CVE-2026-14368

The LwM2M JSON content formatter's get_string() in subsys/net/lib/lwm2m/lwm2m_rw_json.c copies a parsed JSON string into a caller-supplied buffer and NUL-terminates it. The length guard used if (string_length > buflen), which accepts a string whose length is exactly buflen. After memcpy() fills the whole buffer, buf[string_length] = '\0' then writes one byte past the end of the buffer (CWE-787).

The string value and its length are taken directly from the incoming CoAP payload during a LwM2M WRITE: do_write_op_json() parses the payload obtained from coap_packet_get_payload(), and get_string() is invoked from lwm2m_write_handler() (engine_get_string() in subsys/net/lib/lwm2m/lwm2m_message_handling.c) for a LWM2M_RES_TYPE_STRING resource. The destination buf/buflen is either the resource instance's fixed data buffer (res_inst->data_ptr/max_data_len) or the engine validation buffer (msg->ctx->validate_buf). A LwM2M server (the client's DTLS peer) can therefore write a string resource with a value whose length equals the target buffer size and force a one-byte overflow.

The overflow is a single out-of-bounds write of the constant byte 0x00 immediately past the resource or validation buffer, corrupting the adjacent byte in memory. It is not an information leak and the written value is fixed, so it is not a direct code-execution primitive, but it can corrupt adjacent state (an adjacent resource value, a length/flag field, or a struct field) and cause data corruption or a crash. Triggering the write is deterministic; the resulting impact depends on memory layout.

The fix changes the guard to string_length >= buflen, rejecting the exact-length case and aligning the JSON formatter with the other content formatters (lwm2m_rw_plain_text.c, lwm2m_rw_oma_tlv.c, lwm2m_rw_senml_json.c, lwm2m_rw_cbor.c, lwm2m_rw_senml_cbor.c), which already used the correct boundary check.

The LwM2M JSON content formatter's get_string() in subsys/net/lib/lwm2m/lwm2m_rw_json.c copies a parsed JSON string into a caller-supplied buffer and NUL-terminates it. The length guard used if (string_length > buflen), which accepts a string whose length is exactly buflen. After memcpy() fills the whole buffer, buf[string_length] = '\0' then writes one byte past the end of the buffer (CWE-787).

The string value and its length are taken directly from the incoming CoAP payload during a LwM2M WRITE: do_write_op_json() parses the payload obtained from coap_packet_get_payload(), and get_string() is invoked from lwm2m_write_handler() (engine_get_string() in subsys/net/lib/lwm2m/lwm2m_message_handling.c) for a LWM2M_RES_TYPE_STRING resource. The destination buf/buflen is either the resource instance's fixed data buffer (res_inst->data_ptr/max_data_len) or the engine validation buffer (msg->ctx->validate_buf). A LwM2M server (the client's DTLS peer) can therefore write a string resource with a value whose length equals the target buffer size and force a one-byte overflow.

The overflow is a single out-of-bounds write of the constant byte 0x00 immediately past the resource or validation buffer, corrupting the adjacent byte in memory. It is not an information leak and the written value is fixed, so it is not a direct code-execution primitive, but it can corrupt adjacent state (an adjacent resource value, a length/flag field, or a struct field) and cause data corruption or a crash. Triggering the write is deterministic; the resulting impact depends on memory layout.

The fix changes the guard to string_length >= buflen, rejecting the exact-length case and aligning the JSON formatter with the other content formatters (lwm2m_rw_plain_text.c, lwm2m_rw_oma_tlv.c, lwm2m_rw_senml_json.c, lwm2m_rw_cbor.c, lwm2m_rw_senml_cbor.c), which already used the correct boundary check.

The LwM2M JSON content formatter's get_string() in subsys/net/lib/lwm2m/lwm2m_rw_json.c copies a parsed JSON string into a caller-supplied buffer and NUL-terminates it. The length guard used if (string_length > buflen), which accepts a string whose length is exactly buflen. After memcpy() fills the whole buffer, buf[string_length] = '\0' then writes one byte past the end of the buffer (CWE-787).

The string value and its length are taken directly from the incoming CoAP payload during a LwM2M WRITE: do_write_op_json() parses the payload obtained from coap_packet_get_payload(), and get_string() is invoked from lwm2m_write_handler() (engine_get_string() in subsys/net/lib/lwm2m/lwm2m_message_handling.c) for a LWM2M_RES_TYPE_STRING resource. The destination buf/buflen is either the resource instance's fixed data buffer (res_inst->data_ptr/max_data_len) or the engine validation buffer (msg->ctx->validate_buf). A LwM2M server (the client's DTLS peer) can therefore write a string resource with a value whose length equals the target buffer size and force a one-byte overflow.

The overflow is a single out-of-bounds write of the constant byte 0x00 immediately past the resource or validation buffer, corrupting the adjacent byte in memory. It is not an information leak and the written value is fixed, so it is not a direct code-execution primitive, but it can corrupt adjacent state (an adjacent resource value, a length/flag field, or a struct field) and cause data corruption or a crash. Triggering the write is deterministic; the resulting impact depends on memory layout.

The fix changes the guard to string_length >= buflen, rejecting the exact-length case and aligning the JSON formatter with the other content formatters (lwm2m_rw_plain_text.c, lwm2m_rw_oma_tlv.c, lwm2m_rw_senml_json.c, lwm2m_rw_cbor.c, lwm2m_rw_senml_cbor.c), which already used the correct boundary check.

The LwM2M JSON content formatter's get_string() in subsys/net/lib/lwm2m/lwm2m_rw_json.c copies a parsed JSON string into a caller-supplied buffer and NUL-terminates it. The length guard used if (string_length > buflen), which accepts a string whose length is exactly buflen. After memcpy() fills the whole buffer, buf[string_length] = '\0' then writes one byte past the end of the buffer (CWE-787).

The string value and its length are taken directly from the incoming CoAP payload during a LwM2M WRITE: do_write_op_json() parses the payload obtained from coap_packet_get_payload(), and get_string() is invoked from lwm2m_write_handler() (engine_get_string() in subsys/net/lib/lwm2m/lwm2m_message_handling.c) for a LWM2M_RES_TYPE_STRING resource. The destination buf/buflen is either the resource instance's fixed data buffer (res_inst->data_ptr/max_data_len) or the engine validation buffer (msg->ctx->validate_buf). A LwM2M server (the client's DTLS peer) can therefore write a string resource with a value whose length equals the target buffer size and force a one-byte overflow.

The overflow is a single out-of-bounds write of the constant byte 0x00 immediately past the resource or validation buffer, corrupting the adjacent byte in memory. It is not an information leak and the written value is fixed, so it is not a direct code-execution primitive, but it can corrupt adjacent state (an adjacent resource value, a length/flag field, or a struct field) and cause data corruption or a crash. Triggering the write is deterministic; the resulting impact depends on memory layout.

The fix changes the guard to string_length >= buflen, rejecting the exact-length case and aligning the JSON formatter with the other content formatters (lwm2m_rw_plain_text.c, lwm2m_rw_oma_tlv.c, lwm2m_rw_senml_json.c, lwm2m_rw_cbor.c, lwm2m_rw_senml_cbor.c), which already used the correct boundary check.