CVE-2026-27892

FacturaScripts is an open source accounting and invoicing software. In versions prior to 2026, the Library module stores and serves uploaded images byte-for-byte, without stripping EXIF/XMP/IPTC metadata. Any authenticated user who downloaded an image could extract the uploader's embedded metadata, which included GPS coordinates, device information, timestamps, embedded comments/notes, thumbnail previews, and other personally identifiable information (PII) preserved in the image metadata. Of all FacturaScripts' image upload features, only the Library module combined unrestricted uploads, persistent storage, authenticated download access, and a total lack of server-side metadata sanitization. This vulnerability carries significant real-world impact: an employee uploading a photo taken at their home inadvertently discloses their precise home address to every user with Library download access. This issue has been fixed in version 2026.

FacturaScripts is an open source accounting and invoicing software. In versions prior to 2026, the Library module stores and serves uploaded images byte-for-byte, without stripping EXIF/XMP/IPTC metadata. Any authenticated user who downloaded an image could extract the uploader's embedded metadata, which included GPS coordinates, device information, timestamps, embedded comments/notes, thumbnail previews, and other personally identifiable information (PII) preserved in the image metadata. Of all FacturaScripts' image upload features, only the Library module combined unrestricted uploads, persistent storage, authenticated download access, and a total lack of server-side metadata sanitization. This vulnerability carries significant real-world impact: an employee uploading a photo taken at their home inadvertently discloses their precise home address to every user with Library download access. This issue has been fixed in version 2026.

Summary

Fectura Scripts is an open-source ERP application, a sensitive information disclosure vulnerability was identified in the Library module's image upload and download pipeline. The application fails to strip EXIF and other embedded metadata from user-uploaded image files before storing them and serving them for download. As a result, any authenticated user who downloads an image from the Library can extract the original uploader's GPS coordinates, device information, timestamps, embedded comments/notes, thumbnail previews, and other personally identifiable information (PII) preserved in the image metadata.

This vulnerability carries significant real-world impact: an employee uploading a photo taken at their home inadvertently discloses their precise home address to every user with Library download access.

Affected Functionality Overview

Fectura Scripts exposes image upload capabilities across several modules (e.g., email composition, profile settings, etc.). During testing, the Library section was identified as the only module that provides:

• Full image upload (unrestricted image types observed)
• Persistent storage of uploaded files
• Direct download capability for any authenticated user with access
• No server-side metadata sanitization at any point in the pipeline (upload, storage, or delivery)

Other modules (e.g., email attachments) were also tested but either did not render images or had limited upload/download exposure.

Technical Background

What Is EXIF/Image Metadata?

Most modern image formats (JPEG, TIFF, PNG with ancillary chunks, HEIC, WebP with XMP) embed metadata automatically at creation time. This metadata can include:

| Metadata Category | Example Fields | Privacy Risk | |---|---|---| | GPS / Geolocation | GPSLatitude, GPSLongitude, GPSAltitude, GPSTimestamp | Critical — reveals exact physical location | | Device Information | Make, Model, Software, LensModel | Medium — device fingerprinting | | Timestamps | DateTimeOriginal, CreateDate, ModifyDate | Medium — behavioral profiling | | User Comments | UserComment, ImageDescription, XPComment, XPAuthor | High — may contain names, notes, PII | | Thumbnails | ThumbnailImage (embedded JPEG preview) | High — may preserve original uncropped image | | Serial Numbers | BodySerialNumber, LensSerialNumber, InternalSerialNumber | Medium — unique device tracking | | Network/Software | HostComputer, Software, ProcessingSoftware | Low–Medium — infrastructure disclosure | | XMP / IPTC | Creator, Rights, Description, Keywords | Medium — organizational/authorship leakage |

Why This Matters in an ERP Context

ERP platforms are used by businesses with multiple employees, contractors, clients, and sometimes external partners accessing shared resources. The Library module is inherently a collaborative, shared-access feature. Any image uploaded by one party is downloadable by many others — creating a one-to-many PII exposure vector.

Step-by-Step Reproduction

Prerequisites

• A valid user account with access to the Library module (tested with Admin role; lower-privilege roles should also be tested)
• A test image file containing rich EXIF/metadata (see Step 1)
• An EXIF analysis tool: exiftool (CLI), or any online EXIF viewer

Step 1: Prepare a Metadata-Rich Test Image

Create or obtain a JPEG image with embedded GPS and descriptive metadata. You can inject test metadata using exiftool:

exiftool \
  -GPSLatitude="48.8566" \
  -GPSLatitudeRef="N" \
  -GPSLongitude="2.3522" \
  -GPSLongitudeRef="E" \
  -GPSAltitude="35" \
  -UserComment="Confidential: Taken at employee home address" \
  -XPAuthor="John Doe" \
  -Make="Apple" \
  -Model="iPhone 15 Pro Max" \
  -DateTimeOriginal="2025:01:15 09:30:00" \
  test_image.jpg

Verify metadata is present:

exiftool test_image.jpg

…

FacturaScripts is an open source accounting and invoicing software. In versions prior to 2026, the Library module stores and serves uploaded images byte-for-byte, without stripping EXIF/XMP/IPTC metadata. Any authenticated user who downloaded an image could extract the uploader's embedded metadata, which included GPS coordinates, device information, timestamps, embedded comments/notes, thumbnail previews, and other personally identifiable information (PII) preserved in the image metadata. Of all FacturaScripts' image upload features, only the Library module combined unrestricted uploads, persistent storage, authenticated download access, and a total lack of server-side metadata sanitization. This vulnerability carries significant real-world impact: an employee uploading a photo taken at their home inadvertently discloses their precise home address to every user with Library download access. This issue has been fixed in version 2026.

FacturaScripts is an open source accounting and invoicing software. In versions prior to 2026, the Library module stores and serves uploaded images byte-for-byte, without stripping EXIF/XMP/IPTC metadata. Any authenticated user who downloaded an image could extract the uploader's embedded metadata, which included GPS coordinates, device information, timestamps, embedded comments/notes, thumbnail previews, and other personally identifiable information (PII) preserved in the image metadata. Of all FacturaScripts' image upload features, only the Library module combined unrestricted uploads, persistent storage, authenticated download access, and a total lack of server-side metadata sanitization. This vulnerability carries significant real-world impact: an employee uploading a photo taken at their home inadvertently discloses their precise home address to every user with Library download access. This issue has been fixed in version 2026.

Summary

Fectura Scripts is an open-source ERP application, a sensitive information disclosure vulnerability was identified in the Library module's image upload and download pipeline. The application fails to strip EXIF and other embedded metadata from user-uploaded image files before storing them and serving them for download. As a result, any authenticated user who downloads an image from the Library can extract the original uploader's GPS coordinates, device information, timestamps, embedded comments/notes, thumbnail previews, and other personally identifiable information (PII) preserved in the image metadata.

This vulnerability carries significant real-world impact: an employee uploading a photo taken at their home inadvertently discloses their precise home address to every user with Library download access.

Affected Functionality Overview

Fectura Scripts exposes image upload capabilities across several modules (e.g., email composition, profile settings, etc.). During testing, the Library section was identified as the only module that provides:

• Full image upload (unrestricted image types observed)
• Persistent storage of uploaded files
• Direct download capability for any authenticated user with access
• No server-side metadata sanitization at any point in the pipeline (upload, storage, or delivery)

Other modules (e.g., email attachments) were also tested but either did not render images or had limited upload/download exposure.

Technical Background

What Is EXIF/Image Metadata?

Most modern image formats (JPEG, TIFF, PNG with ancillary chunks, HEIC, WebP with XMP) embed metadata automatically at creation time. This metadata can include:

| Metadata Category | Example Fields | Privacy Risk | |---|---|---| | GPS / Geolocation | GPSLatitude, GPSLongitude, GPSAltitude, GPSTimestamp | Critical — reveals exact physical location | | Device Information | Make, Model, Software, LensModel | Medium — device fingerprinting | | Timestamps | DateTimeOriginal, CreateDate, ModifyDate | Medium — behavioral profiling | | User Comments | UserComment, ImageDescription, XPComment, XPAuthor | High — may contain names, notes, PII | | Thumbnails | ThumbnailImage (embedded JPEG preview) | High — may preserve original uncropped image | | Serial Numbers | BodySerialNumber, LensSerialNumber, InternalSerialNumber | Medium — unique device tracking | | Network/Software | HostComputer, Software, ProcessingSoftware | Low–Medium — infrastructure disclosure | | XMP / IPTC | Creator, Rights, Description, Keywords | Medium — organizational/authorship leakage |

Why This Matters in an ERP Context

ERP platforms are used by businesses with multiple employees, contractors, clients, and sometimes external partners accessing shared resources. The Library module is inherently a collaborative, shared-access feature. Any image uploaded by one party is downloadable by many others — creating a one-to-many PII exposure vector.

Step-by-Step Reproduction

Prerequisites

• A valid user account with access to the Library module (tested with Admin role; lower-privilege roles should also be tested)
• A test image file containing rich EXIF/metadata (see Step 1)
• An EXIF analysis tool: exiftool (CLI), or any online EXIF viewer

Step 1: Prepare a Metadata-Rich Test Image

Create or obtain a JPEG image with embedded GPS and descriptive metadata. You can inject test metadata using exiftool:

exiftool \
  -GPSLatitude="48.8566" \
  -GPSLatitudeRef="N" \
  -GPSLongitude="2.3522" \
  -GPSLongitudeRef="E" \
  -GPSAltitude="35" \
  -UserComment="Confidential: Taken at employee home address" \
  -XPAuthor="John Doe" \
  -Make="Apple" \
  -Model="iPhone 15 Pro Max" \
  -DateTimeOriginal="2025:01:15 09:30:00" \
  test_image.jpg

Verify metadata is present:

exiftool test_image.jpg

…