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CVE-2026-118516

Symfony: Host Placeholders Can Match the Start of the Path in Compiled URL Matchers, Bypassing Path-Based Access Control

6.3 MediumFix available

The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.

For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore  match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher  would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x".

Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.45%Unchanged since Nov 5, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 6.3

Symfony: Host Placeholders Can Match the Start of the Path in Compiled URL Matchers, Bypassing Path-Based Access Control

The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.

For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore  match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher  would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x".

Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.

Record
CVE-2026-118516
CVSS 4.0
6.3 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-436, CWE-863
Updated
2026-11-04
EUVDEUVD-2026-116904 6.3

The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.

For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore  match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher  would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x".

Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.

Record
EUVD-2026-116904
CVSS 4.0
6.3 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-04
NVD 6.3

The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.

For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore  match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher  would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x".

Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.

Record
CVE-2026-118516
CVSS 4.0
6.3 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Weakness
CWE-436, CWE-863
Updated
2026-11-07
OSV 6.3

Symfony: Host Placeholders Can Match the Start of the Path in Compiled URL Matchers, Bypassing Path-Based Access Control

The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.

For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore  match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher  would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x".

Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.

Record
CVE-2026-118516
CVSS 4.0
6.3 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-436, CWE-863
Updated
2026-11-05
OSVDEBIAN-CVE-2026-118516 6.3

The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11. For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore  match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher  would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x". Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.

Record
DEBIAN-CVE-2026-118516
CVSS 4.0
6.3 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Updated
2026-11-07
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2026-118516 6.3

The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11. For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x". Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.

Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2026-118516
CVSS 4.0
6.3 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-06

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
symfony
Debian:12
All versions, plus listed versions
5.4.23+dfsg-15.4.23+dfsg-1+deb12u15.4.23+dfsg-1+deb12u25.4.23+dfsg-1+deb12u35.4.23+dfsg-1+deb12u4
Show 45 moreShow less
5.4.23+dfsg-1+deb12u55.4.24+dfsg-15.4.25+dfsg-15.4.27+dfsg-15.4.28+dfsg-15.4.29+dfsg-15.4.30+dfsg-15.4.31+dfsg-15.4.31+dfsg-25.4.32+dfsg-15.4.33+dfsg-15.4.34+dfsg-15.4.34+dfsg-25.4.35+dfsg-15.4.35+dfsg-25.4.35+dfsg-35.4.52+dfsg-0+deb12u15.4.53+dfsg-0+deb12u16.3.0+dfsg-16.3.0~rc1+dfsg-16.3.0~rc2+dfsg-16.3.1+dfsg-16.3.3+dfsg-16.3.4+dfsg-16.3.5+dfsg-16.3.6+dfsg-16.3.7+dfsg-16.4.0+dfsg-16.4.0~beta2+dfsg-16.4.0~beta3+dfsg-16.4.0~rc1+dfsg-16.4.0~rc2+dfsg-16.4.1+dfsg-16.4.10+dfsg-16.4.11+dfsg-16.4.12+dfsg-16.4.13+dfsg-16.4.14+dfsg-16.4.15+dfsg-16.4.16+dfsg-16.4.16+dfsg-26.4.17+dfsg-16.4.17+dfsg-26.4.17+dfsg-36.4.17+dfsg-4
None known
symfony
Debian:13
All versions, plus listed versions
6.4.21+dfsg-26.4.21+dfsg-2+deb13u16.4.24+dfsg-16.4.25+dfsg-16.4.40+dfsg-0+deb13u1
Show 45 moreShow less
6.4.41+dfsg-0+deb13u16.4.49+dfsg-0+deb13u17.0.4+dfsg-17.0.5+dfsg-17.0.6+dfsg-17.0.7+dfsg-17.1.0~beta1+dfsg-17.1.0~rc1+dfsg-17.1.2+dfsg-17.1.3+dfsg-17.1.4+dfsg-17.1.5+dfsg-17.2.0~beta1+dfsg-17.2.0~beta2+dfsg-17.2.0~rc1+dfsg-17.2.1+dfsg-17.2.2+dfsg-17.2.3+dfsg-17.2.4+dfsg-17.2.5+dfsg-17.2.6-17.3.0+dfsg-17.3.0~beta1+dfsg-17.3.0~beta2+dfsg-17.3.0~rc1+dfsg-17.3.1+dfsg-17.3.2+dfsg-17.3.3+dfsg-17.3.4+dfsg-17.3.5-17.4.0+dfsg-17.4.0+dfsg-27.4.0~beta1-17.4.0~beta1-27.4.0~beta2+dfsg-17.4.0~beta2+dfsg-27.4.0~beta2+dfsg-37.4.0~rc1+dfsg-17.4.0~rc2+dfsg-17.4.0~rc3+dfsg-17.4.10+dfsg-17.4.12+dfsg-17.4.13+dfsg-17.4.13+dfsg-27.4.14+dfsg-1
None known
symfony
Debian:14
before 7.4.23+dfsg-1, plus listed versions
6.4.21+dfsg-26.4.24+dfsg-16.4.25+dfsg-17.0.4+dfsg-17.0.5+dfsg-1
Show 45 moreShow less
7.0.6+dfsg-17.0.7+dfsg-17.1.0~beta1+dfsg-17.1.0~rc1+dfsg-17.1.2+dfsg-17.1.3+dfsg-17.1.4+dfsg-17.1.5+dfsg-17.2.0~beta1+dfsg-17.2.0~beta2+dfsg-17.2.0~rc1+dfsg-17.2.1+dfsg-17.2.2+dfsg-17.2.3+dfsg-17.2.4+dfsg-17.2.5+dfsg-17.2.6-17.3.0+dfsg-17.3.0~beta1+dfsg-17.3.0~beta2+dfsg-17.3.0~rc1+dfsg-17.3.1+dfsg-17.3.2+dfsg-17.3.3+dfsg-17.3.4+dfsg-17.3.5-17.4.0+dfsg-17.4.0+dfsg-27.4.0~beta1-17.4.0~beta1-27.4.0~beta2+dfsg-17.4.0~beta2+dfsg-27.4.0~beta2+dfsg-37.4.0~rc1+dfsg-17.4.0~rc2+dfsg-17.4.0~rc3+dfsg-17.4.10+dfsg-17.4.12+dfsg-17.4.13+dfsg-17.4.13+dfsg-27.4.14+dfsg-17.4.15+dfsg-17.4.15+dfsg-27.4.16+dfsg-17.4.17+dfsg-1
7.4.23+dfsg-1
symfony
Ubuntu:16.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
2.7.1+dfsg-12.7.5+dfsg-12.7.9+dfsg-12.7.9+dfsg-1ubuntu22.7.10-0ubuntu2
None known
symfony
Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
2.8.7+dfsg-1.3ubuntu13.4.3+dfsg-1ubuntu43.4.6+dfsg-13.4.6+dfsg-1ubuntu0.13.4.6+dfsg-1ubuntu0.1+esm13.4.6+dfsg-1ubuntu0.1+esm2
None known
symfony
Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
4.3.4+dfsg-1ubuntu14.3.8+dfsg-1ubuntu14.3.8+dfsg-1ubuntu1+esm14.3.8+dfsg-1ubuntu1+esm2
None known
symfony
Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
5.2.6+dfsg-1ubuntu75.4.4+dfsg-1ubuntu85.4.4+dfsg-1ubuntu8+esm1
None known
symfony
Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
5.4.23+dfsg-1ubuntu15.4.35+dfsg-3ubuntu16.4.5+dfsg-3ubuntu26.4.5+dfsg-3ubuntu36.4.5+dfsg-3ubuntu3+esm1
None known
symfony
Ubuntu:26.10
All versions, plus listed versions
7.4.7+dfsg-1ubuntu17.4.9+dfsg-1ubuntu17.4.13+dfsg-2ubuntu17.4.14+dfsg-1ubuntu27.4.15+dfsg-2ubuntu27.4.16+dfsg-1ubuntu2
None known
symfony
Ubuntu:26.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
6.4.24+dfsg-17.4.5+dfsg-1ubuntu17.4.6+dfsg-2ubuntu17.4.7+dfsg-1ubuntu1
None known

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, factsNVD, OSV
referencesOSV
affected, aliases, published, referencesOSV
affected, aliases, referencesCVE List, EUVD, NVD, OSV
aliases, products, publishedEUVD
first indexedCVE List

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-118516 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.3) in Sensiolabs Symfony, published November 4, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.45%, the 38th percentile. Fixed in symfony 7.4.23+dfsg-1.

References

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Left out here: 183 versions. The JSON record has them.

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