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CVE-2026-116794

russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation

8.3 HighFix available

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.16%Unchanged since Oct 29, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 8.3

russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Record
CVE-2026-116794
CVSS 4.0
8.3 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-862
Updated
2026-11-03
EUVDEUVD-2026-112267 8.3

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Record
EUVD-2026-112267
CVSS 4.0
8.3 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-03
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv 8.3

russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation

Summary

The agent server in russh::keys::agent::server never calls Agent::confirm before signing with a key that was added with the confirm constraint. That constraint is SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM (RFC 9987 §5.2.7.2), which is what ssh-add -c sends.

The call was replaced by a hard-coded true in 3e04597 ("Native async traits encore", #455), first released in 0.50.0-beta.12. Every release since, up to and including 0.64.1, signs requests for confirm-constrained keys without asking the Agent implementation. A user who added a key with -c is therefore never asked to confirm.

Details

Connection::try_sign notes that the key needs confirmation, then awaits a ready future instead of the agent (server.rs L348-L360 at v0.64.1):

let agent = if needs_confirm {
    let (agent, ok) = {
        let _pk = key.clone();
        Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true)))
    }
    .await;
    if !ok {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
    agent
} else {
    agent
};

Before 3e04597 the first statement was let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;.

try_sign was checked in the published crates on crates.io:

  • Every russh release from 0.50.0-beta.12 to 0.64.1 (52 versions) has the hard-coded true.
  • russh 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 call agent.confirm.
  • Earlier russh releases have no agent server. It lived in russh-keys, and no russh-keys release is affected.

Not affected:

  • Agent implementations that keep the default confirm, which returns true anyway.
  • Checks made in Agent::confirm_request, which is still called with MessageType::Sign for every sign request (L158-L159).
  • The agent client, and the SSH client and server.

PoC

  1. Add this test to mod test in russh/src/keys/mod.rs. It uses the module's existing Incoming helper and ED25519_KEY.
  2. Run cargo test -p russh --lib keys::test::test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint.
#[tokio::test]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint() {
    use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};

    // An agent whose user refuses every confirmation prompt.
    #[derive(Clone)]
    struct Refuse(std::sync::Arc<AtomicUsize>);
    impl agent::server::Agent for Refuse {
        fn confirm(
            self,
            _: std::sync::Arc<PrivateKey>,
        ) -> Box<dyn Future<Output = (Self, bool)> + Send + Unpin> {
            self.0.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
            Box::new(futures::future::ready((self, false)))
        }
    }

    let prompts = std::sync::Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let agent_path = dir.path().join("agent");
    let mut listener = tokio::net::UnixListener::bind(&agent_path).unwrap();
    let agent = Refuse(prompts.clone());
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        agent::server::serve(
            Incoming {
                listener: &mut listener,
            },
            agent,
        )
        .await
    });

    let key = decode_secret_key(ED25519_KEY, Some("blabla")).unwrap();
    let public = key.public_key().clone();
    let stream = tokio::net::UnixStream::connect(&agent_path).await.unwrap();
    let mut client = agent::client::AgentClient::connect(stream);
    // What `ssh-add -c` sends.
    client
        .add_identity(&key, &[agent::Constraint::Confirm])
        .await
        .unwrap();

    let signed = client
        .sign_request(&AgentIdentity::from(public), None, b"data".to_vec())
        .await;
    let confirm_calls = prompts.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
    assert!(
        signed.is_err(),
        "the agent signed with a…
Record
GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv
CVSS 4.0
8.3 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-862
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 8.3

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Record
CVE-2026-116794
CVSS 4.0
8.3 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Weakness
CWE-862
Updated
2026-11-05
OSV 8.3

russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Record
CVE-2026-116794
CVSS 4.0
8.3 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-862
Updated
2026-11-05
OSVDEBIAN-CVE-2026-116794 8.3

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Record
DEBIAN-CVE-2026-116794
CVSS 4.0
8.3 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Updated
2026-11-05
OSVGHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv 8.3

russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation

Summary

The agent server in russh::keys::agent::server never calls Agent::confirm before signing with a key that was added with the confirm constraint. That constraint is SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM (RFC 9987 §5.2.7.2), which is what ssh-add -c sends.

The call was replaced by a hard-coded true in 3e04597 ("Native async traits encore", #455), first released in 0.50.0-beta.12. Every release since, up to and including 0.64.1, signs requests for confirm-constrained keys without asking the Agent implementation. A user who added a key with -c is therefore never asked to confirm.

Details

Connection::try_sign notes that the key needs confirmation, then awaits a ready future instead of the agent (server.rs L348-L360 at v0.64.1):

let agent = if needs_confirm {
    let (agent, ok) = {
        let _pk = key.clone();
        Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true)))
    }
    .await;
    if !ok {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
    agent
} else {
    agent
};

Before 3e04597 the first statement was let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;.

try_sign was checked in the published crates on crates.io:

  • Every russh release from 0.50.0-beta.12 to 0.64.1 (52 versions) has the hard-coded true.
  • russh 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 call agent.confirm.
  • Earlier russh releases have no agent server. It lived in russh-keys, and no russh-keys release is affected.

Not affected:

  • Agent implementations that keep the default confirm, which returns true anyway.
  • Checks made in Agent::confirm_request, which is still called with MessageType::Sign for every sign request (L158-L159).
  • The agent client, and the SSH client and server.

PoC

  1. Add this test to mod test in russh/src/keys/mod.rs. It uses the module's existing Incoming helper and ED25519_KEY.
  2. Run cargo test -p russh --lib keys::test::test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint.
#[tokio::test]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint() {
    use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};

    // An agent whose user refuses every confirmation prompt.
    #[derive(Clone)]
    struct Refuse(std::sync::Arc<AtomicUsize>);
    impl agent::server::Agent for Refuse {
        fn confirm(
            self,
            _: std::sync::Arc<PrivateKey>,
        ) -> Box<dyn Future<Output = (Self, bool)> + Send + Unpin> {
            self.0.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
            Box::new(futures::future::ready((self, false)))
        }
    }

    let prompts = std::sync::Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let agent_path = dir.path().join("agent");
    let mut listener = tokio::net::UnixListener::bind(&agent_path).unwrap();
    let agent = Refuse(prompts.clone());
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        agent::server::serve(
            Incoming {
                listener: &mut listener,
            },
            agent,
        )
        .await
    });

    let key = decode_secret_key(ED25519_KEY, Some("blabla")).unwrap();
    let public = key.public_key().clone();
    let stream = tokio::net::UnixStream::connect(&agent_path).await.unwrap();
    let mut client = agent::client::AgentClient::connect(stream);
    // What `ssh-add -c` sends.
    client
        .add_identity(&key, &[agent::Constraint::Confirm])
        .await
        .unwrap();

    let signed = client
        .sign_request(&AgentIdentity::from(public), None, b"data".to_vec())
        .await;
    let confirm_calls = prompts.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
    assert!(
        signed.is_err(),
        "the agent signed with a…
Record
GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv
CVSS 4.0
8.3 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-862
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2026-116794 8.3

russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.

Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2026-116794
CVSS 4.0
8.3 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-05

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
russh
crates.io
before 0.65
0.65
rust-russh
Debian:14
All versions, plus listed versions
0.57.1-10.57.1-20.64.1-10.64.1-2
None known
rust-russh
Ubuntu:26.10
All versions, plus listed versions
0.57.1-2
None known

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, aliases, referencesOSV
factsEUVD, NVD
referencesCVE List
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-116794 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.3) in Eugeny Russh, published October 28, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.16%, the 4th percentile. Fixed in russh 0.65.

References

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Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.

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