CVE-2026-108522

A vulnerability was found in Studio-Saelix Sencho up to 0.94.1. This affects an unknown part of the file /api/auth/login of the component Login Endpoint. Performing a manipulation of the argument X-Forwarded-For results in improper authentication. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named 79b86ddcd4aefdd6941f098e35990ab397b13c72. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. The vendor confirms: "The login limiter relied on client-supplied X-Forwarded-For data without an explicit trusted-proxy boundary, allowing an attacker to rotate the apparent client address. The remediation now ignores forwarding headers by default, accepts them only from explicitly configured proxy CIDRs, and adds a separate failed-attempt limit keyed by normalized account identity."

A vulnerability was found in Studio-Saelix Sencho up to 0.94.1. This affects an unknown part of the file /api/auth/login of the component Login Endpoint. Performing a manipulation of the argument X-Forwarded-For results in improper authentication. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named 79b86ddcd4aefdd6941f098e35990ab397b13c72. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. The vendor confirms: "The login limiter relied on client-supplied X-Forwarded-For data without an explicit trusted-proxy boundary, allowing an attacker to rotate the apparent client address. The remediation now ignores forwarding headers by default, accepts them only from explicitly configured proxy CIDRs, and adds a separate failed-attempt limit keyed by normalized account identity."

A vulnerability was found in Studio-Saelix Sencho up to 0.94.1. This affects an unknown part of the file /api/auth/login of the component Login Endpoint. Performing a manipulation of the argument X-Forwarded-For results in improper authentication. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named 79b86ddcd4aefdd6941f098e35990ab397b13c72. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. The vendor confirms: "The login limiter relied on client-supplied X-Forwarded-For data without an explicit trusted-proxy boundary, allowing an attacker to rotate the apparent client address. The remediation now ignores forwarding headers by default, accepts them only from explicitly configured proxy CIDRs, and adds a separate failed-attempt limit keyed by normalized account identity."

A vulnerability was found in Studio-Saelix Sencho up to 0.94.1. This affects an unknown part of the file /api/auth/login of the component Login Endpoint. Performing a manipulation of the argument X-Forwarded-For results in improper authentication. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named 79b86ddcd4aefdd6941f098e35990ab397b13c72. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. The vendor confirms: "The login limiter relied on client-supplied X-Forwarded-For data without an explicit trusted-proxy boundary, allowing an attacker to rotate the apparent client address. The remediation now ignores forwarding headers by default, accepts them only from explicitly configured proxy CIDRs, and adds a separate failed-attempt limit keyed by normalized account identity."

A vulnerability was found in Studio-Saelix Sencho up to 0.94.1. This affects an unknown part of the file /api/auth/login of the component Login Endpoint. Performing a manipulation of the argument X-Forwarded-For results in improper authentication. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named 79b86ddcd4aefdd6941f098e35990ab397b13c72. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. The vendor confirms: "The login limiter relied on client-supplied X-Forwarded-For data without an explicit trusted-proxy boundary, allowing an attacker to rotate the apparent client address. The remediation now ignores forwarding headers by default, accepts them only from explicitly configured proxy CIDRs, and adds a separate failed-attempt limit keyed by normalized account identity."