CVE-2026-120306
Beta9 build sandbox escape via chroot-only isolation
Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and executes it with Buildah on the build worker. The worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot, and no buildah invocation passes --isolation, so the step only changes its filesystem root. It keeps the worker pod's PID, network, IPC, and user namespaces, runs as uid 0, and holds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. PID 1 in that procfs is the worker entrypoint, so /proc/1/root is the worker container's filesystem and is writable. That filesystem contains the runc, buildah, and runsc binaries the worker uses to start tenant containers, the worker's Kubernetes service account token, and the host directories mounted into the pod. Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
9.9
Beta9 build sandbox escape via chroot-only isolation
Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and executes it with Buildah on the build worker. The worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot, and no buildah invocation passes --isolation, so the step only changes its filesystem root. It keeps the worker pod's PID, network, IPC, and user namespaces, runs as uid 0, and holds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. PID 1 in that procfs is the worker entrypoint, so /proc/1/root is the worker container's filesystem and is writable. That filesystem contains the runc, buildah, and runsc binaries the worker uses to start tenant containers, the worker's Kubernetes service account token, and the host directories mounted into the pod. Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.
- Record
CVE-2026-120306- CVSS 3.1
- 9.9 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-653, CWE-269
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-114840
9.9
Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and executes it with Buildah on the build worker. The worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot, and no buildah invocation passes --isolation, so the step only changes its filesystem root. It keeps the worker pod's PID, network, IPC, and user namespaces, runs as uid 0, and holds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. PID 1 in that procfs is the worker entrypoint, so /proc/1/root is the worker container's filesystem and is writable. That filesystem contains the runc, buildah, and runsc binaries the worker uses to start tenant containers, the worker's Kubernetes service account token, and the host directories mounted into the pod. Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.
- Record
EUVD-2026-114840- CVSS 3.1
- 9.9 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-03
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-xvhg-75x6-gj86
9.9
Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and...
Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and executes it with Buildah on the build worker. The worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot, and no buildah invocation passes --isolation, so the step only changes its filesystem root. It keeps the worker pod's PID, network, IPC, and user namespaces, runs as uid 0, and holds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. PID 1 in that procfs is the worker entrypoint, so /proc/1/root is the worker container's filesystem and is writable. That filesystem contains the runc, buildah, and runsc binaries the worker uses to start tenant containers, the worker's Kubernetes service account token, and the host directories mounted into the pod. Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.
- Record
GHSA-xvhg-75x6-gj86- CVSS 3.1
- 9.9 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-269
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
9.9
Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and executes it with Buildah on the build worker. The worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot, and no buildah invocation passes --isolation, so the step only changes its filesystem root. It keeps the worker pod's PID, network, IPC, and user namespaces, runs as uid 0, and holds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. PID 1 in that procfs is the worker entrypoint, so /proc/1/root is the worker container's filesystem and is writable. That filesystem contains the runc, buildah, and runsc binaries the worker uses to start tenant containers, the worker's Kubernetes service account token, and the host directories mounted into the pod. Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.
- Record
CVE-2026-120306- CVSS 3.1
- 9.9 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-269, CWE-653
- Updated
- 2026-11-03
OSV
9.9
Beta9 build sandbox escape via chroot-only isolation
Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and executes it with Buildah on the build worker. The worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot, and no buildah invocation passes --isolation, so the step only changes its filesystem root. It keeps the worker pod's PID, network, IPC, and user namespaces, runs as uid 0, and holds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. PID 1 in that procfs is the worker entrypoint, so /proc/1/root is the worker container's filesystem and is writable. That filesystem contains the runc, buildah, and runsc binaries the worker uses to start tenant containers, the worker's Kubernetes service account token, and the host directories mounted into the pod. Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.
- Record
CVE-2026-120306- CVSS 3.1
- 9.9 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-269, CWE-653
- Updated
- 2026-11-04
Affected products
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| facts | EUVD, OSV | |
| references | CVE List, NVD, OSV | |
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-120306 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.9) in Beam-cloud Beta9 Worker, published November 1, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.36%, the 30th percentile. No source names a fixed version.
References
github.com/beam-cloud/beta9
github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/pull/1897
github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/commit/a28bf12cf0007c792a25d8ed282b4e8bf6f30393
github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases/tag/worker-0.1.756
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120306
github.com/advisories/GHSA-xvhg-75x6-gj86
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/120xxx/CVE-2026-120306.json
github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases