CVE-2026-120560

The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the get_table_data() AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied wp_columns_actions parameter directly to apply_filters() alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the table_id parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers wp_delete_attachment() as a callback on hooks such as upgrader_scheduled_cleanup and importer_scheduled_cleanup, which sanitize_key() does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside wp-content/uploads — such as wp-config.php or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.

The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the get_table_data() AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied wp_columns_actions parameter directly to apply_filters() alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the table_id parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers wp_delete_attachment() as a callback on hooks such as upgrader_scheduled_cleanup and importer_scheduled_cleanup, which sanitize_key() does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside wp-content/uploads — such as wp-config.php or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.

The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the get_table_data() AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied wp_columns_actions parameter directly to apply_filters() alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the table_id parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers wp_delete_attachment() as a callback on hooks such as upgrader_scheduled_cleanup and importer_scheduled_cleanup, which sanitize_key() does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside wp-content/uploads — such as wp-config.php or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.

The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the get_table_data() AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied wp_columns_actions parameter directly to apply_filters() alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the table_id parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers wp_delete_attachment() as a callback on hooks such as upgrader_scheduled_cleanup and importer_scheduled_cleanup, which sanitize_key() does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside wp-content/uploads — such as wp-config.php or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.