CVE-2026-110726
In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver...
In api-gateway versions till 1.7.3, The default rate-limit key resolver, ClientIpKeyResolver, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the X-Forwarded-For request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
6.5
In api-gateway versions till 1.7.3, The default rate-limit key resolver, ClientIpKeyResolver, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the X-Forwarded-For request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
- Record
CVE-2026-110726- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-348, CWE-807, CWE-770
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-102022
6.5
In api-gateway versions till 1.7.3, The default rate-limit key resolver, ClientIpKeyResolver, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the X-Forwarded-For request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
- Record
EUVD-2026-102022- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-r566-6hq2-633r
6.5
In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver...
In api-gateway versions till 1.7.3, The default rate-limit key resolver, ClientIpKeyResolver, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the X-Forwarded-For request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
- Record
GHSA-r566-6hq2-633r- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-348
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
6.5
In api-gateway versions till 1.7.3, The default rate-limit key resolver, ClientIpKeyResolver, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the X-Forwarded-For request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
- Record
CVE-2026-110726- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-348, CWE-770, CWE-807
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
6.5
In api-gateway versions till 1.7.3, The default rate-limit key resolver, ClientIpKeyResolver, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the X-Forwarded-For request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
- Record
CVE-2026-110726- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-348, CWE-770, CWE-807
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-110726 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.5) in Eclipse Foundation Connected Services Platform, published October 15, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.19%, the 8th percentile. No source names a fixed version.
References
github.com/eclipse-ecsp/api-gateway/pull/330
gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/404
github.com/eclipse-ecsp/api-gateway/security/advisories/GHSA-ch6x-rg7q-7jfx
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110726
github.com/advisories/GHSA-r566-6hq2-633r
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/110xxx/CVE-2026-110726.json