CVE-2026-126537

The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker's data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin's own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.

The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker's data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin's own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.

The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker's data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin's own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.

The Ninja Forms - File Uploads add-on for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion (and arbitrary file read via S3/Dropbox/Google Drive exfiltration) in versions up to, and including, 3.3.36. The flaw spans NF_FU_Fields_Upload::process() in includes/fields/upload.php — which returns early (leaving the client-supplied files[] intact) whenever a public submission carries a nonempty extra.saveProgress — and NF_FU_External_Abstracts_Service::process_upload() in includes/external/abstracts/service.php, whose authoritative-path reload only fires when the client sends upload_id. By omitting upload_id, an attacker's data[file_path] survives into the Background Upload queue and is used by both upload_file_to_s3() (as SourceFile) and the maybe_delete_server_file() unlink() call in includes/external/abstracts/backgroundupload.php, with no canonicalization or upload-directory containment check (the plugin's own is_path_within_upload_dir() helper is only applied on admin paths). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible — specifically, deleting wp-config.php forces WordPress into its setup screen, enabling full site takeover.