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CVE-2026-27695

zae-limiter: DynamoDB hot partition throttling enables per-entity Denial of Service

4.3 MediumFix available

zae-limiter is a rate limiting library using the token bucket algorithm. Prior to version 0.10.1, all rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition. Version 0.10.1 fixes the issue.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

Exploit likelihood

0.27%Up 0.2 points since Feb 26, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used4.3

zae-limiter: DynamoDB hot partition throttling enables per-entity Denial of Service

zae-limiter is a rate limiting library using the token bucket algorithm. Prior to version 0.10.1, all rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition. Version 0.10.1 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-27695
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weakness
CWE-770
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-86424.3

zae-limiter is a rate limiting library using the token bucket algorithm. Prior to version 0.10.1, all rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition. Version 0.10.1 fixes the issue.

Record
EUVD-2026-8642
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-76rv-2r9v-c5m64.3

zae-limiter: DynamoDB hot partition throttling enables per-entity Denial of Service

Summary

All rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition.

Details

Each acquire() call performs a TransactWriteItems (or UpdateItem in speculative mode) against items sharing the same partition key. For cascade entities, this doubles to 2-4 writes per request (child + parent). At sustained rates above ~500 req/sec for a single entity, DynamoDB's adaptive capacity may not redistribute fast enough, causing ProvisionedThroughputExceededException.

The library has no built-in mitigation:

  • No partition key sharding/salting
  • No write coalescing or batching
  • No client-side admission control before hitting DynamoDB
  • RateLimiterUnavailable is raised but the caller has already been delayed

Impact

  • Availability: High-traffic entities experience elevated latency and rejected requests beyond what their rate limits specify
  • Fairness: Other entities sharing the same DynamoDB partition may experience collateral throttling
  • Multi-tenant risk: In a shared LLM proxy scenario, one tenant's burst traffic could degrade service for others

Reproduction

  1. Create an entity with high rate limits (e.g., 100,000 rpm)
  2. Send sustained traffic at 1,000+ req/sec to a single entity
  3. Observe DynamoDB ThrottledRequests CloudWatch metric increasing
  4. Observe acquire() latency spikes and RateLimiterUnavailable exceptions

Remediation Design: Pre-Shard Buckets

  • Move buckets to PK={ns}/BUCKET#{entity}#{resource}#{shard}, SK=#STATE — one partition per (entity, resource, shard)
  • Auto-inject wcu:1000 reserved limit on every bucket — tracks DynamoDB partition write pressure in-band (name may change during implementation)
  • Shard doubling (1→2→4→8) triggered by client on wcu exhaustion or proactively by aggregator
  • Shard 0 at suffix #0 is source of truth for shard_count. Aggregator propagates to other shards
  • Original limits stored on bucket, effective limits derived: original / shard_count. Infrastructure limits (wcu) not divided
  • Shard selection: random/round-robin. On application limit exhaustion, retry on another shard (max 2 retries)
  • Lazy shard creation on first access
  • Bucket discovery via GSI3 (KEYS_ONLY) + BatchGetItem. GSI2 for resource aggregation unchanged
  • Cascade: parent unaware, protected by own wcu
  • Aggregator: parse new PK format, key by shard_id, effective limits for refill, filter wcu from snapshots
  • Clean break migration: schema version bump, old buckets ignored, new buckets created on first access
  • $0.625/M preserved on hot path
Record
GHSA-76rv-2r9v-c5m6
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weakness
CWE-770
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD4.3

zae-limiter is a rate limiting library using the token bucket algorithm. Prior to version 0.10.1, all rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition. Version 0.10.1 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-27695
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
CVSS 3.1
5.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weakness
CWE-770
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV4.3

zae-limiter: DynamoDB hot partition throttling enables per-entity Denial of Service

zae-limiter is a rate limiting library using the token bucket algorithm. Prior to version 0.10.1, all rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition. Version 0.10.1 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-27695
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weakness
CWE-770
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-76rv-2r9v-c5m64.3

zae-limiter: DynamoDB hot partition throttling enables per-entity Denial of Service

Summary

All rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition.

Details

Each acquire() call performs a TransactWriteItems (or UpdateItem in speculative mode) against items sharing the same partition key. For cascade entities, this doubles to 2-4 writes per request (child + parent). At sustained rates above ~500 req/sec for a single entity, DynamoDB's adaptive capacity may not redistribute fast enough, causing ProvisionedThroughputExceededException.

The library has no built-in mitigation:

  • No partition key sharding/salting
  • No write coalescing or batching
  • No client-side admission control before hitting DynamoDB
  • RateLimiterUnavailable is raised but the caller has already been delayed

Impact

  • Availability: High-traffic entities experience elevated latency and rejected requests beyond what their rate limits specify
  • Fairness: Other entities sharing the same DynamoDB partition may experience collateral throttling
  • Multi-tenant risk: In a shared LLM proxy scenario, one tenant's burst traffic could degrade service for others

Reproduction

  1. Create an entity with high rate limits (e.g., 100,000 rpm)
  2. Send sustained traffic at 1,000+ req/sec to a single entity
  3. Observe DynamoDB ThrottledRequests CloudWatch metric increasing
  4. Observe acquire() latency spikes and RateLimiterUnavailable exceptions

Remediation Design: Pre-Shard Buckets

  • Move buckets to PK={ns}/BUCKET#{entity}#{resource}#{shard}, SK=#STATE — one partition per (entity, resource, shard)
  • Auto-inject wcu:1000 reserved limit on every bucket — tracks DynamoDB partition write pressure in-band (name may change during implementation)
  • Shard doubling (1→2→4→8) triggered by client on wcu exhaustion or proactively by aggregator
  • Shard 0 at suffix #0 is source of truth for shard_count. Aggregator propagates to other shards
  • Original limits stored on bucket, effective limits derived: original / shard_count. Infrastructure limits (wcu) not divided
  • Shard selection: random/round-robin. On application limit exhaustion, retry on another shard (max 2 retries)
  • Lazy shard creation on first access
  • Bucket discovery via GSI3 (KEYS_ONLY) + BatchGetItem. GSI2 for resource aggregation unchanged
  • Cascade: parent unaware, protected by own wcu
  • Aggregator: parse new PK format, key by shard_id, effective limits for refill, filter wcu from snapshots
  • Clean break migration: schema version bump, old buckets ignored, new buckets created on first access
  • $0.625/M preserved on hot path
Record
GHSA-76rv-2r9v-c5m6
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weakness
CWE-770
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVPYSEC-2026-34344.3

zae-limiter: DynamoDB hot partition throttling enables per-entity Denial of Service

Summary

All rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition.

Details

Each acquire() call performs a TransactWriteItems (or UpdateItem in speculative mode) against items sharing the same partition key. For cascade entities, this doubles to 2-4 writes per request (child + parent). At sustained rates above ~500 req/sec for a single entity, DynamoDB's adaptive capacity may not redistribute fast enough, causing ProvisionedThroughputExceededException.

The library has no built-in mitigation:

  • No partition key sharding/salting
  • No write coalescing or batching
  • No client-side admission control before hitting DynamoDB
  • RateLimiterUnavailable is raised but the caller has already been delayed

Impact

  • Availability: High-traffic entities experience elevated latency and rejected requests beyond what their rate limits specify
  • Fairness: Other entities sharing the same DynamoDB partition may experience collateral throttling
  • Multi-tenant risk: In a shared LLM proxy scenario, one tenant's burst traffic could degrade service for others

Reproduction

  1. Create an entity with high rate limits (e.g., 100,000 rpm)
  2. Send sustained traffic at 1,000+ req/sec to a single entity
  3. Observe DynamoDB ThrottledRequests CloudWatch metric increasing
  4. Observe acquire() latency spikes and RateLimiterUnavailable exceptions

Remediation Design: Pre-Shard Buckets

  • Move buckets to PK={ns}/BUCKET#{entity}#{resource}#{shard}, SK=#STATE — one partition per (entity, resource, shard)
  • Auto-inject wcu:1000 reserved limit on every bucket — tracks DynamoDB partition write pressure in-band (name may change during implementation)
  • Shard doubling (1→2→4→8) triggered by client on wcu exhaustion or proactively by aggregator
  • Shard 0 at suffix #0 is source of truth for shard_count. Aggregator propagates to other shards
  • Original limits stored on bucket, effective limits derived: original / shard_count. Infrastructure limits (wcu) not divided
  • Shard selection: random/round-robin. On application limit exhaustion, retry on another shard (max 2 retries)
  • Lazy shard creation on first access
  • Bucket discovery via GSI3 (KEYS_ONLY) + BatchGetItem. GSI2 for resource aggregation unchanged
  • Cascade: parent unaware, protected by own wcu
  • Aggregator: parse new PK format, key by shard_id, effective limits for refill, filter wcu from snapshots
  • Clean break migration: schema version bump, old buckets ignored, new buckets created on first access
  • $0.625/M preserved on hot path
Record
PYSEC-2026-3434
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
zae-limiter
PyPI
through 0.10.0
0.10.1
zae-limiter
PyPI
before 0.10.1, plus listed versions
0.1.00.10.00.2.00.3.00.4.0
Show 9 moreShow less
0.4.10.5.00.6.00.6.10.7.00.8.00.8.10.9.00.9.1
0.10.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-27695 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 4.3) in Zeroae Zae-limiter, published February 25, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.27%, the 18th percentile. Fixed in zae-limiter 0.10.1.

References

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