CVE-2026-118516
Symfony: Host Placeholders Can Match the Start of the Path in Compiled URL Matchers, Bypassing Path-Based Access Control
The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.
For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x".
Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
6.3
Symfony: Host Placeholders Can Match the Start of the Path in Compiled URL Matchers, Bypassing Path-Based Access Control
The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.
For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x".
Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.
- Record
CVE-2026-118516- CVSS 4.0
- 6.3 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-436, CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-04
EUVDEUVD-2026-116904
6.3
The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.
For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x".
Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.
- Record
EUVD-2026-116904- CVSS 4.0
- 6.3 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Updated
- 2026-11-04
NVD
6.3
The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.
For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x".
Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.
- Record
CVE-2026-118516- CVSS 4.0
- 6.3 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - Weakness
- CWE-436, CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-07
OSV
6.3
Symfony: Host Placeholders Can Match the Start of the Path in Compiled URL Matchers, Bypassing Path-Based Access Control
The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.
For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x".
Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.
- Record
CVE-2026-118516- CVSS 4.0
- 6.3 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-436, CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-05
OSVDEBIAN-CVE-2026-118516
6.3
The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11. For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x". Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.
- Record
DEBIAN-CVE-2026-118516- CVSS 4.0
- 6.3 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - Updated
- 2026-11-07
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2026-118516
6.3
The Symfony Routing components CompiledUrlMatcher and UrlMatcher interpret the host and path information differently, allowing path-based authorization rules to be bypassed in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11. For routes that define a host, CompiledUrlMatcher matches the string $host.'.'.$pathinfo against the host regular expression followed by the path regular expression, while UrlMatcher matches the host and the path separately. A host placeholder can therefore match /, and consume the beginning of the path, so the request is routed to a controller, while UrlMatcher would find no route. Rules that look at the path, such as access_control entries and firewall patterns, are evaluated against the actual request path, so they do not apply while the controller of the route runs, potentially allowing an unauthenticated request to reach a protected controller. For example, with the route /admin/report/{id}, the host app.{domain} and the rule access_control: [{ path: ^/admin, roles: ROLE_ADMIN }], an anonymous request for /admin/report/1 is sent to the login page. A request with the Host header app and path /x./admin/report/1 instead reaches the controller, with domain="/x". With the required domain: .+, the real hostname works: app.example.com and /x./admin/report/1 match with domain="example.com./x". Applications are affected if they have routes with host placeholders protected by path-based rules. With the default requirement, the Host header must be the host of the route without its last labels, such as app: framework.trusted_hosts blocks that, while a web server that only serves known names may not, for instance, Nginx passing the raw Host header to FastCGI for a request line that carries an absolute URI. If the requirement accepts /, such as .+, a real hostname works, and trusted_hosts does not help.
- Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2026-118516- CVSS 4.0
- 6.3 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Updated
- 2026-11-06
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
symfonyDebian:12 |
All versions, plus listed versions 5.4.23+dfsg-15.4.23+dfsg-1+deb12u15.4.23+dfsg-1+deb12u25.4.23+dfsg-1+deb12u35.4.23+dfsg-1+deb12u4 Show 45 moreShow less5.4.23+dfsg-1+deb12u55.4.24+dfsg-15.4.25+dfsg-15.4.27+dfsg-15.4.28+dfsg-15.4.29+dfsg-15.4.30+dfsg-15.4.31+dfsg-15.4.31+dfsg-25.4.32+dfsg-15.4.33+dfsg-15.4.34+dfsg-15.4.34+dfsg-25.4.35+dfsg-15.4.35+dfsg-25.4.35+dfsg-35.4.52+dfsg-0+deb12u15.4.53+dfsg-0+deb12u16.3.0+dfsg-16.3.0~rc1+dfsg-16.3.0~rc2+dfsg-16.3.1+dfsg-16.3.3+dfsg-16.3.4+dfsg-16.3.5+dfsg-16.3.6+dfsg-16.3.7+dfsg-16.4.0+dfsg-16.4.0~beta2+dfsg-16.4.0~beta3+dfsg-16.4.0~rc1+dfsg-16.4.0~rc2+dfsg-16.4.1+dfsg-16.4.10+dfsg-16.4.11+dfsg-16.4.12+dfsg-16.4.13+dfsg-16.4.14+dfsg-16.4.15+dfsg-16.4.16+dfsg-16.4.16+dfsg-26.4.17+dfsg-16.4.17+dfsg-26.4.17+dfsg-36.4.17+dfsg-4 |
None known |
symfonyDebian:13 |
All versions, plus listed versions 6.4.21+dfsg-26.4.21+dfsg-2+deb13u16.4.24+dfsg-16.4.25+dfsg-16.4.40+dfsg-0+deb13u1 Show 45 moreShow less6.4.41+dfsg-0+deb13u16.4.49+dfsg-0+deb13u17.0.4+dfsg-17.0.5+dfsg-17.0.6+dfsg-17.0.7+dfsg-17.1.0~beta1+dfsg-17.1.0~rc1+dfsg-17.1.2+dfsg-17.1.3+dfsg-17.1.4+dfsg-17.1.5+dfsg-17.2.0~beta1+dfsg-17.2.0~beta2+dfsg-17.2.0~rc1+dfsg-17.2.1+dfsg-17.2.2+dfsg-17.2.3+dfsg-17.2.4+dfsg-17.2.5+dfsg-17.2.6-17.3.0+dfsg-17.3.0~beta1+dfsg-17.3.0~beta2+dfsg-17.3.0~rc1+dfsg-17.3.1+dfsg-17.3.2+dfsg-17.3.3+dfsg-17.3.4+dfsg-17.3.5-17.4.0+dfsg-17.4.0+dfsg-27.4.0~beta1-17.4.0~beta1-27.4.0~beta2+dfsg-17.4.0~beta2+dfsg-27.4.0~beta2+dfsg-37.4.0~rc1+dfsg-17.4.0~rc2+dfsg-17.4.0~rc3+dfsg-17.4.10+dfsg-17.4.12+dfsg-17.4.13+dfsg-17.4.13+dfsg-27.4.14+dfsg-1 |
None known |
symfonyDebian:14 |
before 7.4.23+dfsg-1, plus listed versions 6.4.21+dfsg-26.4.24+dfsg-16.4.25+dfsg-17.0.4+dfsg-17.0.5+dfsg-1 Show 45 moreShow less7.0.6+dfsg-17.0.7+dfsg-17.1.0~beta1+dfsg-17.1.0~rc1+dfsg-17.1.2+dfsg-17.1.3+dfsg-17.1.4+dfsg-17.1.5+dfsg-17.2.0~beta1+dfsg-17.2.0~beta2+dfsg-17.2.0~rc1+dfsg-17.2.1+dfsg-17.2.2+dfsg-17.2.3+dfsg-17.2.4+dfsg-17.2.5+dfsg-17.2.6-17.3.0+dfsg-17.3.0~beta1+dfsg-17.3.0~beta2+dfsg-17.3.0~rc1+dfsg-17.3.1+dfsg-17.3.2+dfsg-17.3.3+dfsg-17.3.4+dfsg-17.3.5-17.4.0+dfsg-17.4.0+dfsg-27.4.0~beta1-17.4.0~beta1-27.4.0~beta2+dfsg-17.4.0~beta2+dfsg-27.4.0~beta2+dfsg-37.4.0~rc1+dfsg-17.4.0~rc2+dfsg-17.4.0~rc3+dfsg-17.4.10+dfsg-17.4.12+dfsg-17.4.13+dfsg-17.4.13+dfsg-27.4.14+dfsg-17.4.15+dfsg-17.4.15+dfsg-27.4.16+dfsg-17.4.17+dfsg-1 |
7.4.23+dfsg-1 |
symfonyUbuntu:16.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 2.7.1+dfsg-12.7.5+dfsg-12.7.9+dfsg-12.7.9+dfsg-1ubuntu22.7.10-0ubuntu2 |
None known |
symfonyUbuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 2.8.7+dfsg-1.3ubuntu13.4.3+dfsg-1ubuntu43.4.6+dfsg-13.4.6+dfsg-1ubuntu0.13.4.6+dfsg-1ubuntu0.1+esm13.4.6+dfsg-1ubuntu0.1+esm2 |
None known |
symfonyUbuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 4.3.4+dfsg-1ubuntu14.3.8+dfsg-1ubuntu14.3.8+dfsg-1ubuntu1+esm14.3.8+dfsg-1ubuntu1+esm2 |
None known |
symfonyUbuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 5.2.6+dfsg-1ubuntu75.4.4+dfsg-1ubuntu85.4.4+dfsg-1ubuntu8+esm1 |
None known |
symfonyUbuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 5.4.23+dfsg-1ubuntu15.4.35+dfsg-3ubuntu16.4.5+dfsg-3ubuntu26.4.5+dfsg-3ubuntu36.4.5+dfsg-3ubuntu3+esm1 |
None known |
symfonyUbuntu:26.10 |
All versions, plus listed versions 7.4.7+dfsg-1ubuntu17.4.9+dfsg-1ubuntu17.4.13+dfsg-2ubuntu17.4.14+dfsg-1ubuntu27.4.15+dfsg-2ubuntu27.4.16+dfsg-1ubuntu2 |
None known |
symfonyUbuntu:26.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 6.4.24+dfsg-17.4.5+dfsg-1ubuntu17.4.6+dfsg-2ubuntu17.4.7+dfsg-1ubuntu1 |
None known |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| affected, facts | NVD, OSV | |
| references | OSV | |
| affected, aliases, published, references | OSV | |
| affected, aliases, references | CVE List, EUVD, NVD, OSV | |
| aliases, products, published | EUVD | |
| first indexed | CVE List |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-118516 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.3) in Sensiolabs Symfony, published November 4, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.45%, the 38th percentile. Fixed in symfony 7.4.23+dfsg-1.
References
github.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-xqw3-x93m-887x
github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/067cde51e29f6d605de4de53322a02c6e23b5416
packagist.org/packages/symfony/routing
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/118xxx/CVE-2026-118516.json
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118516
github.com/symfony/routing
security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-118516
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-118516
cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-118516
Left out here: 183 versions. The JSON record has them.