CVE-2026-126186
Active Storage: Possible arbitrary file read and remote code execution in Active Storage video previews, analysis and image processing
CVE-2026-126186 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.8) in Rails, published November 10, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.51%, the 44th percentile. Fixed in activestorage 8.1.4.1.
- Severity
- 8.8 HighCVSS 3.1, CVE List
- Exploit chance
- 0.51%EPSS, 44th percentile
- Exploitation
- None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
- Fixed in
8.1.4.1activestorage +17 more
Description
Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way. An application is affected if it accepts uploads from untrusted users and analyzes video or audio attachments, generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick. The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
Discussion
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
activestorageRubyGems | 8.1.0.beta1 up to 8.1.4.1 | 8.1.4.1 |
activestorageRubyGems | before 8.0.5.2 | 8.0.5.2 |
railsDebian:12 | All versions, plus listed versions 2:6.1.7.10+dfsg-1~deb12u12:6.1.7.10+dfsg-1~deb12u22:6.1.7.10+dfsg-1~deb12u32:6.1.7.3+dfsg-12:6.1.7.3+dfsg-10 Show 38 moreShow less2:6.1.7.3+dfsg-112:6.1.7.3+dfsg-122:6.1.7.3+dfsg-132:6.1.7.3+dfsg-22:6.1.7.3+dfsg-2~deb12u12:6.1.7.3+dfsg-32:6.1.7.3+dfsg-42:6.1.7.3+dfsg-52:6.1.7.3+dfsg-62:6.1.7.3+dfsg-72:6.1.7.3+dfsg-7~exp12:6.1.7.3+dfsg-82:6.1.7.3+dfsg-92:7.2.2.1+dfsg-12:7.2.2.1+dfsg-1~exp12:7.2.2.1+dfsg-1~exp22:7.2.2.1+dfsg-1~exp32:7.2.2.1+dfsg-1~exp42:7.2.2.1+dfsg-1~exp62:7.2.2.1+dfsg-22:7.2.2.1+dfsg-32:7.2.2.1+dfsg-42:7.2.2.1+dfsg-52:7.2.2.1+dfsg-62:7.2.2.1+dfsg-72:7.2.2.2+dfsg-12:7.2.2.2+dfsg-22:7.2.2.2+dfsg-2~deb13u12:7.2.2.2+dfsg-2~deb13u22:7.2.3+dfsg-12:7.2.3+dfsg-22:7.2.3+dfsg-32:7.2.3.1+dfsg-12:7.2.3.2+dfsg-12:7.2.3.2+dfsg-22:7.2.3.2+dfsg-32:7.2.4+dfsg-12:7.2.4+dfsg-2 | None known |
railsDebian:13 | All versions, plus listed versions 2:7.2.2.1+dfsg-72:7.2.2.2+dfsg-12:7.2.2.2+dfsg-22:7.2.2.2+dfsg-2~deb13u12:7.2.2.2+dfsg-2~deb13u2 Show 9 moreShow less2:7.2.3+dfsg-12:7.2.3+dfsg-22:7.2.3+dfsg-32:7.2.3.1+dfsg-12:7.2.3.2+dfsg-12:7.2.3.2+dfsg-22:7.2.3.2+dfsg-32:7.2.4+dfsg-12:7.2.4+dfsg-2 | None known |
railsDebian:14 | All versions, plus listed versions 2:7.2.2.1+dfsg-72:7.2.2.2+dfsg-12:7.2.2.2+dfsg-22:7.2.2.2+dfsg-2~deb13u12:7.2.2.2+dfsg-2~deb13u2 Show 9 moreShow less2:7.2.3+dfsg-12:7.2.3+dfsg-22:7.2.3+dfsg-32:7.2.3.1+dfsg-12:7.2.3.2+dfsg-12:7.2.3.2+dfsg-22:7.2.3.2+dfsg-32:7.2.4+dfsg-12:7.2.4+dfsg-2 | None known |
gitlab-rails-18Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | Listed versions 18.11.11-r018.11.11-r118.11.11-r218.11.12-r018.11.12-r1 Show 15 moreShow less18.11.12-r218.11.12-r318.11.12-r418.11.14-r018.11.14-r118.11.14-r1018.11.14-r1118.11.14-r218.11.14-r318.11.14-r418.11.14-r518.11.14-r618.11.14-r718.11.14-r818.11.14-r9 | None known |
gitlab-rails-19Docker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.24 | Listed versions 19.1.8-r019.1.8-r119.4.1-r019.4.1-r119.4.1-r2 Show 16 moreShow less19.4.1-r319.4.2-r019.5.3-r019.5.3-r119.5.3-r219.5.3-r319.5.3-r419.5.3-r519.5.3-r619.5.3-r719.5.3-r819.5.4-r019.5.4-r119.5.5-r019.5.5-r119.5.5-r2 | None known |
gitlab-rails-18Docker Hardened Images:Debian:13 | Listed versions 18.11.11-018.11.11-118.11.11-218.11.12-018.11.12-1 Show 18 moreShow less18.11.12-218.11.14-018.11.14-118.11.14-1018.11.14-1118.11.14-1218.11.14-1318.11.14-1418.11.14-1518.11.14-1618.11.14-218.11.14-318.11.14-418.11.14-518.11.14-618.11.14-718.11.14-818.11.14-9 | None known |
gitlab-rails-19Docker Hardened Images:Debian:13 | Listed versions 19.1.8-019.1.8-119.4.1-019.4.1-119.4.1-2 Show 20 moreShow less19.4.2-019.5.3-019.5.3-119.5.3-219.5.3-319.5.3-419.5.3-519.5.3-619.5.3-719.5.3-819.5.3-919.5.4-019.5.4-119.5.5-019.5.5-119.5.5-219.5.5-319.5.5-419.5.5-519.5.5-6 | None known |
activestorageRubyGems | 8.1.0.beta1 up to 8.1.4.1, plus listed versions 8.1.08.1.0.rc18.1.18.1.28.1.2.18.1.38.1.3.18.1.4 | 8.1.4.1 |
Show 8 moreShow less
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
activestorageRubyGems | before 8.0.5.2, plus listed versions 0.15.2.05.2.0.beta15.2.0.beta25.2.0.rc1 Show 45 moreShow less5.2.0.rc25.2.15.2.1.15.2.1.rc15.2.25.2.2.15.2.2.rc15.2.35.2.3.rc15.2.45.2.4.15.2.4.25.2.4.35.2.4.45.2.4.55.2.4.65.2.4.rc15.2.55.2.65.2.6.15.2.6.25.2.6.35.2.75.2.7.15.2.85.2.8.16.0.06.0.0.beta16.0.0.beta26.0.0.beta36.0.0.rc16.0.0.rc26.0.16.0.1.rc16.0.26.0.2.16.0.2.26.0.2.rc16.0.2.rc26.0.36.0.3.16.0.3.26.0.3.36.0.3.46.0.3.5 | 8.0.5.2 |
railsUbuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS | All versions, plus listed versions 2:4.1.10-12:4.2.5-12:4.2.5.1-12:4.2.5.2-22:4.2.6-12:4.2.6-1ubuntu0.1~esm12:4.2.6-1ubuntu0.1~esm2 | None known |
railsUbuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS | All versions, plus listed versions 2:4.2.9-22:4.2.9-42:4.2.10-0ubuntu42:4.2.10-0ubuntu4+esm12:4.2.10-0ubuntu4+esm2 | None known |
railsUbuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS | All versions, plus listed versions 2:5.2.2.1+dfsg-1ubuntu12:5.2.3+dfsg-32:5.2.3+dfsg-3ubuntu0.1~esm1 | None known |
railsUbuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS | All versions, plus listed versions 2:6.0.3.7+dfsg-22:6.1.4.1+dfsg-8ubuntu22:6.1.4.1+dfsg-8ubuntu2+esm1 | None known |
railsUbuntu:24.04:LTS | All versions, plus listed versions 2:6.1.7.3+dfsg-2build12:6.1.7.3+dfsg-3 | None known |
railsUbuntu:26.10 | All versions, plus listed versions 2:7.2.3+dfsg-22:7.2.3.2+dfsg-2 | None known |
railsUbuntu:26.04:LTS | All versions, plus listed versions 2:7.2.2.1+dfsg-72:7.2.2.2+dfsg-22:7.2.3+dfsg-2 | None known |
What each source reports
CVE List Score used 8.8
Active Storage: Possible arbitrary file read and remote code execution in Active Storage video previews, analysis and image processing
Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way. An application is affected if it accepts uploads from untrusted users and analyzes video or audio attachments, generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick. The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.
- Record
CVE-2026-126186- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-646
- Updated
- 2026-11-10
EUVDEUVD-2026-122941 8.8
Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way. An application is affected if it accepts uploads from untrusted users and analyzes video or audio attachments, generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick. The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.
- Record
EUVD-2026-122941- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-11
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-v924-7rp8-4mxh 8.8
Active Storage: Possible arbitrary file read and remote code execution in video previews, analysis and image processing
Impact
ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way.
Details
The fixed releases keep the uploaded extension on the tempfile only when Marcel maps that extension to the blob's recorded content type, and name the tempfile with no extension otherwise. A form upload whose Rack tempfile fails the same check is copied to a correctly named tempfile before processing. Files whose uploaded extension disagrees with their content type are still processed; the external tool detects their format from the content. The Active Storage CHANGELOG describes the change.
Affected applications
An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements:
- Accepts uploads from untrusted users.
- Analyzes video or audio attachments (which Active Storage does on attach by default), generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick.
The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to a fixed version of
activestorage.
Expire and change secrets
Upgrading closes the vulnerability but does not undo a disclosure that already occurred. An application that meets the AviSynth requirement above should treat every secret readable by the application process as potentially exposed and change it, including secret_key_base, the master key and everything in config/credentials.yml.enc that it decrypts, the Active Storage service credentials, database credentials, and tokens for third-party services. Changing secret_key_base expires active sessions and invalidates signed and encrypted cookies, signed global IDs and Active Storage URLs. Do not retain an exposed secret as a fallback.
Workarounds
Applications that cannot upgrade can stop Active Storage from running FFmpeg on uploaded files by removing ActiveStorage::Previewer::VideoPreviewer from config.active_storage.previewers, and ActiveStorage::Analyzer::VideoAnalyzer and ActiveStorage::Analyzer::AudioAnalyzer from config.active_storage.analyzers. Running an FFmpeg built without AviSynth support closes the AviSynth attack but not the extension-selected decoders of ImageMagick.
Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.
Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once:
- 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/72136ff39153bc8d63ecbc899993848eb3d6573e.patch
- 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/8106938fb0a595f11006dd1497cd409e27d7d636.patch
Versions affected
- activestorage < 8.0.5.2
- activestorage >= 8.1, < 8.1.4.1
Credit
This issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher pirikara.
- Record
GHSA-v924-7rp8-4mxh- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-646
- Updated
- 2026-11-10
NVD 8.8
Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way. An application is affected if it accepts uploads from untrusted users and analyzes video or audio attachments, generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick. The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.
- Record
CVE-2026-126186- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-646
- Updated
- 2026-11-11
OSV 8.8
Active Storage: Possible arbitrary file read and remote code execution in Active Storage video previews, analysis and image processing
Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way. An application is affected if it accepts uploads from untrusted users and analyzes video or audio attachments, generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick. The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.
- Record
CVE-2026-126186- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-646
- Updated
- 2026-11-12
OSVDEBIAN-CVE-2026-126186 8.8
Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way. An application is affected if it accepts uploads from untrusted users and analyzes video or audio attachments, generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick. The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.
- Record
DEBIAN-CVE-2026-126186- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-11
OSVDHI-nxz5-ttkj-6eje-a56c 8.8
Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record…
Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way. An application is affected if it accepts uploads from untrusted users and analyzes video or audio attachments, generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick. The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.
- Record
DHI-nxz5-ttkj-6eje-a56c- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-16
OSVGHSA-v924-7rp8-4mxh 8.8
Active Storage: Possible arbitrary file read and remote code execution in video previews, analysis and image processing
Impact
ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way.
Details
The fixed releases keep the uploaded extension on the tempfile only when Marcel maps that extension to the blob's recorded content type, and name the tempfile with no extension otherwise. A form upload whose Rack tempfile fails the same check is copied to a correctly named tempfile before processing. Files whose uploaded extension disagrees with their content type are still processed; the external tool detects their format from the content. The Active Storage CHANGELOG describes the change.
Affected applications
An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements:
- Accepts uploads from untrusted users.
- Analyzes video or audio attachments (which Active Storage does on attach by default), generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick.
The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to a fixed version of
activestorage.
Expire and change secrets
Upgrading closes the vulnerability but does not undo a disclosure that already occurred. An application that meets the AviSynth requirement above should treat every secret readable by the application process as potentially exposed and change it, including secret_key_base, the master key and everything in config/credentials.yml.enc that it decrypts, the Active Storage service credentials, database credentials, and tokens for third-party services. Changing secret_key_base expires active sessions and invalidates signed and encrypted cookies, signed global IDs and Active Storage URLs. Do not retain an exposed secret as a fallback.
Workarounds
Applications that cannot upgrade can stop Active Storage from running FFmpeg on uploaded files by removing ActiveStorage::Previewer::VideoPreviewer from config.active_storage.previewers, and ActiveStorage::Analyzer::VideoAnalyzer and ActiveStorage::Analyzer::AudioAnalyzer from config.active_storage.analyzers. Running an FFmpeg built without AviSynth support closes the AviSynth attack but not the extension-selected decoders of ImageMagick.
Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.
Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once:
- 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/72136ff39153bc8d63ecbc899993848eb3d6573e.patch
- 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/8106938fb0a595f11006dd1497cd409e27d7d636.patch
Versions affected
- activestorage < 8.0.5.2
- activestorage >= 8.1, < 8.1.4.1
Credit
This issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher pirikara.
- Record
GHSA-v924-7rp8-4mxh- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-646
- Updated
- 2026-11-10
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2026-126186 8.8
Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Blob#open writes a blob to a tempfile whose name carries the extension of the uploaded filename, and hands that path to ffprobe (VideoAnalyzer, AudioAnalyzer), ffmpeg (VideoPreviewer) and ImageMagick (ImageAnalyzer, the :mini_magick variant processor). These tools select a decoder from the file extension when the content does not identify its own format, so an attacker who chooses the filename and declares the content type of an upload chooses which decoder processes it. An FFmpeg built with AviSynth support treats a file with the .avs extension as an AviSynth script and evaluates it, which could disclose files readable by the application process through the preview image, or load a native library the attacker has also uploaded, possibly leading to remote code execution in the FFmpeg process. ImageMagick selects its coders and delegates from the extension in the same way. An application is affected if it accepts uploads from untrusted users and analyzes video or audio attachments, generates video previews, or processes images with ImageMagick. The AviSynth attack additionally requires an FFmpeg built with --enable-avisynth and the AviSynthPlus runtime on the host. Upstream FFmpeg and the common Linux distribution and Homebrew packages do not enable it; the GPL builds distributed for Windows and Linux from ffmpeg.org do. Other decoders that FFmpeg or ImageMagick select from the extension may be reachable without AviSynth. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.
- Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2026-126186- CVSS 3.1
- 8.8 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-13
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| affected, aliases, references | OSV | |
| affected, aliases, references | OSV | |
| affected, aliases, references | OSV | |
| references | OSV | |
| published | EUVD, NVD | |
| published | EUVD | |
| description, references, severity, title | CVE List | |
| aliases, products, published | EUVD | |
| affected, references | OSV | |
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
References
github.com/rails/rails/security/advisories/GHSA-v924-7rp8-4mxh
github.com/rails/rails/commit/72136ff39153bc8d63ecbc899993848eb3d6573e
github.com/rails/rails/commit/8106938fb0a595f11006dd1497cd409e27d7d636
github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.0.5.2
github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.1.4.1
github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/activestorage/GHSA-v924-7rp8-4mxh.yml
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github.com/advisories/GHSA-v924-7rp8-4mxh
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/126xxx/CVE-2026-126186.json
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-126186
security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-126186
scout.docker.com/v/DHI-nxz5-ttkj-6eje-a56c
access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-126186
cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-126186
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-126186
people.ubuntu.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/CVE-2026-126186
github.com/rails/rails
Left out here: 127 versions. The JSON record has them.