CVE-2026-116682

FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to 1.5.2-stable and 2.0.1-beta, file read handling in backend/pkg/indexing/indexingFiles.go resolves symbolic links through GetRealPath without confirming that the resolved target remains inside the source root and the user's authorized scope. Download, preview, media, OnlyOffice, and public-share read flows that enable FollowSymlinks can therefore serve an out-of-scope target through a reachable in-scope symlink. An authenticated user with download access can read server-accessible files outside the assigned scope, and a holder of a public share link can do the same without an account when the shared directory exposes such a symlink. This issue is fixed in 1.5.2-stable and 2.0.1-beta.

FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to 1.5.2-stable and 2.0.1-beta, file read handling in backend/pkg/indexing/indexingFiles.go resolves symbolic links through GetRealPath without confirming that the resolved target remains inside the source root and the user's authorized scope. Download, preview, media, OnlyOffice, and public-share read flows that enable FollowSymlinks can therefore serve an out-of-scope target through a reachable in-scope symlink. An authenticated user with download access can read server-accessible files outside the assigned scope, and a holder of a public share link can do the same without an account when the shared directory exposes such a symlink. This issue is fixed in 1.5.2-stable and 2.0.1-beta.

Summary

File read paths resolve symbolic links with filepath.EvalSymlinks and then operate on the resolved target without re-checking that the target still lies inside the user's source/scope.

A symlink located inside a user's accessible directory that points outside the scope (for example to /etc/passwd, another tenant's directory, SSH keys, or container secrets) is followed transparently, and its contents are served through the normal download, preview, media, and OnlyOffice endpoints. Any authenticated user with download access can read files anywhere the server process can, whenever such a symlink is reachable in their scope.

The same symlink-following read path is used by the public share endpoints, which are authorized only by a share hash and not by any account, so when a public share exposes a directory that contains such a symlink, an unauthenticated attacker holding only the share link reads files outside the scope with no credential.

Details

1. Symlink resolution performs no containment check (indexing/iteminfo/utils.go:110-119)

func ResolveSymlinks(path string) (string, bool, error) {
    resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path)   // follows the link to its real target
    if err != nil {
        return path, false, fmt.Errorf("could not resolve symlinks for %s: %v", path, err)
    }
    info, err := os.Lstat(resolvedPath)
    // ...
    return resolvedPath, IsDirectory(info), nil         // returned with no scope validation
}

There is no comparison of resolvedPath against the index/scope root.

2. GetRealPath returns the resolved target unchecked (indexing/indexingFiles.go:991-1008)

absolutePath, err := filepath.Abs(joinedPath)
// ...
realPath, isDir, err := iteminfo.ResolveSymlinks(absolutePath)   // escapes scope here
// ...
return realPath, isDir, err

realPath is then used by file handlers to open and serve the file. No caller re-validates that realPath is a descendant of the user's source root. (By contrast, the project did add containment for archive extraction via symlinkTargetStaysUnderDest, but that guard is specific to extraction and is not applied to this general read path.)

3. The read handlers request symlink following, including the unauthenticated public-share handlers (http/resource.go:96,503, http/media.go:124, http/onlyOffice.go:133, http/public.go:279,441,494)

FollowSymlinks: true,

Authenticated download, preview, media-subtitle, and OnlyOffice read flows all set FollowSymlinks: true, and so do the public share handlers in http/public.go. The public download route is registered as publicApi.HandleFunc("GET /resources/download", withHashFile(publicDownloadHandler)) (http/httpRouter.go:130), where withHashFile authorizes by the share hash alone with no account, so the same escape is reachable with no authentication when a public share exposes a directory containing the symlink.

PoC

Confirmed live on gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable. A symlink pointing outside the user's directory must exist inside it; here it is placed on the host volume, which is what happens whenever a bind-mounted directory contains symlinks.

1. Start a fresh container and seed a file outside the user's intended subtree.

docker rm -f fb-q-lab 2>/dev/null; rm -rf /tmp/fb-q-lab; mkdir -p /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv/user1
echo "ROOT_DB_PASSWORD=supersecret" > /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv/secret-outside.txt
docker run -d --name fb-q-lab -p 8090:80 -v /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv:/srv gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable && sleep 8
TARGET_URL=http://localhost:8090

2. Place symlinks inside the served tree that point outside it. One points at a host file (/etc/passwd), one at the file outside the user's subtree.

docker exec fb-q-lab sh -c 'ln -sf /etc/passwd /srv/user1/passwd_link; ln -sf /srv/secret-outside.txt /srv/user1/secret_link'

Vector 1: authenticated user (any account with download access)

**3. Log in as the…

FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to 1.5.2-stable and 2.0.1-beta, file read handling in backend/pkg/indexing/indexingFiles.go resolves symbolic links through GetRealPath without confirming that the resolved target remains inside the source root and the user's authorized scope. Download, preview, media, OnlyOffice, and public-share read flows that enable FollowSymlinks can therefore serve an out-of-scope target through a reachable in-scope symlink. An authenticated user with download access can read server-accessible files outside the assigned scope, and a holder of a public share link can do the same without an account when the shared directory exposes such a symlink. This issue is fixed in 1.5.2-stable and 2.0.1-beta.

FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to 1.5.2-stable and 2.0.1-beta, file read handling in backend/pkg/indexing/indexingFiles.go resolves symbolic links through GetRealPath without confirming that the resolved target remains inside the source root and the user's authorized scope. Download, preview, media, OnlyOffice, and public-share read flows that enable FollowSymlinks can therefore serve an out-of-scope target through a reachable in-scope symlink. An authenticated user with download access can read server-accessible files outside the assigned scope, and a holder of a public share link can do the same without an account when the shared directory exposes such a symlink. This issue is fixed in 1.5.2-stable and 2.0.1-beta.

Summary

File read paths resolve symbolic links with filepath.EvalSymlinks and then operate on the resolved target without re-checking that the target still lies inside the user's source/scope.

A symlink located inside a user's accessible directory that points outside the scope (for example to /etc/passwd, another tenant's directory, SSH keys, or container secrets) is followed transparently, and its contents are served through the normal download, preview, media, and OnlyOffice endpoints. Any authenticated user with download access can read files anywhere the server process can, whenever such a symlink is reachable in their scope.

The same symlink-following read path is used by the public share endpoints, which are authorized only by a share hash and not by any account, so when a public share exposes a directory that contains such a symlink, an unauthenticated attacker holding only the share link reads files outside the scope with no credential.

Details

1. Symlink resolution performs no containment check (indexing/iteminfo/utils.go:110-119)

func ResolveSymlinks(path string) (string, bool, error) {
    resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path)   // follows the link to its real target
    if err != nil {
        return path, false, fmt.Errorf("could not resolve symlinks for %s: %v", path, err)
    }
    info, err := os.Lstat(resolvedPath)
    // ...
    return resolvedPath, IsDirectory(info), nil         // returned with no scope validation
}

There is no comparison of resolvedPath against the index/scope root.

2. GetRealPath returns the resolved target unchecked (indexing/indexingFiles.go:991-1008)

absolutePath, err := filepath.Abs(joinedPath)
// ...
realPath, isDir, err := iteminfo.ResolveSymlinks(absolutePath)   // escapes scope here
// ...
return realPath, isDir, err

realPath is then used by file handlers to open and serve the file. No caller re-validates that realPath is a descendant of the user's source root. (By contrast, the project did add containment for archive extraction via symlinkTargetStaysUnderDest, but that guard is specific to extraction and is not applied to this general read path.)

3. The read handlers request symlink following, including the unauthenticated public-share handlers (http/resource.go:96,503, http/media.go:124, http/onlyOffice.go:133, http/public.go:279,441,494)

FollowSymlinks: true,

Authenticated download, preview, media-subtitle, and OnlyOffice read flows all set FollowSymlinks: true, and so do the public share handlers in http/public.go. The public download route is registered as publicApi.HandleFunc("GET /resources/download", withHashFile(publicDownloadHandler)) (http/httpRouter.go:130), where withHashFile authorizes by the share hash alone with no account, so the same escape is reachable with no authentication when a public share exposes a directory containing the symlink.

PoC

Confirmed live on gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable. A symlink pointing outside the user's directory must exist inside it; here it is placed on the host volume, which is what happens whenever a bind-mounted directory contains symlinks.

1. Start a fresh container and seed a file outside the user's intended subtree.

docker rm -f fb-q-lab 2>/dev/null; rm -rf /tmp/fb-q-lab; mkdir -p /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv/user1
echo "ROOT_DB_PASSWORD=supersecret" > /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv/secret-outside.txt
docker run -d --name fb-q-lab -p 8090:80 -v /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv:/srv gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable && sleep 8
TARGET_URL=http://localhost:8090

2. Place symlinks inside the served tree that point outside it. One points at a host file (/etc/passwd), one at the file outside the user's subtree.

docker exec fb-q-lab sh -c 'ln -sf /etc/passwd /srv/user1/passwd_link; ln -sf /srv/secret-outside.txt /srv/user1/secret_link'

Vector 1: authenticated user (any account with download access)

**3. Log in as the…

FileBrowser: Symlink following escapes user scope allowing arbitrary file read outside the served directory in github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/backend