CVE-2026-113796

Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.6, Electron treated pages opened into a new window from links as application-initiated navigations instead of preserving the page containing the link as the initiator. The resulting top-level request could be classified as same-site, causing SameSite=Strict cookies to be sent and Sec-Fetch-Site not to identify the initiating page. An application that loads untrusted content and permits it to open new windows could therefore allow that content to make a credentialed request to another site that relies on SameSite cookies for CSRF protection. This issue is fixed in versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.6.

Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.6, Electron treated pages opened into a new window from links as application-initiated navigations instead of preserving the page containing the link as the initiator. The resulting top-level request could be classified as same-site, causing SameSite=Strict cookies to be sent and Sec-Fetch-Site not to identify the initiating page. An application that loads untrusted content and permits it to open new windows could therefore allow that content to make a credentialed request to another site that relies on SameSite cookies for CSRF protection. This issue is fixed in versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.6.

Impact

Pages opened into a new window from a link were loaded as if the app itself had navigated there rather than the page that contained the link, so the request was treated as same-site: SameSite=Strict cookies were sent and Sec-Fetch-Site did not identify the initiating page. Content shown in the app could use this to make a credentialed top-level request to another site that relies on SameSite cookies as a CSRF defence.

Apps are only affected if they load untrusted content and allow it to open new windows. Apps that deny new windows from untrusted content with setWindowOpenHandler are not affected.

Workarounds

Return { action: 'deny' } from setWindowOpenHandler for windows opened by untrusted content.

Fixed Versions

• 45.0.0-alpha.6
• 44.3.0
• 43.7.0
• 42.11.3

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]

Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.6, Electron treated pages opened into a new window from links as application-initiated navigations instead of preserving the page containing the link as the initiator. The resulting top-level request could be classified as same-site, causing SameSite=Strict cookies to be sent and Sec-Fetch-Site not to identify the initiating page. An application that loads untrusted content and permits it to open new windows could therefore allow that content to make a credentialed request to another site that relies on SameSite cookies for CSRF protection. This issue is fixed in versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.6.

Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.6, Electron treated pages opened into a new window from links as application-initiated navigations instead of preserving the page containing the link as the initiator. The resulting top-level request could be classified as same-site, causing SameSite=Strict cookies to be sent and Sec-Fetch-Site not to identify the initiating page. An application that loads untrusted content and permits it to open new windows could therefore allow that content to make a credentialed request to another site that relies on SameSite cookies for CSRF protection. This issue is fixed in versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.6.

Impact

Pages opened into a new window from a link were loaded as if the app itself had navigated there rather than the page that contained the link, so the request was treated as same-site: SameSite=Strict cookies were sent and Sec-Fetch-Site did not identify the initiating page. Content shown in the app could use this to make a credentialed top-level request to another site that relies on SameSite cookies as a CSRF defence.

Apps are only affected if they load untrusted content and allow it to open new windows. Apps that deny new windows from untrusted content with setWindowOpenHandler are not affected.

Workarounds

Return { action: 'deny' } from setWindowOpenHandler for windows opened by untrusted content.

Fixed Versions

• 45.0.0-alpha.6
• 44.3.0
• 43.7.0
• 42.11.3

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [email protected]