CVE-2026-27009

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, a atored XSS issue in the OpenClaw Control UI when rendering assistant identity (name/avatar) into an inline <script> tag without script-context-safe escaping. A crafted value containing </script> could break out of the script tag and execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Control UI origin. Version 2026.2.15 removed inline script injection and serve bootstrap config from a JSON endpoint and added a restrictive Content Security Policy for the Control UI (script-src 'self', no inline scripts).

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, a atored XSS issue in the OpenClaw Control UI when rendering assistant identity (name/avatar) into an inline <script> tag without script-context-safe escaping. A crafted value containing </script> could break out of the script tag and execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Control UI origin. Version 2026.2.15 removed inline script injection and serve bootstrap config from a JSON endpoint and added a restrictive Content Security Policy for the Control UI (script-src 'self', no inline scripts).

Summary

Stored XSS in the OpenClaw Control UI when rendering assistant identity (name/avatar) into an inline <script> tag without script-context-safe escaping. A crafted value containing </script> could break out of the script tag and execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Control UI origin.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Affected versions: <= 2026.2.14
• Fixed in: >= 2026.2.15 (next release; fix is already merged on main)

Details

The gateway Control UI HTML response previously injected assistantName and assistantAvatar directly into an inline <script> block using JSON.stringify(...). JSON.stringify does not prevent </script> from terminating the script element, enabling stored XSS if an operator/admin sets the assistant identity to a malicious string.

OpenClaw’s Control UI is intended for local use only (see SECURITY.md); this advisory’s CVSS reflects a loopback-only/local-access deployment assumption.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to set assistant identity values (config or agent identity) could cause JavaScript execution for Control UI visitors, enabling token/session theft and privileged actions in the UI.

Fix

• Removed inline script injection and serve bootstrap config from a JSON endpoint.
• Added a restrictive Content Security Policy for the Control UI (script-src 'self', no inline scripts).

Fix Commit(s)

• adc818db4a4b3b8d663e7674ef20436947514e1b
• 3b4096e02e7e335f99f5986ec1bd566e90b14a7e

Release Process Note

This advisory pre-sets the patched version to the planned next release (2026.2.15). Once that version is published to npm, this advisory can be published without further edits.

Thanks @Adam55A-code for reporting.

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, a atored XSS issue in the OpenClaw Control UI when rendering assistant identity (name/avatar) into an inline <script> tag without script-context-safe escaping. A crafted value containing </script> could break out of the script tag and execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Control UI origin. Version 2026.2.15 removed inline script injection and serve bootstrap config from a JSON endpoint and added a restrictive Content Security Policy for the Control UI (script-src 'self', no inline scripts).

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, a atored XSS issue in the OpenClaw Control UI when rendering assistant identity (name/avatar) into an inline <script> tag without script-context-safe escaping. A crafted value containing </script> could break out of the script tag and execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Control UI origin. Version 2026.2.15 removed inline script injection and serve bootstrap config from a JSON endpoint and added a restrictive Content Security Policy for the Control UI (script-src 'self', no inline scripts).

Summary

Stored XSS in the OpenClaw Control UI when rendering assistant identity (name/avatar) into an inline <script> tag without script-context-safe escaping. A crafted value containing </script> could break out of the script tag and execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Control UI origin.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Affected versions: <= 2026.2.14
• Fixed in: >= 2026.2.15 (next release; fix is already merged on main)

Details

The gateway Control UI HTML response previously injected assistantName and assistantAvatar directly into an inline <script> block using JSON.stringify(...). JSON.stringify does not prevent </script> from terminating the script element, enabling stored XSS if an operator/admin sets the assistant identity to a malicious string.

OpenClaw’s Control UI is intended for local use only (see SECURITY.md); this advisory’s CVSS reflects a loopback-only/local-access deployment assumption.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to set assistant identity values (config or agent identity) could cause JavaScript execution for Control UI visitors, enabling token/session theft and privileged actions in the UI.

Fix

• Removed inline script injection and serve bootstrap config from a JSON endpoint.
• Added a restrictive Content Security Policy for the Control UI (script-src 'self', no inline scripts).

Fix Commit(s)

• adc818db4a4b3b8d663e7674ef20436947514e1b
• 3b4096e02e7e335f99f5986ec1bd566e90b14a7e

Release Process Note

This advisory pre-sets the patched version to the planned next release (2026.2.15). Once that version is published to npm, this advisory can be published without further edits.

Thanks @Adam55A-code for reporting.