CVE-2026-107597

PIA's token verification (verify_token in pia/oidc.py) fetches the OIDC discovery document of an allowlisted issuer and then follows the jwks_uri contained in that response without parsing it as a URL, comparing it against the approved issuer's origin, or requiring HTTPS — the only check is that the field is non-empty (pia/oidc.py:42-52). An approved identity provider — and every registered per-project Jenkins instance under https://ci.eclipse.org/<project>/oidc is a separate such party (pia/models.py) — can therefore direct PIA to issue a GET request to an arbitrary host and port, including over plaintext http, from PIA's own network position. The fetch happens before any signature is verified, as a side effect of an unauthenticated POST /v1/upload/sbom request that is ultimately rejected with 401.

PIA's token verification (verify_token in pia/oidc.py) fetches the OIDC discovery document of an allowlisted issuer and then follows the jwks_uri contained in that response without parsing it as a URL, comparing it against the approved issuer's origin, or requiring HTTPS — the only check is that the field is non-empty (pia/oidc.py:42-52). An approved identity provider — and every registered per-project Jenkins instance under https://ci.eclipse.org/<project>/oidc is a separate such party (pia/models.py) — can therefore direct PIA to issue a GET request to an arbitrary host and port, including over plaintext http, from PIA's own network position. The fetch happens before any signature is verified, as a side effect of an unauthenticated POST /v1/upload/sbom request that is ultimately rejected with 401.

PIA's token verification (verify_token in pia/oidc.py) fetches the OIDC discovery document of an allowlisted issuer and then follows the jwks_uri contained in that response without parsing it as a URL, comparing it against the approved issuer's origin, or requiring HTTPS — the only check is that the field is non-empty (pia/oidc.py:42-52). An approved identity provider — and every registered per-project Jenkins instance under https://ci.eclipse.org/<project>/oidc is a separate such party (pia/models.py) — can therefore direct PIA to issue a GET request to an arbitrary host and port, including over plaintext http, from PIA's own network position. The fetch happens before any signature is verified, as a side effect of an unauthenticated POST /v1/upload/sbom request that is ultimately rejected with 401.

PIA's token verification (verify_token in pia/oidc.py) fetches the OIDC discovery document of an allowlisted issuer and then follows the jwks_uri contained in that response without parsing it as a URL, comparing it against the approved issuer's origin, or requiring HTTPS — the only check is that the field is non-empty (pia/oidc.py:42-52). An approved identity provider — and every registered per-project Jenkins instance under https://ci.eclipse.org/<project>/oidc is a separate such party (pia/models.py) — can therefore direct PIA to issue a GET request to an arbitrary host and port, including over plaintext http, from PIA's own network position. The fetch happens before any signature is verified, as a side effect of an unauthenticated POST /v1/upload/sbom request that is ultimately rejected with 401.