CVE-2026-114097

Dulwich from 0.23.1 before 1.2.8 contains a path traversal vulnerability in CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() that allows attackers to write files outside the working directory via symlinks persisting between commits. Attackers can craft a repository where an ancestor commit's symlink redirects a descendant commit's file writes during filter_branch, enabling code execution by writing into .git/hooks.

Dulwich from 0.23.1 before 1.2.8 contains a path traversal vulnerability in CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() that allows attackers to write files outside the working directory via symlinks persisting between commits. Attackers can craft a repository where an ancestor commit's symlink redirects a descendant commit's file writes during filter_branch, enabling code execution by writing into .git/hooks.

Dulwich from 0.23.1 before 1.2.8 contains a path traversal vulnerability in CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() that allows attackers to write files outside the working directory via symlinks persisting between commits. Attackers can craft a repository where an ancestor commit's symlink redirects a descendant commit's file writes during filter_branch, enabling code execution by writing into .git/hooks.

Summary

Dulwich's filter_branch.py CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal. When processing commit history, materialized tree entries (including symlinks) persist in the working directory between commits, allowing a symlink from an ancestor commit to redirect file writes from a descendant commit to arbitrary filesystem locations.

Root Cause

_apply_index_filter() at dulwich/filter_branch.py:212 calls build_index_from_tree(".", tmp_index_path, ...) which materializes all tree entries to the current working directory. The finally block (line 229-230) only cleans up the temporary index file (os.unlink(tmp_index_path)) — NOT the filesystem files written to CWD. When process_commit() processes parents recursively first (line 260), files materialized from ancestor commits persist and affect processing of descendant commits.

On dulwich 1.2.7, build_file_from_blob() has no symlink protection, and validate_path_element only validates name patterns, not filesystem state.

Impact

An attacker can craft a malicious repository where running filter_branch with an index filter writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations via symlink traversal. This achieves RCE if the write targets .git/hooks/.

Attack Scenario

1. Attacker creates a repository where commit history (linearized) has:
   • Ancestor commit: tree entry evil (mode 120000, symlink → /target_dir)
   • Descendant commit: tree entry evil/payload (mode 100644, attacker content)
2. Victim clones repository and runs filter_branch with an index filter
3. process_commit() processes ancestor first → materializes evil as symlink to /target_dir in CWD
4. CWD is NOT cleaned between commits
5. Processing descendant: os.path.exists("./evil") → True (symlink exists). build_file_from_blob(blob, mode, "./evil/payload") → open("./evil/payload", "wb") follows intermediate symlink → writes to /target_dir/payload

Suggested Fix

Clean the CWD between commit iterations in _apply_index_filter(), or verify that no intermediate path components are symlinks before writing files.

Reported by zx (Jace)

Dulwich from 0.23.1 before 1.2.8 contains a path traversal vulnerability in CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() that allows attackers to write files outside the working directory via symlinks persisting between commits. Attackers can craft a repository where an ancestor commit's symlink redirects a descendant commit's file writes during filter_branch, enabling code execution by writing into .git/hooks.

Dulwich from 0.23.1 before 1.2.8 contains a path traversal vulnerability in CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() that allows attackers to write files outside the working directory via symlinks persisting between commits. Attackers can craft a repository where an ancestor commit's symlink redirects a descendant commit's file writes during filter_branch, enabling code execution by writing into .git/hooks.