CVE-2026-15964

The Single Sign On For TNG plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via unauthenticated password reset in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.0. This is due to the ssoprocess_ajax() function — registered on wp_ajax_nopriv_ssoprocess_ajax and therefore reachable without authentication — accepting an attacker-supplied email parameter with the setnewpassword operation and calling reset_password() on the resolved account without any ownership token, email confirmation link, or capability check. The sole guard is a call to check_ajax_referer(), which provides no authorization barrier because the ssoajaxnonce nonce is publicly broadcast on every front-end page via wp_localize_script() into the SSOPWDREQUIREMENT JavaScript object; since WordPress computes nonces for logged-out visitors against a shared anonymous session context, any unauthenticated visitor can scrape a valid nonce from the homepage and use it to authenticate the request. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any WordPress account, including administrator accounts, enabling complete site takeover.

The Single Sign On For TNG plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via unauthenticated password reset in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.0. This is due to the ssoprocess_ajax() function — registered on wp_ajax_nopriv_ssoprocess_ajax and therefore reachable without authentication — accepting an attacker-supplied email parameter with the setnewpassword operation and calling reset_password() on the resolved account without any ownership token, email confirmation link, or capability check. The sole guard is a call to check_ajax_referer(), which provides no authorization barrier because the ssoajaxnonce nonce is publicly broadcast on every front-end page via wp_localize_script() into the SSOPWDREQUIREMENT JavaScript object; since WordPress computes nonces for logged-out visitors against a shared anonymous session context, any unauthenticated visitor can scrape a valid nonce from the homepage and use it to authenticate the request. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any WordPress account, including administrator accounts, enabling complete site takeover.

The Single Sign On For TNG plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via unauthenticated password reset in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.0. This is due to the ssoprocess_ajax() function — registered on wp_ajax_nopriv_ssoprocess_ajax and therefore reachable without authentication — accepting an attacker-supplied email parameter with the setnewpassword operation and calling reset_password() on the resolved account without any ownership token, email confirmation link, or capability check. The sole guard is a call to check_ajax_referer(), which provides no authorization barrier because the ssoajaxnonce nonce is publicly broadcast on every front-end page via wp_localize_script() into the SSOPWDREQUIREMENT JavaScript object; since WordPress computes nonces for logged-out visitors against a shared anonymous session context, any unauthenticated visitor can scrape a valid nonce from the homepage and use it to authenticate the request. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any WordPress account, including administrator accounts, enabling complete site takeover.

The Single Sign On For TNG plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via unauthenticated password reset in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.0. This is due to the ssoprocess_ajax() function — registered on wp_ajax_nopriv_ssoprocess_ajax and therefore reachable without authentication — accepting an attacker-supplied email parameter with the setnewpassword operation and calling reset_password() on the resolved account without any ownership token, email confirmation link, or capability check. The sole guard is a call to check_ajax_referer(), which provides no authorization barrier because the ssoajaxnonce nonce is publicly broadcast on every front-end page via wp_localize_script() into the SSOPWDREQUIREMENT JavaScript object; since WordPress computes nonces for logged-out visitors against a shared anonymous session context, any unauthenticated visitor can scrape a valid nonce from the homepage and use it to authenticate the request. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any WordPress account, including administrator accounts, enabling complete site takeover.