CVE-2026-114606

draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content "sniff" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.

draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content "sniff" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.

draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content "sniff" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.

draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content "sniff" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.