CVE-2026-111114

The Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.7.11 The vulnerability exists because the /?reset-view handler in role_switcher_to_view_admin_as() performs no nonce or capability check when the supplied username matches the authenticated caller, and because the plugin's only cleanup mechanism — the profile_update hook — does not fire when WordPress performs a bulk role change via wp-admin/users.php?action=promote, which calls WP_User::set_role() directly and leaves a stale administrator value in the nxtext_view_admin_original_role user meta. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access or above to restore the stale stored Administrator role to their own account, effectively escalating their privileges to Administrator. Exploitation requires that the attacker's account previously held the Administrator role and used the View Admin Role Switcher feature before being demoted specifically through the bulk role-change control rather than the Edit User screen, as only the bulk path bypasses the profile_update hook that would otherwise have cleared the stored original role.

The Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.7.11 The vulnerability exists because the /?reset-view handler in role_switcher_to_view_admin_as() performs no nonce or capability check when the supplied username matches the authenticated caller, and because the plugin's only cleanup mechanism — the profile_update hook — does not fire when WordPress performs a bulk role change via wp-admin/users.php?action=promote, which calls WP_User::set_role() directly and leaves a stale administrator value in the nxtext_view_admin_original_role user meta. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access or above to restore the stale stored Administrator role to their own account, effectively escalating their privileges to Administrator. Exploitation requires that the attacker's account previously held the Administrator role and used the View Admin Role Switcher feature before being demoted specifically through the bulk role-change control rather than the Edit User screen, as only the bulk path bypasses the profile_update hook that would otherwise have cleared the stored original role.

The Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.7.11 The vulnerability exists because the /?reset-view handler in role_switcher_to_view_admin_as() performs no nonce or capability check when the supplied username matches the authenticated caller, and because the plugin's only cleanup mechanism — the profile_update hook — does not fire when WordPress performs a bulk role change via wp-admin/users.php?action=promote, which calls WP_User::set_role() directly and leaves a stale administrator value in the nxtext_view_admin_original_role user meta. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access or above to restore the stale stored Administrator role to their own account, effectively escalating their privileges to Administrator. Exploitation requires that the attacker's account previously held the Administrator role and used the View Admin Role Switcher feature before being demoted specifically through the bulk role-change control rather than the Edit User screen, as only the bulk path bypasses the profile_update hook that would otherwise have cleared the stored original role.

The Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.7.11 The vulnerability exists because the /?reset-view handler in role_switcher_to_view_admin_as() performs no nonce or capability check when the supplied username matches the authenticated caller, and because the plugin's only cleanup mechanism — the profile_update hook — does not fire when WordPress performs a bulk role change via wp-admin/users.php?action=promote, which calls WP_User::set_role() directly and leaves a stale administrator value in the nxtext_view_admin_original_role user meta. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access or above to restore the stale stored Administrator role to their own account, effectively escalating their privileges to Administrator. Exploitation requires that the attacker's account previously held the Administrator role and used the View Admin Role Switcher feature before being demoted specifically through the bulk role-change control rather than the Edit User screen, as only the bulk path bypasses the profile_update hook that would otherwise have cleared the stored original role.