws.ExtLst == nil { return } (slicer.go:816-818) and then immediately dereferences ws.Drawing.RID with no nil check on ws.Drawing itself. Drawing and ExtLst are two independently optional child elements of <worksheet> in xl/worksheets/sheetN.xml, populated separately by encoding/xml depending on whether each tag is present. I executed a PoC: took a plain NewFile() workbook (no drawing, no slicer), saved it, then injected a bare <extLst></extLst> immediately before </worksheet> in xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml (no other change, no drawing element present) and called GetSlicers. Result: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference, confirmed at the ws.Drawing.RID line via stack trace.
Reachability / who can trigger this
Unauthenticated: any application that opens an untrusted .xlsx and calls the public File.GetSlicers(sheet) API. The trigger is a single empty XML tag with no valid slicer or drawing content required at all, making it an even smaller/simpler payload than candidate 1.
Proof of Concept / Reproduction
Method:
- Reused the existing clone at C:\Users\vatsa\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\D--\59901fa2-b549-40e1-a433-30c8a3d01718\scratchpad\CVE-Hunt-10k\repos\qax-os__excelize (origin=https://github.com/qax-os/excelize.git, branch master up to date, commit e81f05008b33232151a58f06474fad5f70c4d060 dated 2026-09-27,
git describe=v2.11.0-42-ge81f050, i.e. 42 commits past the v2.11.0 tag). 2) Manually re-read the cited source myself (not trusting the claim): slicer.go:805-820 (GetSlicers) and xmlWorksheet.go:21-72 (xlsxWorksheet struct + xlsxDrawing struct) -- confirmed verbatim, matches claim exactly. 3) Confirmed local toolchain: go version go1.27.0 windows/amd64 (/c/Program Files/Go/bin/go). 4) Built the whole package withgo build ./...from the repo root -- succeeded with zero errors, proving the current checkout compiles cleanly. 5) Ran the pre-existing PoC test file already present in this checkout (slicer_extlst_poc_test.go, TestGetSlicersNilDrawingPanic) viago test -run TestGetSlicersNilDrawingPanic -v .: it builds a benign excelize.NewFile() workbook, saves it, reopens it, loads the raw zip entry xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml, string-replaces</worksheet>with<extLst></extLst></worksheet>(adds nothing else, no <drawing> anywhere), rebuilds the zip byte-for-byte otherwise unchanged (rezipReplacing helper, plain archive/zip re-encode), reopens the crafted file with excelize.OpenReader, and calls the public GetSlicers("Sheet1") API inside a recover(). 6) For a fully independent, non-test-harness reproduction, I additionally wrote and built my own separate standalone Go module+program from scratch (excelize-nilptr-repro/{go.mod,main.go} in my scratchpad dir) that imports the real, unmodified excelize package as an external library dependency via areplace github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 => ../CVE-Hunt-10k/repos/qax-os__excelizedirective (no copy-pasted/reimplemented function -- the actual library code, used through its real public API from a separate consumer program, simulating "any application that opens an untrusted .xlsx"). This program performs the identical craft-and-open sequence but calls GetSlicers with NO recover() at all. Built withgo build -o repro.exe .(succeeded) and ran./repro.exedirectly, observing an unhandled process crash.
Evidence:
SOURCE VERIFICATION (current HEAD, read directly): slicer.go:816-820 is exactly as claimed -- if ws.ExtLst == nil { return slicers, err } followed immediately by target := f.getSheetRelationshipsTargetByID(sheet, ws.Drawing.RID) with no nil check on ws.Drawing. xmlWorksheet.go:54 Drawing *xlsxDrawing xml:"drawing" and xmlWorksheet.go:64 `ExtLst *xlsxExtLst `xml:"extLst" are both independently-optional pointer fields on xlsxWorksheet, populated only when their respective XML tag is present in the worksheet part -- confirming Drawing and ExtLst are…
- Record
GHSA-r7x5-4969-99p7- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-476
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
8.7
Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. From 2.9.0 to 2.11.0, GetSlicers checks for ExtLst but dereferences ws.Drawing without checking whether the independently optional drawing element exists. File.GetSlicers reads ws.Drawing.RID after seeing a worksheet extLst element even when the independently optional worksheet drawing element is absent. When a crafted worksheet contains an extLst element without a drawing element and the application calls GetSlicers, the nil ws.Drawing pointer is dereferenced while resolving the drawing relationship, allowing an attacker to panic and terminate an unprotected process. No fixed version is available as of this review.
- Record
CVE-2026-107213- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - CVSS 3.1
- 5.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-476
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
8.7
Excelize: Nil-pointer dereference in GetSlicers when a worksheet has extLst present but no drawing element
Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. From 2.9.0 to 2.11.0, GetSlicers checks for ExtLst but dereferences ws.Drawing without checking whether the independently optional drawing element exists. File.GetSlicers reads ws.Drawing.RID after seeing a worksheet extLst element even when the independently optional worksheet drawing element is absent. When a crafted worksheet contains an extLst element without a drawing element and the application calls GetSlicers, the nil ws.Drawing pointer is dereferenced while resolving the drawing relationship, allowing an attacker to panic and terminate an unprotected process. No fixed version is available as of this review.
- Record
CVE-2026-107213- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-476
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-r7x5-4969-99p7
8.7
Excelize: Nil-pointer dereference in GetSlicers when a worksheet has extLst present but no drawing element
Summary
GetSlicers guards only if ws.ExtLst == nil { return } (slicer.go:816-818) and then immediately dereferences ws.Drawing.RID with no nil check on ws.Drawing itself. Drawing and ExtLst are two independently optional child elements of <worksheet> in xl/worksheets/sheetN.xml, populated separately by encoding/xml depending on whether each tag is present. I executed a PoC: took a plain NewFile() workbook (no drawing, no slicer), saved it, then injected a bare <extLst></extLst> immediately before </worksheet> in xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml (no other change, no drawing element present) and called GetSlicers. Result: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference, confirmed at the ws.Drawing.RID line via stack trace.
Reachability / who can trigger this
Unauthenticated: any application that opens an untrusted .xlsx and calls the public File.GetSlicers(sheet) API. The trigger is a single empty XML tag with no valid slicer or drawing content required at all, making it an even smaller/simpler payload than candidate 1.
Proof of Concept / Reproduction
Method:
- Reused the existing clone at C:\Users\vatsa\AppData\Local\Temp\claude\D--\59901fa2-b549-40e1-a433-30c8a3d01718\scratchpad\CVE-Hunt-10k\repos\qax-os__excelize (origin=https://github.com/qax-os/excelize.git, branch master up to date, commit e81f05008b33232151a58f06474fad5f70c4d060 dated 2026-09-27,
git describe=v2.11.0-42-ge81f050, i.e. 42 commits past the v2.11.0 tag). 2) Manually re-read the cited source myself (not trusting the claim): slicer.go:805-820 (GetSlicers) and xmlWorksheet.go:21-72 (xlsxWorksheet struct + xlsxDrawing struct) -- confirmed verbatim, matches claim exactly. 3) Confirmed local toolchain: go version go1.27.0 windows/amd64 (/c/Program Files/Go/bin/go). 4) Built the whole package withgo build ./...from the repo root -- succeeded with zero errors, proving the current checkout compiles cleanly. 5) Ran the pre-existing PoC test file already present in this checkout (slicer_extlst_poc_test.go, TestGetSlicersNilDrawingPanic) viago test -run TestGetSlicersNilDrawingPanic -v .: it builds a benign excelize.NewFile() workbook, saves it, reopens it, loads the raw zip entry xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml, string-replaces</worksheet>with<extLst></extLst></worksheet>(adds nothing else, no <drawing> anywhere), rebuilds the zip byte-for-byte otherwise unchanged (rezipReplacing helper, plain archive/zip re-encode), reopens the crafted file with excelize.OpenReader, and calls the public GetSlicers("Sheet1") API inside a recover(). 6) For a fully independent, non-test-harness reproduction, I additionally wrote and built my own separate standalone Go module+program from scratch (excelize-nilptr-repro/{go.mod,main.go} in my scratchpad dir) that imports the real, unmodified excelize package as an external library dependency via areplace github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 => ../CVE-Hunt-10k/repos/qax-os__excelizedirective (no copy-pasted/reimplemented function -- the actual library code, used through its real public API from a separate consumer program, simulating "any application that opens an untrusted .xlsx"). This program performs the identical craft-and-open sequence but calls GetSlicers with NO recover() at all. Built withgo build -o repro.exe .(succeeded) and ran./repro.exedirectly, observing an unhandled process crash.
Evidence:
SOURCE VERIFICATION (current HEAD, read directly): slicer.go:816-820 is exactly as claimed -- if ws.ExtLst == nil { return slicers, err } followed immediately by target := f.getSheetRelationshipsTargetByID(sheet, ws.Drawing.RID) with no nil check on ws.Drawing. xmlWorksheet.go:54 Drawing *xlsxDrawing xml:"drawing" and xmlWorksheet.go:64 `ExtLst *xlsxExtLst `xml:"extLst" are both independently-optional pointer fields on xlsxWorksheet, populated only when their respective XML tag is present in the worksheet part -- confirming Drawing and ExtLst are…
- Record
GHSA-r7x5-4969-99p7- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-476
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-6687 No score
Nil-pointer dereference in GetSlicers when a worksheet has extLst present but no drawing element in github.com/xuri/excelize
Nil-pointer dereference in GetSlicers when a worksheet has extLst present but no drawing element in github.com/xuri/excelize
- Record
GO-2026-6687- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2Go |
2.9.0 up to 2.11.1-0.20260929015830-8ffeb07ec9a3 | 2.11.1-0.20260929015830-8ffeb07ec9a3 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-107213 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.7) in Excelize, published October 7, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.23%, the 14th percentile. Fixed in github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 2.11.1-0.20260929015830-8ffeb07ec9a3.
References
github.com/qax-os/excelize/security/advisories/GHSA-r7x5-4969-99p7
github.com/qax-os/excelize/pull/2434
github.com/qax-os/excelize/commit/8ffeb07ec9a350410f6922313f6b7e4f5cc79241
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107213
github.com/advisories/GHSA-r7x5-4969-99p7
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/107xxx/CVE-2026-107213.json
github.com/qax-os/excelize
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.