CVE-2026-110251

The Photo Reviews for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.31. This is due to the delete_reviews_image() function's delete_comment hook trusting attachment IDs supplied via the wcpr_image_upload_id POST parameter that were stored in comment meta without any ownership or capability check — viwcpr_filter_review_image_ids() verifies only that each submitted ID refers to an attachment post type, not that the submitter uploaded or owns it. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to permanently delete any WordPress media library attachment — including its files on disk as recorded by wp_delete_attachment() — by embedding attacker-chosen attachment IDs into a review comment, then waiting for a moderator to remove the review or for WordPress core's wp_scheduled_delete cron to purge it after EMPTY_TRASH_DAYS. The nonce required to submit the parameter (wcpr_image_upload) is a shared public value printed on every product page for guest commenters and does not function as an authentication barrier, making this trivially exploitable without any account.

The Photo Reviews for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.31. This is due to the delete_reviews_image() function's delete_comment hook trusting attachment IDs supplied via the wcpr_image_upload_id POST parameter that were stored in comment meta without any ownership or capability check — viwcpr_filter_review_image_ids() verifies only that each submitted ID refers to an attachment post type, not that the submitter uploaded or owns it. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to permanently delete any WordPress media library attachment — including its files on disk as recorded by wp_delete_attachment() — by embedding attacker-chosen attachment IDs into a review comment, then waiting for a moderator to remove the review or for WordPress core's wp_scheduled_delete cron to purge it after EMPTY_TRASH_DAYS. The nonce required to submit the parameter (wcpr_image_upload) is a shared public value printed on every product page for guest commenters and does not function as an authentication barrier, making this trivially exploitable without any account.

The Photo Reviews for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.31. This is due to the delete_reviews_image() function's delete_comment hook trusting attachment IDs supplied via the wcpr_image_upload_id POST parameter that were stored in comment meta without any ownership or capability check — viwcpr_filter_review_image_ids() verifies only that each submitted ID refers to an attachment post type, not that the submitter uploaded or owns it. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to permanently delete any WordPress media library attachment — including its files on disk as recorded by wp_delete_attachment() — by embedding attacker-chosen attachment IDs into a review comment, then waiting for a moderator to remove the review or for WordPress core's wp_scheduled_delete cron to purge it after EMPTY_TRASH_DAYS. The nonce required to submit the parameter (wcpr_image_upload) is a shared public value printed on every product page for guest commenters and does not function as an authentication barrier, making this trivially exploitable without any account.

The Photo Reviews for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.31. This is due to the delete_reviews_image() function's delete_comment hook trusting attachment IDs supplied via the wcpr_image_upload_id POST parameter that were stored in comment meta without any ownership or capability check — viwcpr_filter_review_image_ids() verifies only that each submitted ID refers to an attachment post type, not that the submitter uploaded or owns it. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to permanently delete any WordPress media library attachment — including its files on disk as recorded by wp_delete_attachment() — by embedding attacker-chosen attachment IDs into a review comment, then waiting for a moderator to remove the review or for WordPress core's wp_scheduled_delete cron to purge it after EMPTY_TRASH_DAYS. The nonce required to submit the parameter (wcpr_image_upload) is a shared public value printed on every product page for guest commenters and does not function as an authentication barrier, making this trivially exploitable without any account.