CVE-2026-28473

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability where clients with operator.write scope can approve or deny exec approval requests by sending the /approve chat command. The /approve command path invokes exec.approval.resolve through an internal privileged gateway client, bypassing the operator.approvals permission check that protects direct RPC calls.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability where clients with operator.write scope can approve or deny exec approval requests by sending the /approve chat command. The /approve command path invokes exec.approval.resolve through an internal privileged gateway client, bypassing the operator.approvals permission check that protects direct RPC calls.

Summary

What this means (plain language)

If you give a client “chat/write” access to the gateway (operator.write) but you do not intend to let that client approve exec requests (operator.approvals), affected versions could still let that client approve/deny a pending exec approval by sending the /approve chat command.

This is mainly relevant for shared or multi-client setups where different tokens are intentionally scoped differently. Single-operator installs are typically less impacted.

Technical summary

A gateway client authenticated with a device token scoped only to operator.write (without operator.approvals) could approve/deny pending exec approval requests by sending a chat message containing the built-in /approve command.

exec.approval.resolve is correctly scoped to operator.approvals for direct RPC calls, but the /approve command path invoked it via an internal privileged gateway client.

Affected Packages / Versions

• openclaw (npm): < 2026.2.2

Fix

• Fixed in openclaw 2026.2.2.
• Fix commit(s): efe2a464afcff55bb5a95b959e6bd9ec0fef086e.
• Change: when /approve is invoked from gateway clients (webchat/internal channel), it now requires the requesting client to have operator.approvals (or operator.admin).

Workarounds

• Upgrade to openclaw >= 2026.2.2.
• If you cannot upgrade: avoid issuing write-only device tokens to untrusted clients; disable text commands (commands.text=false) or restrict access to the webchat/control UI.

References

• Fix: src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.ts
• Coverage: src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.test.ts

Release Process Note

This advisory is kept in draft; once the fixed npm versions are available, it can be published without further edits.

Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability where clients with operator.write scope can approve or deny exec approval requests by sending the /approve chat command. The /approve command path invokes exec.approval.resolve through an internal privileged gateway client, bypassing the operator.approvals permission check that protects direct RPC calls.

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability where clients with operator.write scope can approve or deny exec approval requests by sending the /approve chat command. The /approve command path invokes exec.approval.resolve through an internal privileged gateway client, bypassing the operator.approvals permission check that protects direct RPC calls.

Summary

What this means (plain language)

If you give a client “chat/write” access to the gateway (operator.write) but you do not intend to let that client approve exec requests (operator.approvals), affected versions could still let that client approve/deny a pending exec approval by sending the /approve chat command.

This is mainly relevant for shared or multi-client setups where different tokens are intentionally scoped differently. Single-operator installs are typically less impacted.

Technical summary

A gateway client authenticated with a device token scoped only to operator.write (without operator.approvals) could approve/deny pending exec approval requests by sending a chat message containing the built-in /approve command.

exec.approval.resolve is correctly scoped to operator.approvals for direct RPC calls, but the /approve command path invoked it via an internal privileged gateway client.

Affected Packages / Versions

• openclaw (npm): < 2026.2.2

Fix

• Fixed in openclaw 2026.2.2.
• Fix commit(s): efe2a464afcff55bb5a95b959e6bd9ec0fef086e.
• Change: when /approve is invoked from gateway clients (webchat/internal channel), it now requires the requesting client to have operator.approvals (or operator.admin).

Workarounds

• Upgrade to openclaw >= 2026.2.2.
• If you cannot upgrade: avoid issuing write-only device tokens to untrusted clients; disable text commands (commands.text=false) or restrict access to the webchat/control UI.

References

• Fix: src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.ts
• Coverage: src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.test.ts

Release Process Note

This advisory is kept in draft; once the fixed npm versions are available, it can be published without further edits.

Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.