CVE-2026-28466

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a vulnerability in the gateway in which it fails to sanitize internal approval fields in node.invoke parameters, allowing authenticated clients to bypass exec approval gating for system.run commands. Attackers with valid gateway credentials can inject approval control fields to execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts, potentially compromising developer workstations and CI runners.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a vulnerability in the gateway in which it fails to sanitize internal approval fields in node.invoke parameters, allowing authenticated clients to bypass exec approval gating for system.run commands. Attackers with valid gateway credentials can inject approval control fields to execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts, potentially compromising developer workstations and CI runners.

Summary

A remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the gateway-to-node invocation path allowed an authenticated gateway client to bypass node-host exec approvals by injecting internal control fields into node.invoke parameters.

Affected Component

• Gateway method: node.invoke for node command system.run
• Node host runner: exec approval gating for system.run

Impact

If an attacker can authenticate to a gateway (for example via a leaked/shared gateway token or a paired device token with operator.write), they could execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts that support system.run. This can lead to full compromise of developer workstations, CI runners, and servers running the node host.

Technical Details

The gateway forwarded user-controlled params to node hosts without sanitizing internal approval fields. The node host treated params.approved === true and/or params.approvalDecision as sufficient to skip the approval workflow.

Fix

Patched in OpenClaw 2026.2.14.

• Commits:
  • 318379cdb8d045da0009b0051bd0e712e5c65e2d
  • a7af646fdab124a7536998db6bd6ad567d2b06b0
  • c1594627421f95b6bc4ad7c606657dc75b5ad0ce
  • 0af76f5f0e93540efbdf054895216c398692afcd
• Gateway strips untrusted approval control fields from system.run user input.
• Gateway only re-attaches approval flags when params.runId references a valid exec.approval.request record and the request context matches. Approval IDs are bound to the requesting device identity (stable across reconnects), preventing replay by other clients.
• Gateway forwards only an allowlisted set of system.run parameters, preventing future control-field smuggling.

Mitigations

• Upgrade to 2026.2.14 or later.
• Restrict access to the gateway (do not expose it to untrusted networks/users).
• Rotate gateway credentials if you suspect token/password exposure.
• Disable remote command execution on nodes by blocking system.run at the gateway (gateway.nodes.denyCommands) and/or by configuring node exec security to deny.

Credits

OpenClaw thanks @222n5 for reporting this issue.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a vulnerability in the gateway in which it fails to sanitize internal approval fields in node.invoke parameters, allowing authenticated clients to bypass exec approval gating for system.run commands. Attackers with valid gateway credentials can inject approval control fields to execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts, potentially compromising developer workstations and CI runners.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a vulnerability in the gateway in which it fails to sanitize internal approval fields in node.invoke parameters, allowing authenticated clients to bypass exec approval gating for system.run commands. Attackers with valid gateway credentials can inject approval control fields to execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts, potentially compromising developer workstations and CI runners.

Summary

A remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the gateway-to-node invocation path allowed an authenticated gateway client to bypass node-host exec approvals by injecting internal control fields into node.invoke parameters.

Affected Component

• Gateway method: node.invoke for node command system.run
• Node host runner: exec approval gating for system.run

Impact

If an attacker can authenticate to a gateway (for example via a leaked/shared gateway token or a paired device token with operator.write), they could execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts that support system.run. This can lead to full compromise of developer workstations, CI runners, and servers running the node host.

Technical Details

The gateway forwarded user-controlled params to node hosts without sanitizing internal approval fields. The node host treated params.approved === true and/or params.approvalDecision as sufficient to skip the approval workflow.

Fix

Patched in OpenClaw 2026.2.14.

• Commits:
  • 318379cdb8d045da0009b0051bd0e712e5c65e2d
  • a7af646fdab124a7536998db6bd6ad567d2b06b0
  • c1594627421f95b6bc4ad7c606657dc75b5ad0ce
  • 0af76f5f0e93540efbdf054895216c398692afcd
• Gateway strips untrusted approval control fields from system.run user input.
• Gateway only re-attaches approval flags when params.runId references a valid exec.approval.request record and the request context matches. Approval IDs are bound to the requesting device identity (stable across reconnects), preventing replay by other clients.
• Gateway forwards only an allowlisted set of system.run parameters, preventing future control-field smuggling.

Mitigations

• Upgrade to 2026.2.14 or later.
• Restrict access to the gateway (do not expose it to untrusted networks/users).
• Rotate gateway credentials if you suspect token/password exposure.
• Disable remote command execution on nodes by blocking system.run at the gateway (gateway.nodes.denyCommands) and/or by configuring node exec security to deny.

Credits

OpenClaw thanks @222n5 for reporting this issue.