CVE-2026-2673
OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may choose unexpected key agreement group
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword.
Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server.
If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported.
As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction).
OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included.
The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group.
The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'.
No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary.
OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue.
OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released.
OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may choose unexpected key agreement group
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword.
Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server.
If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported.
As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction).
OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included.
The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group.
The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'.
No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary.
OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue.
OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released.
OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-2673- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-757
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-12033
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword.
Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server.
If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported.
As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction).
OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included.
The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group.
The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'.
No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary.
OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue.
OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released.
OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
- Record
EUVD-2026-12033- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-wj64-gh9j-xm82
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key...
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword.
Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server.
If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported.
As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction).
OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included.
The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group.
The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'.
No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary.
OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue.
OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released.
OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
- Record
GHSA-wj64-gh9j-xm82- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-757
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword.
Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server.
If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported.
As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction).
OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included.
The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group.
The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'.
No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary.
OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue.
OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released.
OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-2673- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-757
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVALPINE-CVE-2026-2673
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword.
Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server.
If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported.
As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction).
OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included.
The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group.
The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'.
No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary.
OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue.
OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released.
OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
- Record
ALPINE-CVE-2026-2673- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVBELL-CVE-2026-2673
- Record
BELL-CVE-2026-2673- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
Show 17 moreShow less
OSV
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword.
Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server.
If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported.
As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction).
OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included.
The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group.
The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'.
No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary.
OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue.
OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released.
OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-2673- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVDEBIAN-CVE-2026-2673
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword. Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server. If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported. As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction). OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included. The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group. The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'. No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary. OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
- Record
DEBIAN-CVE-2026-2673- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVJLSEC-2026-271
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange...
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword.
Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server.
If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported.
As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction).
OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included.
The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group.
The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'.
No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary.
OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue.
OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released.
OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
- Record
JLSEC-2026-271- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVRHSA-2026:19066
Red Hat Security Advisory: openssl security update
- Record
RHSA-2026:19066- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVRHSA-2026:22312
Red Hat Security Advisory: openssl security update
- Record
RHSA-2026:22312- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVRHSA-2026:7261
Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update
- Record
RHSA-2026:7261- CVSS 3.1
- 9.8 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2026-2673
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword. Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server. If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported. As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction). OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included. The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group. The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'. No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary. OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
- Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2026-2673- CVSS 3.1
- 6.5 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVALSA-2026:19066 No score
Moderate: openssl security update
OpenSSL is a toolkit that implements the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols, as well as a full-strength general-purpose cryptography library.
Security Fix(es):
- openssl: openssl: Information Disclosure from Uninitialized Memory via Invalid RSA Public Key (CVE-2026-31790)
For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.
- Record
ALSA-2026:19066- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVALSA-2026:22312 No score
Moderate: openssl security update
OpenSSL is a toolkit that implements the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols, as well as a full-strength general-purpose cryptography library.
Security Fix(es):
- openssl: OpenSSL: Denial of Service due to NULL pointer dereference in CMS EnvelopedData processing (CVE-2026-28390)
For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.
- Record
ALSA-2026:22312- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:10533-1 No score
libopenssl-3-devel-3.5.3-4.1 on GA media
These are all security issues fixed in the libopenssl-3-devel-3.5.3-4.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.
- Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:10533-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:20525-1 No score
Security update for openssl-3
This update for openssl-3 fixes the following issues:
Security issues fixed:
- CVE-2026-2673: TLS 1.3 servers may choose unexpected key agreement group (bsc#1259652).
- CVE-2026-28387: potential use-after-free in DANE client code (bsc#1260441).
- CVE-2026-28388: NULL pointer dereference when processing a delta (bsc#1260442).
- CVE-2026-28389: possible NULL pointer dereference when processing CMS KeyAgreeRecipientInfo (bsc#1260443).
- CVE-2026-28390: NULL pointer dereference during processing of a crafted CMS EnvelopedData message with KeyTransportRecipientInfo (bsc#1261678).
- CVE-2026-31789: heap buffer overflow in hexadecimal conversion (bsc#1260444).
- CVE-2026-31790: incorrect failure handling in RSA KEM RSASVE encapsulation (bsc#1260445).
Other updates and bugfixes:
- Enable MD2 in legacy provider (jsc#PED-15724).
- Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:20525-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21005-1 No score
Security update for openssl-3
This update for openssl-3 fixes the following issues
- CVE-2026-2673: TLS 1.3 servers may choose unexpected key agreement group (bsc#1259652).
- CVE-2026-7383: Possible Heap Buffer Overflow in ASN.1 Multibyte String Conversion (bsc#1266340).
- CVE-2026-9076: Out-of-Bounds Read in CMS Password-Based Decryption (bsc#1266341).
- CVE-2026-34180: Heap Buffer Over-read in ASN.1 Content Parsing (bsc#1266342).
- CVE-2026-34182: CMS AuthEnvelopedData Processing May Accept Forged Messages (bsc#1266344).
- CVE-2026-34183: Unbounded Memory Growth in the QUIC PATH_CHALLENGE Handler (bsc#1266345).
- CVE-2026-42764: NULL pointer dereference in QUIC server initial packet handling (bsc#1266347).
- CVE-2026-42766: Possible NULL Dereference in Password-Based CMS Decryption (bsc#1266349).
- CVE-2026-42767: NULL Pointer Dereference in CRMF EncryptedValue Decryption (bsc#1266350).
- CVE-2026-42768: Multi-RecipientInfo Bleichenbacher Oracle in CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt() (bsc#1266351).
- CVE-2026-42769: Trust-Anchor Substitution via cert/issuer Typo in CMP rootCaKeyUpdate (bsc#1266352).
- CVE-2026-42770: FFC-DH Peer Validation Uses Attacker-Supplied q (bsc#1266353).
- CVE-2026-45445: AES-OCB IV Ignored on EVP_Cipher() Path (bsc#1266355).
- CVE-2026-45446: Incorrect Tag Processing for Empty Messages in AES-GCM-SIV and AES-SIV modes (bsc#1266356).
- CVE-2026-45447: Heap Use-After-Free in OpenSSL PKCS7_verify() (bsc#1266357).
- Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21005-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVSUSE-SU-2026:21107-1 No score
Security update for openssl-3
This update for openssl-3 fixes the following issues:
Security issues fixed:
- CVE-2026-2673: TLS 1.3 servers may choose unexpected key agreement group (bsc#1259652).
- CVE-2026-28387: potential use-after-free in DANE client code (bsc#1260441).
- CVE-2026-28388: NULL pointer dereference when processing a delta (bsc#1260442).
- CVE-2026-28389: possible NULL pointer dereference when processing CMS KeyAgreeRecipientInfo (bsc#1260443).
- CVE-2026-28390: NULL pointer dereference during processing of a crafted CMS EnvelopedData message with KeyTransportRecipientInfo (bsc#1261678).
- CVE-2026-31789: heap buffer overflow in hexadecimal conversion (bsc#1260444).
- CVE-2026-31790: incorrect failure handling in RSA KEM RSASVE encapsulation (bsc#1260445).
Other updates and bugfixes:
- Enable MD2 in legacy provider (jsc#PED-15724).
- Record
SUSE-SU-2026:21107-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVSUSE-SU-2026:21186-1 No score
Security update for openssl-3
This update for openssl-3 fixes the following issues:
Security issues fixed:
- CVE-2026-2673: TLS 1.3 servers may choose unexpected key agreement group (bsc#1259652).
- CVE-2026-28387: potential use-after-free in DANE client code (bsc#1260441).
- CVE-2026-28388: NULL pointer dereference when processing a delta (bsc#1260442).
- CVE-2026-28389: possible NULL pointer dereference when processing CMS KeyAgreeRecipientInfo (bsc#1260443).
- CVE-2026-28390: NULL pointer dereference during processing of a crafted CMS EnvelopedData message with KeyTransportRecipientInfo (bsc#1261678).
- CVE-2026-31789: heap buffer overflow in hexadecimal conversion (bsc#1260444).
- CVE-2026-31790: incorrect failure handling in RSA KEM RSASVE encapsulation (bsc#1260445).
Other updates and bugfixes:
- Enable MD2 in legacy provider (jsc#PED-15724).
- Record
SUSE-SU-2026:21186-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVSUSE-SU-2026:22251-1 No score
Security update for openssl-3
This update for openssl-3 fixes the following issues
- CVE-2026-2673: TLS 1.3 servers may choose unexpected key agreement group (bsc#1259652).
- CVE-2026-7383: Possible Heap Buffer Overflow in ASN.1 Multibyte String Conversion (bsc#1266340).
- CVE-2026-9076: Out-of-Bounds Read in CMS Password-Based Decryption (bsc#1266341).
- CVE-2026-34180: Heap Buffer Over-read in ASN.1 Content Parsing (bsc#1266342).
- CVE-2026-34182: CMS AuthEnvelopedData Processing May Accept Forged Messages (bsc#1266344).
- CVE-2026-34183: Unbounded Memory Growth in the QUIC PATH_CHALLENGE Handler (bsc#1266345).
- CVE-2026-42764: NULL pointer dereference in QUIC server initial packet handling (bsc#1266347).
- CVE-2026-42766: Possible NULL Dereference in Password-Based CMS Decryption (bsc#1266349).
- CVE-2026-42767: NULL Pointer Dereference in CRMF EncryptedValue Decryption (bsc#1266350).
- CVE-2026-42768: Multi-RecipientInfo Bleichenbacher Oracle in CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt() (bsc#1266351).
- CVE-2026-42769: Trust-Anchor Substitution via cert/issuer Typo in CMP rootCaKeyUpdate (bsc#1266352).
- CVE-2026-42770: FFC-DH Peer Validation Uses Attacker-Supplied q (bsc#1266353).
- CVE-2026-45445: AES-OCB IV Ignored on EVP_Cipher() Path (bsc#1266355).
- CVE-2026-45446: Incorrect Tag Processing for Empty Messages in AES-GCM-SIV and AES-SIV modes (bsc#1266356).
- CVE-2026-45447: Heap Use-After-Free in OpenSSL PKCS7_verify() (bsc#1266357).
- Record
SUSE-SU-2026:22251-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVSUSE-SU-2026:22315-1 No score
Security update for openssl-3
This update for openssl-3 fixes the following issues
- CVE-2026-2673: TLS 1.3 servers may choose unexpected key agreement group (bsc#1259652).
- CVE-2026-7383: Possible Heap Buffer Overflow in ASN.1 Multibyte String Conversion (bsc#1266340).
- CVE-2026-9076: Out-of-Bounds Read in CMS Password-Based Decryption (bsc#1266341).
- CVE-2026-34180: Heap Buffer Over-read in ASN.1 Content Parsing (bsc#1266342).
- CVE-2026-34182: CMS AuthEnvelopedData Processing May Accept Forged Messages (bsc#1266344).
- CVE-2026-34183: Unbounded Memory Growth in the QUIC PATH_CHALLENGE Handler (bsc#1266345).
- CVE-2026-42764: NULL pointer dereference in QUIC server initial packet handling (bsc#1266347).
- CVE-2026-42766: Possible NULL Dereference in Password-Based CMS Decryption (bsc#1266349).
- CVE-2026-42767: NULL Pointer Dereference in CRMF EncryptedValue Decryption (bsc#1266350).
- CVE-2026-42768: Multi-RecipientInfo Bleichenbacher Oracle in CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt() (bsc#1266351).
- CVE-2026-42769: Trust-Anchor Substitution via cert/issuer Typo in CMP rootCaKeyUpdate (bsc#1266352).
- CVE-2026-42770: FFC-DH Peer Validation Uses Attacker-Supplied q (bsc#1266353).
- CVE-2026-45445: AES-OCB IV Ignored on EVP_Cipher() Path (bsc#1266355).
- CVE-2026-45446: Incorrect Tag Processing for Empty Messages in AES-GCM-SIV and AES-SIV modes (bsc#1266356).
- CVE-2026-45447: Heap Use-After-Free in OpenSSL PKCS7_verify() (bsc#1266357).
- Record
SUSE-SU-2026:22315-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVUSN-8155-1 No score
openssl vulnerabilities
Viktor Dukhovni discovered that OpenSSL incorrectly negotiated the expected preferred key exchange group when used as a TLS 1.3 server. This could result in a less preferred key exchange being used, contrary to expectations. This issue only affected Ubuntu 25.10. (CVE-2026-2673)
Igor Morgenstern discovered that OpenSSL incorrectly handled certain memory operations when used as a DANE client. A remote attacker could use this issue to cause OpenSSL to crash, resulting in a denial of service, or possibly execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2026-28387)
Igor Morgenstern discovered that OpenSSL incorrectly handled certain memory operations when processing a delta CRL. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to cause OpenSSL to crash, resulting in a denial of service. (CVE-2026-28388)
Nathan Sportsman, Daniel Rhea, and Jaeho Nam discovered that OpenSSL incorrectly handled certain memory operations when processing a crafted CMS EnvelopedData message with KeyAgreeRecipientInfo. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to cause OpenSSL to crash, resulting in a denial of service. (CVE-2026-28389)
Muhammad Daffa, Joshua Rogers, and Chanho Kim discovered that OpenSSL incorrectly handled processing of a crafted CMS EnvelopedData message with KeyTransportRecipientInfo. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to cause OpenSSL to crash, resulting in a denial of service. (CVE-2026-28390)
Quoc Tran discovered that OpenSSL incorrectly handled hexadecimal conversion on 32-bit platforms. A remote attacker could use this issue to cause OpenSSL to crash, resulting in a denial of service, or possibly execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2026-31789)
Simo Sorce discovered that OpenSSL incorrectly handled failures in RSA KEM RSASVE Encapsulation. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to obtain sensitive information. (CVE-2026-31790)
- Record
USN-8155-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
opensslAlpine:v3.22 |
3.5.0 up to 3.5.6-r0 | 3.5.6-r0 |
opensslAlpine:v3.23 |
3.5.0 up to 3.5.6-r0 | 3.5.6-r0 |
opensslAlpine:v3.24 |
3.5.0 up to 3.5.6-r0 | 3.5.6-r0 |
opensslAlmaLinux:10 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.alma.1 | 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.alma.1 |
openssl-develAlmaLinux:10 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.alma.1 | 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.alma.1 |
openssl-libsAlmaLinux:10 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.alma.1 | 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.alma.1 |
openssl-perlAlmaLinux:10 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.alma.1 | 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.alma.1 |
opensslAlmaLinux:9 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
openssl-develAlmaLinux:9 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
openssl-libsAlmaLinux:9 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
Show 48 moreShow less
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
openssl-perlAlmaLinux:9 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
opensslAlpaquita:25 |
3.5.0-r0 up to 3.5.5-r1 | 3.5.5-r1 |
opensslAlpaquita:stream |
3.5.0-r0 up to 3.5.5-r1 | 3.5.5-r1 |
opensslBellSoft Hardened Containers:25 |
3.5.0-r0 up to 3.5.5-r1 | 3.5.5-r1 |
opensslBellSoft Hardened Containers:stream |
3.5.0-r0 up to 3.5.5-r1 | 3.5.5-r1 |
opensslDebian:13 |
before 3.5.5-1~deb13u2, plus listed versions 3.5.1-13.5.1-1+deb13u13.5.2-13.5.3-13.5.4-13.5.4-1~deb13u13.5.4-1~deb13u23.5.5-1~deb13u1 |
3.5.5-1~deb13u2 |
opensslDebian:14 |
before 3.6.2-1, plus listed versions 3.5.1-13.5.2-13.5.3-13.5.4-13.5.4-1~deb13u1 Show 16 moreShow less3.5.4-1~deb13u23.5.5-13.5.5-1~deb13u13.5.5-1~deb13u23.5.6-1~deb13u13.5.6-1~deb13u23.5.7-1~deb13u13.5.7-1~deb13u23.5.7-1~deb13u33.6.0-13.6.0-23.6.0~~alpha1-13.6.0~~beta1-13.6.1-13.6.1-23.6.1-3 |
3.6.2-1 |
AppBundlerJulia |
1.0.0 up to 1.0.1 | 1.0.1 |
OpenSSL_jllJulia |
3.5.0+0 up to 3.5.6+0 | 3.5.6+0 |
Openresty_jllJulia |
1.29.203+0 and later | None known |
openssl-debuginfoRed Hat:enterprise_linux:10.2 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 | 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 |
openssl-debugsourceRed Hat:enterprise_linux:10.2 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 | 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 |
openssl-develRed Hat:enterprise_linux:10.2 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 | 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 |
openssl-libs-debuginfoRed Hat:enterprise_linux:10.2 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 | 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 |
openssl-perlRed Hat:enterprise_linux:10.2 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 | 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 |
opensslRed Hat:enterprise_linux:10.2 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 | 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 |
openssl-libsRed Hat:enterprise_linux:10.2 From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 | 1:3.5.5-2.el10_2 |
openssl-debuginfoRed Hat:enterprise_linux:9::appstream From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
openssl-debugsourceRed Hat:enterprise_linux:9::appstream From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
openssl-develRed Hat:enterprise_linux:9::appstream From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
openssl-libs-debuginfoRed Hat:enterprise_linux:9::appstream From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
openssl-perlRed Hat:enterprise_linux:9::appstream From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
opensslRed Hat:enterprise_linux:9::baseos From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
openssl-debuginfoRed Hat:enterprise_linux:9::baseos From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
openssl-debugsourceRed Hat:enterprise_linux:9::baseos From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
openssl-libsRed Hat:enterprise_linux:9::baseos From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
openssl-libs-debuginfoRed Hat:enterprise_linux:9::baseos From an advisory covering 2 CVEs |
before 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 | 1:3.5.5-3.el9_8 |
opensslRed Hat:hummingbird:1 From an advisory covering 23 CVEs |
before 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 | 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 |
openssl-config-fipsRed Hat:hummingbird:1 From an advisory covering 23 CVEs |
before 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 | 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 |
openssl-develRed Hat:hummingbird:1 From an advisory covering 23 CVEs |
before 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 | 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 |
openssl-devel-engineRed Hat:hummingbird:1 From an advisory covering 23 CVEs |
before 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 | 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 |
openssl-libsRed Hat:hummingbird:1 From an advisory covering 23 CVEs |
before 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 | 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 |
openssl-perlRed Hat:hummingbird:1 From an advisory covering 23 CVEs |
before 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 | 0:3.5.6-0.1.hum1 |
openssl-3SUSE:Linux Micro 6.2 From an advisory covering 7 CVEs |
before 3.5.0-160000.7.1 | 3.5.0-160000.7.1 |
openssl-3SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server 16.0 From an advisory covering 7 CVEs |
before 3.5.0-160000.7.1 | 3.5.0-160000.7.1 |
openssl-3SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.0 From an advisory covering 7 CVEs |
before 3.5.0-160000.7.1 | 3.5.0-160000.7.1 |
openssl-3SUSE:Linux Micro 6.2 From an advisory covering 15 CVEs |
before 3.5.0-160000.8.1 | 3.5.0-160000.8.1 |
openssl-3SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server 16.0 From an advisory covering 15 CVEs |
before 3.5.0-160000.8.1 | 3.5.0-160000.8.1 |
openssl-3SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.0 From an advisory covering 15 CVEs |
before 3.5.0-160000.8.1 | 3.5.0-160000.8.1 |
nodejsUbuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 12.22.5~dfsg-5ubuntu112.22.7~dfsg-2ubuntu112.22.7~dfsg-2ubuntu312.22.9~dfsg-1ubuntu212.22.9~dfsg-1ubuntu3 Show 7 moreShow less12.22.9~dfsg-1ubuntu3.112.22.9~dfsg-1ubuntu3.212.22.9~dfsg-1ubuntu3.312.22.9~dfsg-1ubuntu3.412.22.9~dfsg-1ubuntu3.512.22.9~dfsg-1ubuntu3.612.22.9~dfsg-1ubuntu3.6+esm2 |
None known |
opensslUbuntu:25.10 |
before 3.5.3-1ubuntu3.3, plus listed versions 3.4.1-1ubuntu33.5.0-2ubuntu13.5.2-1ubuntu13.5.3-1ubuntu23.5.3-1ubuntu3 |
3.5.3-1ubuntu3.3 |
opensslUbuntu:26.10 |
before 3.5.5-1ubuntu3 | 3.5.5-1ubuntu3 |
opensslUbuntu:26.04:LTS |
before 3.5.5-1ubuntu3, plus listed versions 3.5.3-1ubuntu23.5.5-1ubuntu1 |
3.5.5-1ubuntu3 |
opensslUbuntu:22.04:LTS |
before 3.0.2-0ubuntu1.23, plus listed versions 1.1.1l-1ubuntu13.0.0-1ubuntu13.0.1-0ubuntu13.0.2-0ubuntu13.0.2-0ubuntu1.1 Show 18 moreShow less3.0.2-0ubuntu1.23.0.2-0ubuntu1.43.0.2-0ubuntu1.53.0.2-0ubuntu1.63.0.2-0ubuntu1.73.0.2-0ubuntu1.83.0.2-0ubuntu1.93.0.2-0ubuntu1.103.0.2-0ubuntu1.123.0.2-0ubuntu1.133.0.2-0ubuntu1.143.0.2-0ubuntu1.153.0.2-0ubuntu1.163.0.2-0ubuntu1.173.0.2-0ubuntu1.183.0.2-0ubuntu1.193.0.2-0ubuntu1.203.0.2-0ubuntu1.21 |
3.0.2-0ubuntu1.23 |
opensslUbuntu:24.04:LTS |
before 3.0.13-0ubuntu3.9, plus listed versions 3.0.10-1ubuntu23.0.10-1ubuntu2.13.0.10-1ubuntu33.0.10-1ubuntu43.0.13-0ubuntu2 Show 8 moreShow less3.0.13-0ubuntu33.0.13-0ubuntu3.13.0.13-0ubuntu3.23.0.13-0ubuntu3.33.0.13-0ubuntu3.43.0.13-0ubuntu3.53.0.13-0ubuntu3.63.0.13-0ubuntu3.7 |
3.0.13-0ubuntu3.9 |
openssl-3openSUSE:Tumbleweed From an advisory covering 7 CVEs |
before 3.5.3-4.1 | 3.5.3-4.1 |
openssl-3openSUSE:Leap 16.0 From an advisory covering 7 CVEs |
before 3.5.0-160000.7.1 | 3.5.0-160000.7.1 |
openssl-3openSUSE:Leap 16.0 From an advisory covering 15 CVEs |
before 3.5.0-160000.8.1 | 3.5.0-160000.8.1 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| affected, facts | ||
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-2673 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.5) in Openssl, published March 13, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.45%, the 39th percentile. Fixed in openssl 3.5.6-r0.
References
openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260313.txt
github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2157c9d81f7b0bd7dfa25b960e928ec28e8dd63f
openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/03/13/3
cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-032379.html
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2673
Show 168 moreShow less
security.alpinelinux.org/vuln/CVE-2026-2673
access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19066
bugzilla.redhat.com/2451094
errata.almalinux.org/10/ALSA-2026-19066.html
redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2026-2673.html
docs.bell-sw.com/security/cves/CVE-2026-2673
security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-2673
security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/advisories/2026/rhsa-2026_19066.json
cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-2673
images.redhat.com
suse.com/support/update/announcement/2026/suse-su-202621107-1
bugzilla.suse.com/1259652
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-2673