CVE-2026-28446

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.

Summary

An authentication bypass in the optional voice-call extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to allowlist or pairing.

Deployments that do not install/enable the voice-call extension are not affected.

Affected Packages / Versions

• openclaw (npm): <= 2026.2.1
• Fixed in: >= 2026.2.2

Details

In affected versions (for example 2026.2.1), the inbound allowlist check in extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.

This allowed two bypasses:

1. Missing/empty from values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.
2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.

Proof Of Concept

1. Configure the voice-call extension with inboundPolicy: allowlist and allowFrom: ["+15550001234"].
2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.
3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with 15550001234 (for example +99915550001234). The call is accepted.

Impact

Only operators who install/enable the optional voice-call extension and use inboundPolicy=allowlist or pairing could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.

Fix

The fix hardens inbound policy handling:

• Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.
• Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).
• Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.

Fix commit(s):

• f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb

Thanks @simecek for reporting.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.

Summary

An authentication bypass in the optional voice-call extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to allowlist or pairing.

Deployments that do not install/enable the voice-call extension are not affected.

Affected Packages / Versions

• openclaw (npm): <= 2026.2.1
• Fixed in: >= 2026.2.2

Details

In affected versions (for example 2026.2.1), the inbound allowlist check in extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.

This allowed two bypasses:

1. Missing/empty from values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.
2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.

Proof Of Concept

1. Configure the voice-call extension with inboundPolicy: allowlist and allowFrom: ["+15550001234"].
2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.
3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with 15550001234 (for example +99915550001234). The call is accepted.

Impact

Only operators who install/enable the optional voice-call extension and use inboundPolicy=allowlist or pairing could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.

Fix

The fix hardens inbound policy handling:

• Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.
• Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).
• Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.

Fix commit(s):

• f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb

Thanks @simecek for reporting.