CVE-2026-125114
Novu: SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection
Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.15.0, the conditions filter webhook in libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts passes the user-configured child.webhookUrl directly to axios.post without calling validateUrlSsrf. Evaluating a workflow condition can therefore make the worker send a POST request to a private or link-local service and return the response data for condition evaluation. The response is stored in execution details and exposed through GET /execution-details, which can disclose credentials from POST-capable metadata services or data from internal services, although metadata endpoints that require GET are not reachable through this path. This issue is fixed in version 3.15.0.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
8.3
Novu: SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection
Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.15.0, the conditions filter webhook in libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts passes the user-configured child.webhookUrl directly to axios.post without calling validateUrlSsrf. Evaluating a workflow condition can therefore make the worker send a POST request to a private or link-local service and return the response data for condition evaluation. The response is stored in execution details and exposed through GET /execution-details, which can disclose credentials from POST-capable metadata services or data from internal services, although metadata endpoints that require GET are not reachable through this path. This issue is fixed in version 3.15.0.
- Record
CVE-2026-125114- CVSS 4.0
- 8.3 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-09
EUVDEUVD-2026-120495
8.3
Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.15.0, the conditions filter webhook in libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts passes the user-configured child.webhookUrl directly to axios.post without calling validateUrlSsrf. Evaluating a workflow condition can therefore make the worker send a POST request to a private or link-local service and return the response data for condition evaluation. The response is stored in execution details and exposed through GET /execution-details, which can disclose credentials from POST-capable metadata services or data from internal services, although metadata endpoints that require GET are not reachable through this path. This issue is fixed in version 3.15.0.
- Record
EUVD-2026-120495- CVSS 4.0
- 8.3 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N - Updated
- 2026-11-09
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f No score
Novu has SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection
Summary
The conditions filter webhook at libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261 sends POST requests to user-configured URLs using raw axios.post() with no SSRF validation. The HTTP Request workflow step in the same codebase correctly uses validateUrlSsrf() which blocks private IP ranges. The conditions webhook was not included in this protection.
Root Cause
conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261:
return await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config).then((response) => {
return response.data as Record<string, unknown>;
});
No call to validateUrlSsrf(). The webhookUrl comes from the workflow condition configuration with zero validation.
Protected Code (for contrast)
execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts line 130:
const ssrfValidationError = await validateUrlSsrf(url);
if (ssrfValidationError) {
// blocked
}
This function resolves DNS and checks against private ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16). It exists in the codebase but is not applied to the conditions webhook path.
Proof of Concept
- Create a workflow with a condition step
- Configure the condition's webhook URL to
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ - Trigger the workflow by sending a notification event
- The worker evaluates the condition and calls
axios.post()to the metadata endpoint - The response data is stored in execution details and accessible via the execution details API
Impact
Full-read SSRF. The response body is returned as Record<string, unknown> for condition evaluation and stored in the execution details raw field. The GET /execution-details API returns this data.
The POST method limits some metadata endpoints (GCP requires GET, Azure requires GET), but AWS IMDSv1 accepts POST and returns credentials. Internal services accepting POST are also reachable.
Suggested Fix
Extract validateUrlSsrf() to a shared utility and call it before the axios.post in conditions-filter.usecase.ts:
const ssrfError = await validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl);
if (ssrfError) {
throw new Error('Webhook URL blocked by SSRF protection');
}
return await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config)...
- Record
GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f- Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-09
NVD
8.3
Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.15.0, the conditions filter webhook in libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts passes the user-configured child.webhookUrl directly to axios.post without calling validateUrlSsrf. Evaluating a workflow condition can therefore make the worker send a POST request to a private or link-local service and return the response data for condition evaluation. The response is stored in execution details and exposed through GET /execution-details, which can disclose credentials from POST-capable metadata services or data from internal services, although metadata endpoints that require GET are not reachable through this path. This issue is fixed in version 3.15.0.
- Record
CVE-2026-125114- CVSS 4.0
- 8.3 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-10
OSV
8.3
Novu: SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection
Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.15.0, the conditions filter webhook in libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts passes the user-configured child.webhookUrl directly to axios.post without calling validateUrlSsrf. Evaluating a workflow condition can therefore make the worker send a POST request to a private or link-local service and return the response data for condition evaluation. The response is stored in execution details and exposed through GET /execution-details, which can disclose credentials from POST-capable metadata services or data from internal services, although metadata endpoints that require GET are not reachable through this path. This issue is fixed in version 3.15.0.
- Record
CVE-2026-125114- CVSS 4.0
- 8.3 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-11
OSVGHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f No score
Novu has SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection
Summary
The conditions filter webhook at libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261 sends POST requests to user-configured URLs using raw axios.post() with no SSRF validation. The HTTP Request workflow step in the same codebase correctly uses validateUrlSsrf() which blocks private IP ranges. The conditions webhook was not included in this protection.
Root Cause
conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261:
return await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config).then((response) => {
return response.data as Record<string, unknown>;
});
No call to validateUrlSsrf(). The webhookUrl comes from the workflow condition configuration with zero validation.
Protected Code (for contrast)
execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts line 130:
const ssrfValidationError = await validateUrlSsrf(url);
if (ssrfValidationError) {
// blocked
}
This function resolves DNS and checks against private ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16). It exists in the codebase but is not applied to the conditions webhook path.
Proof of Concept
- Create a workflow with a condition step
- Configure the condition's webhook URL to
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ - Trigger the workflow by sending a notification event
- The worker evaluates the condition and calls
axios.post()to the metadata endpoint - The response data is stored in execution details and accessible via the execution details API
Impact
Full-read SSRF. The response body is returned as Record<string, unknown> for condition evaluation and stored in the execution details raw field. The GET /execution-details API returns this data.
The POST method limits some metadata endpoints (GCP requires GET, Azure requires GET), but AWS IMDSv1 accepts POST and returns credentials. Internal services accepting POST are also reachable.
Suggested Fix
Extract validateUrlSsrf() to a shared utility and call it before the axios.post in conditions-filter.usecase.ts:
const ssrfError = await validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl);
if (ssrfError) {
throw new Error('Webhook URL blocked by SSRF protection');
}
return await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config)...
- Record
GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f- Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-09
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
@novu/apinpm |
before 3.15.0 | 3.15.0 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| references | NVD, OSV | |
| description, references, severity, title | CVE List | |
| aliases, products, references, severity | EUVD, OSV | |
| aliases, facts, id | GitHub Advisories | |
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-125114 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.3) in Novuhq Novu, published April 14, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.32%, the 25th percentile. Fixed in @novu/api 3.15.0.
References
github.com/novuhq/novu/security/advisories/GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f
github.com/novuhq/novu/pull/10457
github.com/novuhq/novu/commit/87d965eb88340ac7cd262dd52c8015acd092dc68
github.com/novuhq/novu/releases/tag/v3.15.0
github.com/advisories/GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/125xxx/CVE-2026-125114.json
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125114
github.com/novuhq/novu