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CVE-2026-114129

stream-json: FlexAssembler string/RegExp path filters join the full key stack per container start, giving O(depth^2) CPU denial of service

6.2 MediumFix available

stream-json is a micro-library of stream components for processing JSON and JSONC with a minimal memory footprint. From 2.0.0 until 3.7.0, FlexAssembler compiles string and regular-expression path filters into matchers that join the full key stack on every container start. Because the key stack grows with unbounded object or array nesting, a document nested to depth D causes D joins whose cost grows with the current depth, resulting in quadratic CPU consumption on the single-threaded event loop. The join occurs before the rule match decision, so the attacker does not need to know the target schema. Consumers using only function filters or no rules are not affected. A crafted nested document can stall all concurrent work in a process that feeds it to an affected FlexAssembler. This issue is fixed in 3.7.0, which adds a default maximum depth.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.25%Up 0.1 points since Oct 22, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 6.2

stream-json: FlexAssembler string/RegExp path filters join the full key stack per container start, giving O(depth^2) CPU denial of service

stream-json is a micro-library of stream components for processing JSON and JSONC with a minimal memory footprint. From 2.0.0 until 3.7.0, FlexAssembler compiles string and regular-expression path filters into matchers that join the full key stack on every container start. Because the key stack grows with unbounded object or array nesting, a document nested to depth D causes D joins whose cost grows with the current depth, resulting in quadratic CPU consumption on the single-threaded event loop. The join occurs before the rule match decision, so the attacker does not need to know the target schema. Consumers using only function filters or no rules are not affected. A crafted nested document can stall all concurrent work in a process that feeds it to an affected FlexAssembler. This issue is fixed in 3.7.0, which adds a default maximum depth.

Record
CVE-2026-114129
CVSS 3.1
6.2 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-407
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-107412 6.2

stream-json is a micro-library of stream components for processing JSON and JSONC with a minimal memory footprint. From 2.0.0 until 3.7.0, FlexAssembler compiles string and regular-expression path filters into matchers that join the full key stack on every container start. Because the key stack grows with unbounded object or array nesting, a document nested to depth D causes D joins whose cost grows with the current depth, resulting in quadratic CPU consumption on the single-threaded event loop. The join occurs before the rule match decision, so the attacker does not need to know the target schema. Consumers using only function filters or no rules are not affected. A crafted nested document can stall all concurrent work in a process that feeds it to an affected FlexAssembler. This issue is fixed in 3.7.0, which adds a default maximum depth.

Record
EUVD-2026-107412
CVSS 3.1
6.2 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-jj87-hc4r-jwfw 6.2

stream-json: FlexAssembler string/RegExp path filters join the full key stack per container start, giving O(depth^2) CPU denial of service

Summary

FlexAssembler, the custom-container assembler shipped in the stream-json package (src/core/utils/flex-assembler.js, re-exported at stream-json/utils/flex-assembler.js and stream-json/web/utils/flex-assembler.js), compiles a string or RegExp path filter into a matcher that runs keyStack.join(separator) on every container start. Because the key stack grows one entry per open object or array with no depth bound, a JSON document nested to depth D drives D container-start tokens that each perform an O(D) join, for O(D^2) total CPU on the single-threaded event loop. An unauthenticated party who can supply JSON bytes to a pipeline that uses a FlexAssembler with a string or RegExp rule filter can stall the process with a small input: roughly 96 KB (depth 16000) blocks the event loop for over a second, and the cost grows quadratically.

Root Cause

FlexAssembler reconstructs JavaScript values from the parser token stream and supports custom containers selected by path-matching rules. When a rule filter is a string or RegExp, compileFilter returns a matcher that computes the joined path from the full key stack before making any match decision. That join is O(current depth), and it is invoked unconditionally for every rule on every container start. The key stack that feeds the join has no depth cap. The package does have a depth guard (maxDepth), but it exists only in the unrelated filter base state machine and never executes on the FlexAssembler code path, so nested input is unbounded here.

src/core/utils/flex-assembler.js
  compileFilter (lines 5-21): string branch computes `path.join(separator)` (line 10)
    before the `=== filter || startsWith(...)` comparison; RegExp branch computes
    `filter.test(path.join(separator))` (line 17). The join runs first, unconditionally.
  FlexAssembler._matchRule (lines 160-166): calls `rule.filter(this.keyStack)` for every
    rule; invoked from startObject (line 184) and startArray (line 197) on every
    container start.
  FlexAssembler._pushState (lines 168-176): pushes one entry onto `keyStack` per open
    container with no depth bound.

Impact

An attacker who can deliver JSON to a pipeline whose FlexAssembler is configured with a string or RegExp rule filter (a documented, tested, first-class option: Filter = string | RegExp | FilterFunction) can cause quadratic CPU consumption. The join runs regardless of whether the rule ultimately matches, so no attacker knowledge of the schema is required beyond nesting depth, which the attacker fully controls. The demonstrated capability is an availability impact: a small crafted document blocks the Node.js event loop, stalling all concurrent work on the process. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact. A consumer that uses only a function filter or no rules is not affected, which narrows the vulnerable population but does not raise attack complexity once such a configuration is in use.

Proof of Concept

Node.js and the published [email protected] package. Drive a FlexAssembler configured with a string rule filter, comparing against a function filter as a negative control.

  1. Install [email protected].
  2. Construct a deeply nested object token stream (or equivalently parse a document like '{"k":' repeated D times, a 1, then '}' repeated D times, through parser/parserStream).
  3. Feed it to a FlexAssembler whose objectRules contains a rule with a string filter.
  4. Observe wall-clock time scaling as roughly 4x per doubling of D (quadratic), while a function-filter configuration stays flat.
import FlexAssembler from 'stream-json/utils/flex-assembler.js';

function run(filter, D) {
  const asm = new FlexAssembler(filter ? {objectRules: [{filter, create: () => ({})}]} : undefined);
  const t = performance.now();
  asm.startObject();
  for (let i = 0; i < D; i++) { asm.keyValue('k'); asm.startObject(); }
  return performance.now() - t;
}

for (const D of…
Record
GHSA-jj87-hc4r-jwfw
CVSS 3.1
6.2 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-407
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 6.2

stream-json is a micro-library of stream components for processing JSON and JSONC with a minimal memory footprint. From 2.0.0 until 3.7.0, FlexAssembler compiles string and regular-expression path filters into matchers that join the full key stack on every container start. Because the key stack grows with unbounded object or array nesting, a document nested to depth D causes D joins whose cost grows with the current depth, resulting in quadratic CPU consumption on the single-threaded event loop. The join occurs before the rule match decision, so the attacker does not need to know the target schema. Consumers using only function filters or no rules are not affected. A crafted nested document can stall all concurrent work in a process that feeds it to an affected FlexAssembler. This issue is fixed in 3.7.0, which adds a default maximum depth.

Record
CVE-2026-114129
CVSS 3.1
6.2 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-407
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 6.2

stream-json: FlexAssembler string/RegExp path filters join the full key stack per container start, giving O(depth^2) CPU denial of service

stream-json is a micro-library of stream components for processing JSON and JSONC with a minimal memory footprint. From 2.0.0 until 3.7.0, FlexAssembler compiles string and regular-expression path filters into matchers that join the full key stack on every container start. Because the key stack grows with unbounded object or array nesting, a document nested to depth D causes D joins whose cost grows with the current depth, resulting in quadratic CPU consumption on the single-threaded event loop. The join occurs before the rule match decision, so the attacker does not need to know the target schema. Consumers using only function filters or no rules are not affected. A crafted nested document can stall all concurrent work in a process that feeds it to an affected FlexAssembler. This issue is fixed in 3.7.0, which adds a default maximum depth.

Record
CVE-2026-114129
CVSS 3.1
6.2 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-407
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-jj87-hc4r-jwfw 6.2

stream-json: FlexAssembler string/RegExp path filters join the full key stack per container start, giving O(depth^2) CPU denial of service

Summary

FlexAssembler, the custom-container assembler shipped in the stream-json package (src/core/utils/flex-assembler.js, re-exported at stream-json/utils/flex-assembler.js and stream-json/web/utils/flex-assembler.js), compiles a string or RegExp path filter into a matcher that runs keyStack.join(separator) on every container start. Because the key stack grows one entry per open object or array with no depth bound, a JSON document nested to depth D drives D container-start tokens that each perform an O(D) join, for O(D^2) total CPU on the single-threaded event loop. An unauthenticated party who can supply JSON bytes to a pipeline that uses a FlexAssembler with a string or RegExp rule filter can stall the process with a small input: roughly 96 KB (depth 16000) blocks the event loop for over a second, and the cost grows quadratically.

Root Cause

FlexAssembler reconstructs JavaScript values from the parser token stream and supports custom containers selected by path-matching rules. When a rule filter is a string or RegExp, compileFilter returns a matcher that computes the joined path from the full key stack before making any match decision. That join is O(current depth), and it is invoked unconditionally for every rule on every container start. The key stack that feeds the join has no depth cap. The package does have a depth guard (maxDepth), but it exists only in the unrelated filter base state machine and never executes on the FlexAssembler code path, so nested input is unbounded here.

src/core/utils/flex-assembler.js
  compileFilter (lines 5-21): string branch computes `path.join(separator)` (line 10)
    before the `=== filter || startsWith(...)` comparison; RegExp branch computes
    `filter.test(path.join(separator))` (line 17). The join runs first, unconditionally.
  FlexAssembler._matchRule (lines 160-166): calls `rule.filter(this.keyStack)` for every
    rule; invoked from startObject (line 184) and startArray (line 197) on every
    container start.
  FlexAssembler._pushState (lines 168-176): pushes one entry onto `keyStack` per open
    container with no depth bound.

Impact

An attacker who can deliver JSON to a pipeline whose FlexAssembler is configured with a string or RegExp rule filter (a documented, tested, first-class option: Filter = string | RegExp | FilterFunction) can cause quadratic CPU consumption. The join runs regardless of whether the rule ultimately matches, so no attacker knowledge of the schema is required beyond nesting depth, which the attacker fully controls. The demonstrated capability is an availability impact: a small crafted document blocks the Node.js event loop, stalling all concurrent work on the process. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact. A consumer that uses only a function filter or no rules is not affected, which narrows the vulnerable population but does not raise attack complexity once such a configuration is in use.

Proof of Concept

Node.js and the published [email protected] package. Drive a FlexAssembler configured with a string rule filter, comparing against a function filter as a negative control.

  1. Install [email protected].
  2. Construct a deeply nested object token stream (or equivalently parse a document like '{"k":' repeated D times, a 1, then '}' repeated D times, through parser/parserStream).
  3. Feed it to a FlexAssembler whose objectRules contains a rule with a string filter.
  4. Observe wall-clock time scaling as roughly 4x per doubling of D (quadratic), while a function-filter configuration stays flat.
import FlexAssembler from 'stream-json/utils/flex-assembler.js';

function run(filter, D) {
  const asm = new FlexAssembler(filter ? {objectRules: [{filter, create: () => ({})}]} : undefined);
  const t = performance.now();
  asm.startObject();
  for (let i = 0; i < D; i++) { asm.keyValue('k'); asm.startObject(); }
  return performance.now() - t;
}

for (const D of…
Record
GHSA-jj87-hc4r-jwfw
CVSS 3.1
6.2 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-407
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
stream-json
npm
2.0.0 to 3.6.0
3.7.0
stream-json
npm
2.0.0 up to 3.7.0
3.7.0

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-114129 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.2) in Uhop Stream-json, published October 21, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.25%, the 17th percentile. Fixed in stream-json 3.7.0.

References

This page doesn't list everything

Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.

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